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EDITORS' PREFACE

It is appropriate that the University of Nebraska should publish,
as a grateful memorial, the principal work which Professor Frye left
behind him at his death in 1934. And it is especially appropriate because
not only the work itself but the very spirit which animated it was
engendered here on the spot, in the sparse leisure of his nearly forty
years of teaching. For when he came, in the middle nineties, he had
a bent toward science and mathematics; and it was here, paradoxically
through friendship with a man of science, Louis Trenchard More, that
he turned his face to the Greeks. Through this friendship he later
came to know Mr. More's brother, Paul Elmer More, and Irving Babbitt,
with whose names his own is associated by the tie of their common
humanism.
Meantime, in his early days here, he published a volume of verse,
The Substance of His House, and then, like Cousin's young men
of Paris, settled down in a garret to starve and read Plato. His pen
was soon busy, however, giving expression, through literary criticism,
to the double strain in him of poet and rationalist. It was this double
strain, probably, that enabled him, drawing upon both, to give such
depth and clarity and precision to the distinction between the classic
and the romantic spirits in literature and life-a distinction which
served him as his critical point d'appui. Most of his shorter criticisms
appeared first in the Independent, the Bookman, and the Nation; the longer
ones in UniverJity of Nebraska Studies and the University's Mid-West
Quarterly, which latter he founded, and edited almost single-handed
for over four years. Selections from among these publications, together
with numerous fresh studies, he issued from time to 'time in book form:
Literary Reviews and Criticisms in 1908, Romance and Tragedy in
1922, and Visions and Chimeras in 1928.
That a humanist should write about Plato needs scarcely more explanation than that a man of science should write about natural phenomena.
The text of the present volume, however, does need a prefatory remark.
To say that the several essays, or chapters, which make it up were not
composed for publication is too sweeping, for the one on "Plato's Political
Ideas" appeared entire in the Mid-West Quarterly in 1914, and one section
of "The Dialogues" appeared in 1928 in ia congratulatory volume to Charles
Francis Johnson of Trinity. Both these passages, therefore, had the final
care which the imminent prospect of print induces in any author. But
these passages make up less than a third of the whole; the rest was left
in still fluid manuscript. Not, indeed, that it was left unrevised. The
V
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half-sheets, originally crossed with the crotchets of an almost microscopic
handwriting, were recrossed, interlined, and supplemented on scraps pinned
to the margin-sometimes in the interest of a finer clarity, a subtler nuance,
or a denser coherence, sometimes of a juster cadence in the rhythm of the
sentence. It is but just to Professor Frye's memory, however, to record
that the larger part of the text never underwent his final and telling
scrutiny.
How telling that scrutiny could be, anyone with a mind exigent of
precision and an ear attuned to the rhythms of prose may discover by
turning to Romance and Tragedy and reading the "Racine," or the
"Shakespeare and Sophocles," or to Visions and Chimeras and reading the
"Pascal" or the "Montaigne." But much of the distinctive flavor of the
man is here-the elegiac note that seems inseparable from the richer cadences
of the English sentence, the sub-humor of a new turn given to an old
idiom, and above all the intimate sense as of a mind thinking, and moving
forward, phrase by phrase, in an ardent intensity of concern for the high
significance of the theme. That these essays were a labor of love is made
clear in the text and is apparent in the span of years covered by their
composition. That the rendering of the text has been a labor of love rather
than of erudition is the apology of the editors.
S. B. G.

K. F.
C.A.F.
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I
INTRODUCTION
As a contribution to Platonic scholarship the following essays will
turn out, I am afraid, to be thoroughly insignificant. If so I am sorry
for it; I owe so much to Plato that I should like to make some sort of
adequate acknowledgment. But unfortunately I am neither profound nor
erudite; while the difficulty of my position is increased by the fact that
I am by no means sure of being so good a Platonist as I could wish to be,
particularly when I ponder the opinions of many who have no doubt of
their own competence. By early reading I was confirmed a realist if not
a materialist, a creature whom, for that matter, I continue to hold in greater
esteem than an idealist, so stubborn are my youthful prejudices. I grew up
with Spencer, Darwin, and Huxley, Bain, Maudsley, and Clifford in my
hands-and what expositors they were !-and I still feel more at home in
their lowly dwellings than on the dizzy pinnacles of the metaphysicians,
whom I have frequented of later years. It was all so plain and solid and
settled in those happy days when matter and energy were capable of anything, when consciousness was only a nervous tremor, and thought a mode
of motion. Has such a fare come to seem a little juiceless and innutritious?
And yet in comparison with the spidery fabrics of the transcendentalists,
how rich and varied the picture, how detailed and copious the panorama,
in which all the myriad forms of nature took their places, as evolution
unrolled its transformations one after another from "an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity" ( if I may borrow the terminology of the Spencerian
u:n:Et(.)OV) to that triumph of differentiation and! integration, the body and
brain of man! What a semblance of order and gradation with every
variation catalogued and etiquetted !
And yet in a system which engaged to dispose of everything, and did
in fact dispose of so much, there was one fatal omission. It took care of
man and his appetites, but for his aspirations it made little or no provision-for to a sympathetic tie or bond of union with the powers and
agencies about him it was quite indifferent. With his moral scruples it
left him alien and estranged, a horrified spectator, in the midst of creation - so that even for Huxley his highest activities would seem to
be exercised in defiance of the nature which conceived him. In this respect
the advantage lies with spiritualism. But how insubstantial the foundation, how flimsy the superstructure-a bare framework or shell of generality and abstraction! I acknowledge the "naivete", the credulousness
required to accept the validity of the outer world on the evidence of the
senses; but practically we do so accept it, and having once done so are
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bound to recognize its multiformity and discreteness. For as a mere shadow
of mind, a specter of reality, there is about it a disconcerting obduracy,
a maddening refractoriness ( &.vd.yxri) which the architects of idealism
have never yet succeeded in reckoning with.
Now, I do not suppose that Plato himself has done anything like justice
to generation; such was not his original purpose. And yet it is indubitable
that he insists upon certain facts and distinctions that those other philosophers have ignored or slighted. In particular, for all their differences,
both idealist and materialist (I use the terms roughly for the two orders
of rationalism) unite in packing all creation aboard one boat, like Pyrrho
and his pig-man and beast, stock and stone, the sentient and the insentient promiscuously under a single set of articles or bill of lading.
In this confusion, incident to every system of monism, idealism is by all
odds the worse offender, since materialism does concede, at least tacitly,
a sort of practical efficiency to mind, whereas idealism tends but to attenuate and impoverish actuality the more typical and absolute it becomes.
For this reason, if Plato were living to-day, I am convinced that he would
take the greater interest in science.1 Such an opinion is contrary, I know,
to the general belief which persists in affiliating Platonism with the transcendental metaphysics. But then I am neither an idealist nor a metaphysician; and if one or both of these characters are indeed essential to
the Platonist, then I can hardly claim the privilege of a disciple, and
must seek some other justification for venturing upon this ground at all.
It is nearly a hundred years now since Cousin complained that outside
of six or seven poverty-stricken students starving in the garrets of Paris,
Plato was virtually unknown to his generation; and while he spoke, of
course, for his country solely, the case could not have been very much
better, I imagine, elsewhere. That the situation has changed completely
in the course of a century it would be idle to deny. Partly at Cousin's
instance, but mainly for other causes, the concern for Plato has grown
amazingly. The "literature" of the last decade or two alone would crowd
a good-sized book-case, if not an entire library. So far so good. The
difficulty is that the subject, in developing, has tended to become a kind
of vested interest, the affair of "specialists," Fachmanner-so much so that
for a layman to venture an opinion on the subject, or even for a critic to
express himself in the premises otherwise than in certain set and appointed
ways, is looked upon as something of an indiscretion if not an impertinence. In this respect Plato's plight is not unlike Shakespeare's. As there
1 For that matter he would be more likely to sympathize with the realists than
with the idealists-almost anybody but the idealists-for he did at least believe in "the
d1Scovery of a world independent of the perceiver," however he might differ with some
of them regarding the character of that world.
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is an exclusive and official Shakespearean scholarship, so there has come
to be an equally jealous Platonic faculty, of which no one is free who
has not undergone his novitiate and initiation at the hands of a regularly
ordained pontiff. And in the meantime Plato, like Shakespeare, is in
danger of ceasing to be a liberal study and is turning into a professionif the mischief is not done already-though it is not merely with the
erudite that he must count but with the serious-minded at large, if he
is to count as an influence at all. To them, like his master Socrates, he
was not ashamed to address himself directly; it was for them in the main
that he wrote, and it was they whom he must have hoped to awaken and
inspire. In spirit Platonism is not properly a technology; it is a humanity.
But· unfortunately the present is an age with more regard for learning.
Hence its struggles, when it busies itself with the subject at all, to find,
like Aristotle, in Platonism, by hook or crook, a body of knowledge, a
science of some sort,-a logic or metaphysic, an epistemology, even a
scheme of natural "law"; or at least an esoteric art and "mystery." But
just as the observations of any thoughtful man when inspired by Shakepeare are likely to prove suggestive and haply instructive, it is a great
pity that there should not be more general converse with Plato too. There
will be few enough at best who seek to him-how many intimates has
he now for all his commentators and expositors? "Who has time nowadays to read Plato?" asks Gissing. "Perhaps fifty people in the United
Kingdoms-if so many." And they should rather be welcomed and
encouraged than rebuffed or even tolerated on sufferance 2 •
It would be hard to find even in our literature-certainly, it cannot
be found among the Elizabethans, including Shakespeare himself-a clearer
mirror of the times than that which Plato holds up before our civilization.
The people among whom he lived and with whom he colonized his
writings are not so very dissimilar from our own. Like us the Athenians
were thoroughly democratic; they were great talkers, tremendous boasters,
unconscionable politicians; quite devoid of scruples, corruptible, venal, dishonest; luxurious and extravagant, with an insatiable thirst for novelty
and distraction, self-indulgent, materially minded, capable of paying themselves with words to any extent, skeptical, arrogant, self-conceited, and superstitious. As for their worst vices, if the failure of Greek civilization was
due, as some moralists like to believe, to their contempt of the feminine
ideal, what shall be said of our efforts to obliterate the distinction in
favor of a civilization essentially epicene? And though I may be mistaken
in thinking for my own part that the Nemesis of the Athenians was
2 As an offset to this sort of deformation it is a relief to read a book like E.
Urwick's The Message of Plato for its very extremity in the opposite sense.
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politics, as it is like to prove our own, yet there can be little doubt of
the danger in both cases from the jealousy of public life, a danger so much
the greater in our society for the fact that even the women are no longer
exempt from its seductions. Nor do such parallel sins, suggestive as they
may be, do much more than scratch the surface of the subject. There
is hardly a "modern" doctrine of any importance, a leading philosophical
idea-no, nor a principal heresy-which is not aired and exposed in
Plato's pages. Consider the draughts of controversy blowing through the
dialogues, the whirl of contradictory opinion with all its fantastic diversity-the voices of Callicles and Thrasymachus and all those other young
men who talk as though they had been reading Nietzsche overnight; of
Protagoras, the pragmatic "humanist," and Prodicus, the "neo-realist,"
the whole chorus of Sophists, the professional "educators" of the time3 ,
with their preparation for "citizenship" and "leadership," and on all sides
the silly idolatry of rhetoric, self-expression, and "art."
In short, it is all, or very nearly all in Plato already, with the inestimable advantage that the reflection has acquired perspective by virtue both
of distance and the brilliancy of the speculum. For whatever else he was,
the Athenian was intelligent by nature-Galton pronounces him as superior
to us in that respect as we are to the African negro; and in no one is
this clarity of mind, when untroubled by its vices, displayed to better
advantage than in Plato. There may well be many matters of which
Plato himself was ignorant, but at least his ignorance is clearly delimited.
In this sense he is as certain of what he does not know as of what he does
know. Such knowledge, he agrees with Socrates, is the beginning of
wisdom. He abandons the study of nature for that of man; he is no lover
of the country or of landscape-it is too vague and romantic-but of
humanity and cities. He feels no fascination in obscurity; darkness is in
his eyes the deprivation of light. A hole-and-corner mystification, the
profundity of the cavernous, he finds distasteful. Imagine Plato whimpering over his lost illusions in our semi-hysterical, feministic vein, as though
to be rid of error were an intolerable deprivation. Even death he has
succeeded in divesting of its chimerical horrors: "Be of good cheer," he
says, "no evil can befall a good man alive or dead." 4 The sun is his
symbol; and for the most part it floods his discussions with an equable
diffusion of transparent day.
Nevertheless there is something in Plato's spirit, it must be added,
peculiarly "unsympathetic" to the "modern" mind. His distinction, his
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aristocratic temper, his intellectualism;• his moral bias, his detestation of
cant, his uncompromising hostility to "was uns a/le hiindigt, das Gemeine"
make him repellent to that great pattern of democratic virtues, "the man in
the street" or, in Matthew Arnold's more descriptive phrase, "the average
sensual man." Nor do all the stronger minded appear tc take to him
readily either. How many excerpts from Plato have found their way
into Matthew Arnold's note-book, "the critic's breviary" as it has not
inaptly been called? In Goethe's Gespriiche mit Eckermann I find but
two references to him, and one of them has to do with Goethe's own
Farbenlehre at that. 6 In view of the latter's addiction to symbolism and
the former's critical dogmatism, it may be Plato's naturalism, his habitual
respect for actuality, as much as anything, which has done him a dis,
service in these instances.
Of course it is possible to quote enough tributes-like John Stuart
Mill's-to offset, and more, such slights as these; it may even be granted
that "the philosophy of Plato has been, in the last forty years, one of
the chief inspirations of a school of English political thought," and that
"you may come across English working men to-day, if you talk with
students from the tutorial classes . . . who have read and learned to love
the Republic." 1 That is not my point; and in view of the facts that I
have instanced the question still depends whether it is possible, after allI will not say to "popularize" or give a kind of currency to Plato in
some special sense, but to extend his humane moral influence-if I dared to
express my whole thought, I should say his religious influence, for that
i~ the essential Platonism-beyond certain very narrow limits. All I am
sure of is my indebtedness-an indebtedness which I have not the vanity
to think I can in any manner repay, but to which I can at least own.
I can testify that it is he, most of all, who has propped in these bad days
my mind. And I can protest after a fashion against the romantic deformation which has made his name into a byword of airy and vacuous enthusiasm. For the Plato of the pedants is no more a falsification, no
more suspect to good sense, than the Plato of the sentimentalists-the
metaphysician of predication and abstraction than the mystic of aesthetic
reverie and bemusement.
Needless to say, under the circumstances, I have no idea of proposing
Platonism in satisfaction of the religious needs, wants, or desires, real or
imaginary, of the time. Christianity has absorbed all the Platonism it
5 "The beast intellectualism," W. James: Letters, II, 290.
The "bugbear called
intellectualism" is Bosanquet's expression.
6 "Plato, cavillator urbanus, tumidus poeta, theologus mente captus"---such is Bacon's
rather curious epigraph.
7 E. Barker: Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors, p. 392.
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will hold so that it is pretty well saturated already; and Christianity is not
faring any better at our hands on that account-rather worse, if anything.
It is not likely then that an unmixed Platonism will have very much
appeal for a race that, however it may superficially resemble the Greeks
of the fourth century politically and temperamentally, and not least, I
may add, in their indifference to this very Platonism, is not particularly
remarkable for intellect in itself or respectful of it in others. And yet in
spite of such cautionings of common sense I cannot quite rid myself of
the conviction that Platonism is capable of serving as a kind of refuge
from some of the perplexities and confusions of the day. Plato himself
is at least free from the superstition that would make of matter the substratum of reality, and of the animal the father of the man. Whatever may
be thought of the Timceus and its evolution au rebours, it is at all events
untainted by the particularly noxious implication which our recent psychology has fixed upon that sufficiently ambiguous commonplace, "the
descent of man." Nor in spite of his aberrations-for so I must consider
them-and the frailties of his declining years, is its author any less certain
that justice and the other virtues-f\ aAArJ &.QE't~, in his own words-are
genuine natures-much more truly so, let me say, than mass, inertia, and
the other fabricative characters which have been foisted upon geometry
in the attempt to explain the behavior of reality so called and which are
gradually sloughing off again with the loss of what physical and material
assurance we did for a while seem to possess. But above all, his insistence
after the example of Socrates that our happiness does not consist with
these matters or even with economics but with our own higher nature,
in the health and sanity of the soul, and in its participation by knowledge
in the divinity of that permanent and eternal pattern, the good-it is
this belief that makes them both, and particularly him who has given
their faith its scriptural expression, the greatest if not the first of the
humanists.
And if my more modest attempt at the mere acknowledgment of a
debt should still seem to smack a little of self-conceit, I can excuse myself
only by recalling that if it had not been for some such witnesses as those
poor students of Cousin's a century ago in the garrets of Paris this tradition
would have snapped long since. There may not be enough readers of
Plato in the original to pay for more than one edition of the dialogues
in the course of a life-time-if that. B.ut how important it is then that
one and another, here and there, sheltering under the wall against the inclemency of the times, should tend that fire to the best of his ability
lest the world by its extinction become a gloomier habitation than ever.

6

II
THE DIALOGUES
Incapable of systematic exposition myself, I am naturally susp1c1ous
of all attempts to systematize whatever is not a system on the face of it
and obtrusively. In particular it is, in my opinion, only by a kind of
violence or legerdemain that Plato can be made to submit to such treatment-I mean the Plato of the dialogues. The other Plato-if there ever
was another, the esoteric Plato or the Plato of the school-we know little
or nothing about, save darkly through the polemic of Aristotle, and that
little is not reassuring. It may be that this other' Plato prescribed to the
Academy a rigidly concatenated curriculum; it is not impossible. And
yet I imagine that we are prone to overrate its consistency, if not its
comprehensiveness. Even the remarks on education in the Republic seem
couched in the language of hope rather than attainment; while it is open
to us, I suppose, to make what we please of the defection of a mind like
Aristotle. At all events, that the Plato with whom posterity has most to
do was no great methodist is obvious from the succession of his dialoguesor should I say, from the labor that has been spent in the attempt to
recover their chronological order? In view of such evidence it requires
more imagination than I for one am possessed of to think of Plato, like
a German metaphysician, a Hegel or a Kant, setting out with a readymade apparatus of axioms and postulates to realize a preconceived philosophy of "coherent, interdependent, subordinate, and derivative principles."
Rather, he appears to have begun improvidently with the discussion of
such topics as happened to strike his fancy-moot questions of the fifth
century, some of them, inherited from Socrates and the Sophists-and to
have treated them just as they came, one after the other, of his own nature
freely, without much regard to transition and consequence-often, in fact,
quite inconclusively. That he should come gradually to recognize the
principles underlying his spontaneous activity, the musculature of ·his own
speculation, is only what might be expected-and that they should grow
more and more precise as he continued. But only toward the close of his
life will he be found dissecting them out and treating them formally after
the manner of an anatomical preparation.
On the whole, then, it seems not only more congenial with my disposition but also more consonant with the facts to look upon Plato as a
kind of essayist. Certainly what he has to say does not take its importance
and confirmation from a punctilious agreement among the several parts.
It is significant and convincing, on the, contrary, as it descries an aspect

7

8

PLATO

of truth from some point of vantage at which he happens or has contrived
to find himself at the moment. Displace the point of view and the
vision fades, as the village spire disappears among the trees the instant
you move to right or left; his aperru seems no longer plausible--0r perhaps
wholly intelligible. There is, to be sure, a general similarity of attitude
from time to time; but his position is constantly shifting-as from the
Cratylus to the Symposium, from the Symposium to the Pha:do or from
the Pha:drus to the Thea:tetus. 1 Though his progress is, for a great while,
fairly forthright in its approach to that one goal for which he cared,
tov vo11tov t6:rtov, "the region," in Leibniz' words, "of the eternal truths,"
yet he troubles himself little for the regularity of his 'advance; nor do
occasional retardations or even retrocessions disturb him very much. It is
not the path by which he travels or the spot on which he rests; it is the
prospect, the revelation for which he is concerned. In this sense every
dialogue is a coup d'a:il. It is a single sally, an essay in itself-a form of
philosophic composition unspeakably shocking to discursive minds like
De Quincey's and curiously enough to Montaigne's. And yet as Plato
handles it, it has obvious advantages. It is compact and instant. It needs
no preparation or supplementation, no scaffolding or shoring to sustain it.
Above all, it is the record of a free play of the intelligence; it represents
the moral nature, as a whole, one and undivided, in immediate contact
with some single topic. Hence, in spite of Plato's preference at times for
refuting opinions that he does not hold rather than substantiating those
that he does, it is perfectly competent as far as it goes and satisfactory in
itself.
Not that Plato never reverts. To some subjects he comes again and
again, so that pis dialogues are meshed with an intricate network of crossreference, and the whole or portions of some one may find a varied context
in several others. To trace the gossamers of this web is one of the most
fascinating of Platonic recreations: it excuses the persistency of scholarship
in its efforts to methodize his thought. Only, as one or another thread is
taken for a clue, there emerges a distinct pattern of opinion. In this way
Plato has been made to appear, among other avatars, as a monist, 2 a dualist,3
a Wordsworthian pantheist,4 an expectant disciple of Kant, 5 an ancient
logician and grammarian, 6 a kind of Attic Jansenist,7 an auto-hypnotic
1 If Lutoslawski's arrangement is to be trusted; and it has at least the merit in my
eyes of corroborating on the whole a rapid-reading impression.
2 Fouillee.
3 Pater.
4 Adam.
5Natorp.
6Gomperz.
7 More.
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a:sthete,8 a pre-Christian apostate,n an Athenian Brahman,18 a statesman
manque,U and even the arch-rationalist himself.12 No doubt, like the genius
of philosophy itself, he was something of a logician, metaphysician, cosmologist, lawgiver, and poet by turns, if not simultaneously. Nevertheless, if the probable chronology is to be followed, the truth is that he
approaches a problem anew only after an interval~ften quite unexpectedly and from another quarter. The dialogues are inconsecutive in
theme. And his later views are not so much in correction or revisionnot always in extension-but rather·in illustration of the earlier. It is not a
development, it is a new vista that he offers. The gain is not by way of
rational expansion but of insensible commutation. He outgrows his uncertainties as often as he resolves them. The topical advance appears as a
saltus; and though he may take off quite obviously from some former
position, the original essay still retains its character of singular and sufficient
authenticity.
To a mind so vivacious as Plato's the dialogue offered a particular
attraction over the set expository style to which curiously enough De
Quincey seems totally blind. It gave him a chance to criticize doctrine
not merely in the pure idea but 'in the character of its proponents, toward
many of whom he was personally affected in one way or another, either
through their association with Socrates or through his own acquaintance
with them. From this source his reasoning borrows a peculiar cogency,
like an argume11tum ad hominem; it is not merely sophistry, it is Callicles
or Thrasymachus or Hippias that he is confuting. And why not? A
philosophy, after all, is no better than its adherents. And as these representatives of the views under discussion are human beings, themselves, the
argument, as a result, takes on a moral complexion quite distinct from
that of the theme involved and reinforcing it. To this motive may be
referred in great part the Platonic irony and that strain of comedy in
the dialogues, which appears not uncalculated, when directed again,t the
genuine offenders of virtue and sanity, to offset Aristophanes' satire of
Socrates. That 1,uch a practice is likely to prejudice the impartiality of
debate, is true; quite patently Plato is now and again engaged in settling
old scores, nor is he always averse in a pinch to 'helping himself out with
the Sophists' own petard. But it can not be gainsaid that the treatment,
in giving to his strictures all the shrewdness of personalities, has imparted
8 Stewart.
9

Temple.

18 Urwick.
11 Wilamowitz.

12w. James.

9

10

PLATO

liveliness and pertinency to a kind of writing not always remarkable for
wit or point.
In short, Plato is not content with recommending philosophy as a way
of life; he illustrates it. Every dialogue is a drama, for whose -persona!
philosophy is an occupation-protagonists who exemplify their principles
in their behavior in addition to defending it in their speech. As truly and
in somewhat the same manner as Corneille is reputed the dramatist of
statescraft, Plato is the dramatist, as well as the expositor, of philosophy.
Especially has he dramatized morality. It was the concern of his prime,
the theme of his most energetic exercises, the frame of reference for his
characterization and disquisition, as his Socrates amply proves. In this
sense, even though he was no playwright, it is he who was the successor
of the great tragedians, JEschylus and Sophocles-he and not Euripides.
That his philosophy was explicit while theirs was implicit was incidental to
the period, and being of necessity, was, as he would say, accidental and
irrelevant--of the serious moral tradition of Athens he was, as far as the
times allowed, the heir and perpetuator.
But no product of human invention is ever quite unique. That there
was a great stock of Socratic conversations in circulation before as well as
after Socrates' death-memories and reminiscences and recollections of his
interviews with divers persons and personages-is matter of common conjecture. And it is not improbable that some of them were reduced to
writing in the shape of notes and memoranda of one kind or another.
How much literary coloring such records had taken on in the process,
aside from the imaginative heightening they had previously by word of
mouth, it is impossible to say. There is no evidence, however, of any
genuine Socratic dialogues precedent to Plato's, difficult as it is in the
light of analogy to believe that the form sprang of a sudden: from Plato's
brain full-armed. As an alternative to this sort of creation ab nihilohe may have taken a hint from such report and gossip as wa~ quickening
Athens at the time; or what is more likely, he may have modeled his
essays on the talk of his master itself. As the story goes, he had actually
composed the Lysis before the execution of Socrates, provoking the mockserious protest, "O Hercules! What lies this young fellow tells of me!"
Gratifying though it would be to think of Xenophon's Memorabilia as an
earlier development of the genre-it seems relatively so inchoate and elementary both in excution and thought; yet as a matter of fact the greater
part of it is much later, and of secondary, sometimes of Platonic, inspiration. Nevertheless it challenges comparison with Plato's Socratic dialogues
so called, as a kind of measurement for Plato's own achievement. Herc
is an example of what another, himself a familiar of Socrates, and even
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more favorably situated as a later comer, was able to do with the same .or
similar material.
Nor should we think of the Memorabilia either, as we might be inclined
to do on the strength of Xenophon's representations, as solely matter of
fact. It is a work, not to say of compilation, of imaginatio1' too. Xenophon's avowed intention of vindicating the character of Socrates would
lift it upon another plane than that of actuality, while Xenophon himself
was by no means a contemptible man of letters. On the other hand, it is
under bonds to a certain sort of truth; it is bound to be recognizable. And
since Xenophon knew Socrates personally and admired him, it is only
natural that even when he borrowed his material-from Antisthenes or
another-he should pick and choose, as well as patch and pare, to suit
his preconceptions, as his selection of interlocutors compared with Plato's
seems to indicate that he did. As a result,. the collection, though ostensibly
biography, is in fact partly imagination,· partly imitation, and partly portraiture, achieving hardly more than what Goethe would call the illusion
of a common reality, even tripping occasionally on the edge of caricature,18
without other pretension than to reproduce by hook or crook the firsthand impression of a homely intimacy.
By contrast it is easy to appreciate the genius required first to conceive
the possibility and then to realize it, of using this sort of matter, instinct
with memory as it was, for the construction of a philosophical genre which
should take advantage of the Socratic sentiment and celebrity even to the
extent of recalling actual interpellations and interpellators and yet should
throw off the clogs of actuality itself for the sake of introducing the author's
own interpretations of thought and character and of insinuating, if not at
once asserting, his own convictions and opinions, not only of the theses discussed but also of the disputants themselves. Nor save as an affair of
scholarship does it make much odds-for where the 'literary records and
remains are so fragmentary it is just as well to be wary-whether Plato
was first in the field or 'not; his is the accomplishment and the perfection
of the type to such an extent as to have extinguished rivalry.
The contents of the Memorabilia are very diverse in character and very
uneven in tenor. The first few chapters of the first book are pretty certainly
original and include the gist 'of Xenophon's contribution to the characterization of Socrates. On this account, while in themselves the most important and interesting of the collection, they are hardly pertinent to
comparison. On the contrary the eighth and ninth14 chapters of the third
18 Sec
14 "In

Ill, XI, for instance.
jenem als sokratisch treu ganz besonders ausgezeichncten Capitel," says Joel
.of the ninth chapter: Der echte und der Xenopliontische Sok.rates, I, s. 93.
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book, summarizing a few of the familiar Socratic teachings or what passed
for such, recall the Platonic dialogues, though very much as a crude copy
or rough draft might recall a finished painting. But not to compare incommensurables, one of the most elevated disquisitions of the Memorabilia,
or what at least is intended as a ·pattern of its kind, occupies the third
chapter of the fourth book, which purports to relate a conversation with
Euthydemus, whereof Xenophon feigns to have been an auditor, concerning the goodness of God, something in the vein of Fenelon. "Tell me,
Euthydemus, has it never occurred to you to think how carefully the gods
have made provision for men's needs?" It is deistic theological moral commonplace, but commonplace of such an order, whatever 'its provenance, as
a great French ecclesiastic at the beginning 0£ the eighteenth century was
not ashamed to father. And yet its superficiality is glaring in contrast with
the penetration of almost any Platonic dialogue-the Protagoras, for example, not to say the Gorgias, or more fairly, perhaps, the Charmides,
since its subject is avowedly sophrosyne and the opportunity to compare the
conceptions of that virtue is too good to be missed. Nor would it be unprofitable either, in the interests of Plato's genius, to turn from the fourth
chapter of the same book to the first book and a half of the Republic. The
respondent of the Memorabilia. on this occasion is Hippias, the theme is
justice, and in the course of the argument the Socrates of the Memorabilia
reflects, however mistily, the great Platonic ( or is it indeed the Socratic?)
conception of a universal moral order in distinction from the dingy
"modern" heresy of an exclusively social ethics. "But whosoever transgresses the divine laws 'pays the penalty which none may in any wise
escape, as do many transgressing human laws, some by stealth and some
by violence." That it falls far short of the achievement of the Republic in
exalting righteousness above Olympus and establishing it with happiness
in the constitution of reality, is what might be looked for. Equally remarkable in these two instances is the apportionment of roles; it was not to
such characters as Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus, that precious
pair of verbal contortionists, or to Hippias, the sciolist and jack of all
trades, that Plato was in the habit of intrusting the conduct of his
great moral debates.15
In one respect, it is true, Xenophont may be thought to have the advantage of the comparison. He touches in two instances at least a nerve
15 That these latter chapters have been under suspicion is no matter for my purpose,
which is simply to get some sort of measure for Plato's excellence. Nevertheless whether
this third chapter, together with the two following, actually belongs or not, there is no
particular difficulty in thinki:ng of it as an adaptation. The conception of sophrosyne
is not Platonic. Is it authentically Socratic? or Antisthenic? At all events, if the two
chapters I have cited are not evidence, they are perfectly good illustrations.
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of sentiment to which Plato, it would seem, was nearly insensible. In the
second chapter of the second book he represents Socrates admonishing the
son of Xanthippe to a respect for his mother with a conventional delicacy
which contrasts rather roughly with her husband's chilly dismissal of her
in the Pha:do. And again, in the succeeding chapter the reconciliation
which Socrates effects between Cha:rephon and Cha:recrates strikes a note
which is lacking to the Platonic scale, though the consideration with
which Plato always treats his own brothers may very well be put into
competition with this display of sentimentality on the part of the Xenophontic Socrates. But these are exceptions; I mention them in fairness
for what they may be worth-for even in delimiting Plato's range they
leave 'his superiority in the common field untouched.
That a man of affairs with literary tastes should be excelled by a
philosopher in profundity and acuteness of thought, seems no great matter
for admiration. And yet in Plato's hands the Socratic dialogue is not
solely a vehicle for the conveyance of ideas. It becomes as well the medium
for the representation of a certain kind of experience. To be sure, there
is some such dramatic notion inherent in the very conception of the dialogue as a genre. But the drama of Plato is more than an art; it is a faith,
inspired by the Socratic contention that philosophy itself is nothing more
or less than a way of life. And still, to such a pass of perfection as a
literary form alone has Plato brought this drama of the contemplative or
theoretic life that it is yet an insistent question to what extent and in how
far the dialogues are to be taken in just this sense, as literature pure and
simple.
It is fairly obvious, for example, that closing references to the renewal
of a discussion are usually nothing more than devices of verisimilitude,
as at the end of the Protagoras. To argue otherwise-to the existence of a
dialogue since lost, or to carry over the invitation-say, to the Gorgias, is
surely a little naive at best. And yet the T/zea:tetus, Sophist, and Statesman,
not to say the unborn Philosopher, have been coerced into a trilogy on
little better grounds, to say nothing of the Republic and the Tima:us. To
the same effect it must be admitted that many opinions in their shading
and manner of expression are determined by the imaginative requirements
of the situation, occasion, surroundings, and characters; they are partly
"atmosphere" and "local color," as is self-evidently the case in the Symposium. Less convincingly the so-called aporetic or inconclusive dialogues
may be accounted for by other than exclusively philosophical considerations
-such dubitative endings are 'not entirely unknown to the ingenuity of
modern authorship-indeed, with some degree of plausibility where the
reader has been given a clue to the solution of the problem, formally indecisive though the close may appear. Or on the other hand, may some of
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this reluctance to trancher la question be due to Plato's impatience to commemorate Socrates' familiar theses and modes of thought before he had as
yet made up his own mind in regard to them? Or again may he be merely
maintaining the ironic pretense of Socrates' ignorance?
Further, it may be questioned whether the silence of Socrates in the
Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Statesman has only a kind of poetic
propriety, or whether it is significant of Plato's abandonment of the Socratic
fiction or merely indicates his detachment from the discussion-a kind of
modesty in the face of his own opinions. But then what is Plato's relation
to the protagonist of his drama in general? How far, if at all, are the two
to be identified, the latter as the mouthpiece of the former? With the
ordinary playwright the inclination of the reader is, at times almost irresistibly, to attribute the sentiments of the characters to the author himself. But the interpretation of Plato would appear to have suffered in
addition from the contrary disposition-to credit his characters with what
are actually his own opinions-in particular his leading man. As between
these two stools, is it Socrates or Plato who brings the indictment against
written teaching in the Pha:drus? And in the Pha:do is it Plato or Socrates
who impugns physical science? To be sure, this is one of the convictions
with which Socrates is endowed by Xenophon,16 but hardly that for which
he is satirized by Aristophanes in The Clouds. Again, in the Pha:do, what
is the symbolism of Plato's absence, so firmly underscored, I will not say
from the death of Socrates-I will concede that point to "art"; but what
is the sense of his absence from the debate on immortality with its heavy
charge on the doctrine of ideas? Did he wish to bring that doctrine under
Socrates' protection? Or is it possible that he is indicating as a matter of
fact its Socratic origin? And finally, if Plato's Socrates is authentic and
Plato but concurs with him, so to speak, why did not Xenophon, who
had him under observation too, do better by him?
The answer is obvious. Eminent as Plato is in other respects, the
triumph of his genius is the character of Socrates. It is Plato who is
responsible for the great Socratic tradition. Not that he was without
materials to work with; he had what Xenophon had, even more than
Xenophon had - perhaps more than Antisthenes. He not only had
the man; he understood him better-or so we like to believe. But whatever
he owes to Socrates, Socrates owes more to him. And if his indebtedness
to Socrates is exaggerated, he has no one to blame but himself; for it is
by placing his own person directly in line with his master's and in the
latter's shadow that he has ended by an effect of perspective in running
the two figures together so that dramatically they are almost indistiguish16 Memorabilia,

I, i, 11 et seq.
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able. Philosophically, Plato preserves his own integrity more or less; but
sentimentally, Socrates becomes possessed of all Plato's virtues in addition
to his own-notably a serenity of spirit to which Plato never quite attained.
In this manner Socrates has gained in mental stature, in poetic power, in
urbanity-in short, the friend of Cha:rephon, the Socrates of the greasy
cloak and tousled aspect, with his insolent ostentation of poverty, simplicity, and ignorance, with his bare feet and his boorish address, has been
saved by the devotion of his pupil from the tradition of cynicism for that
of culture and humanism.
Under the circumstances to attempt to discriminate between Plato and
Socrates would be, as a rule, an impossible task. And not only so; it is an
illegitimate one, based on a misconception of the literary meJium chosen
and perfected by Plato for the conveyance of his ideas; for the delight of
the dialogues is that they are literature as well as philosophy, and that
their appreciation calls for taste as well as intelligence. If Plato made
Socrates in interpreting him, then for all representative purposes Socrates
is Plato. As far as the dialogues go, Plato is known through his characters
as Shakespeare is known through his, for it is sheer sophistry to deny the
possibility of surprising the dramatist in his drama. With proper precautions, of course, since there are moments when the critical sense may not
decline to recognize a kind of distinction in Plato's intentions. While in
the dramatic dialogues generally he has no hesitation in merging his personality with Socrates' at the same time that he turns the familiar Socratic
dialectic with all its reminiscent authority to his own uses; still in exceptional cases he appears concerned, on the contrary, to segregate the two
characters and to hold his master apart and at arm's length. Such a purpose may account for his mention of himself and of his absence from
Socrates' execution in the Ph'tt:do, a piece of self-assertion so at odds with
his habit. Is it not as though he said: "Here is Socrates and yonder is Plato,
separate and distinct beings; since I am relating, mark you, the death of
Socrates"? At all events, however it is produced, some such special effect
of portraiture is unmistakable in the Apology, thei Crito, and the Pha:do
in spite of its discussion of the ideas-and, perhaps, in the Symposium.
And it is perceptible elsewhere now and then, if not exactly definable.
Nor is Plato's language, on the whole, any less literary than his composition. As he was without a thorough-going system, so too he had no
special terminology. His style is idiomatic, even colloquial, for he must
have written by ear and very much as he talked-such indeed is the sense
of his genre; though toward the close of his life he developed a more artificial and even intricate style which is not without its virtuosity. Still his
expression is seldom technical. What specialized words and phrases he
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does use are merely handy adaptations of common speech,17 nor does he
employ them with the invariability and consistency that we demand of a
scholastic vocabulary. Even the terms which have come to be associated
particularly with the doctrine of ideas appear frequently with other
denotations.18
As a result there is something wavering, tremulous, and a little unsettled about his phraseology, which tempts the translator and commentator and even the general reader to lend it greater exactitude and definition than it possesses by turning it into good set terms or by substituting
modern catch-words. What mischief can be done in this way is illustrated
by the reckless substitution of the word science for knowledge, or even
wisdom.19 . As Huxley remarks in his modest hesitant fashion, "The Platonic philosophy is probably the grandest example of the unscientific use
of the imagination extant." 20 Quite so; the better the scientist the worse
the philosopher. 21 Would also in addition to scientific we might forswear,
in speaking of Plato, all cant of naturalistic, materialistic, and what not, to
the advantage of our thinking as well as of our English. It is imperative,
however, to be wary of such expressions as substance, reality, essence, reason,
to say nothing of matter, whose significance has so altered in the course
of the centuries that their meaning for Plato involves an exposition of his
entire philosophy. In short there is a constant temptation to force him
verbally into a straiter garment than that which he actually wore and
to cramp the freedom and flexibility of utterance which is not the least
of his qualities as a moralist and philosopher, and which serves to moderate
and humanize even his digressions into metaphysics.22
Well, to turn a long lane at last, if this view of the Platonic dialogue is
correct-if it is indeed an independent tableau from the drama of the ideal
life of contemplation, devoted to the inspection of a single phase or aspect
of reality; then it makes little difference in what order the dialogues are
11 Like aui;o ,mit'
18 e[lloi; as late at

am6 and ,;o ,;( foi;t.
all events as the sixth book of the Republic, 504a, while the
Timtrus presents the curious anomaly of an amorphous idea, dv6Qa'tO'V dll6i; 'tt ,mt
c'iµoQ<pov, Timtrus, 5 la. Cf. the use of Ullla unspecialized in the T hetrtetus, late as
that is, 184d and 203c.
19 ,;amov O.Qa EJtt<J''tfl!LTJ xal. O'O<pta, Thetrtetus, 145e. Even at his most rationalistic Plato is concerned less for science in our sense than epistemology.
20 Preface to Hume.
21 Notwithstanding the immediate Cambridgean reaction. But always in extremes!
22 As an example of what can be done with the hard and fast system of translation
of which I am speaking, apply it, just for fun, to Xenophon's Memorabilia, III, xiv, 2,;o
lhi,ov aui;o xait' amo foitwvi;a-inunediately followed as it is by a mention of
16yoi;, which ought to be as good as a nod to a pedant. Though seriously I often
wonder whether we are not forcing Plato's hand as badly and more often than we
think by just such abuses of interpretation.
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read-and the less so, since he who reads them at all is likely to read
the greater of them more than once and in more than one connection.
For the student and even for the general reader the advantages of following
Plato's development are evident. And yet for reading and even for study
the chronological order has serious drawbacks too. Not only does it break
up the logical sequence of ideas; for Plato was not a patient man and was
prone to revenge himself upon his more intractable subjects by turning
his back upon them temporarily whenever they threatened to become unmanageable, so that the arrangement by approximate date of composition,
while it gives effect to his variety and versatility, is inconsequent and in
so far confusing. But what is more damaging, it does violence to his spirit
-his faith in philosophy as a way of life as well as his conception of the
dialogue as a representation of that life, a kind of moral drama. Hence
I prefer for my part a reading that will take some account of these motives.
And if this grouping differs little from the usual and popular, the coincidence only goes to show how successful he has been for all his fits and
starts in communicating his intention, having as he did to realize it first
for himself.
To this end the dialogues may be sorted into the following sets. There
are first the biogmphical dialogues, as I may be allowed to call them for
distinction; I mean those that appear to make a point of characterizing
Socrates with peculiar intimacy and fidelity-the Apology, the Crito, and
the Phtedo. The second set or series consists of the moral dialogues or
the dialogues of the virtues-prominently the Charmides, the Protagoras,
the Gorgias, and the Thrasymachus, to isolate under this title the first
book of the Republic from the remaining books which belong in the same
compartment with it, though giving a different turn to the virtue of justice
with which they all have to do nominally. Another and third group will
comprise the dialogues of the ideas-say, the Meno, the Symposium, and
the Phcedrus; while the metaphysical dialogues make up the fourth-a
rather ragged classification of the Parmenides, to which the discussion of
the ideas serves as a sort of transition, the Thecetetus, the Sophist, the
Statesman, the Philebus, and the Timceus, which is metaphysical in method,
mythical or symbolic though it may be in spirit. And finally, existing in
apparent isolation, stands the Laws like a pile of terminal stones or
boundary. With these major dialogues are associated their minors, like
the Euthyphro and the Laches, which may be made to serve the purpose of
notes, addenda, and the like, and which may be integrated with the appropriate series wherever they seem particularly pertinent or instructive.
For Plato, as a companion of Socrates and himself at heart a philosopher
as well as a poet, it was only natural to look upon the master who had
inspired him as the fitting exemplar of that life of the spirit to which
17
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he had been converted from the "art" of the day and to make him the
protagonist of that philosophic drama which his genius was early prompting
him to write in demonstration of the faith which they had in common.
On this account the three dialogues which purport to detach more or less
realistically the person of Socrates and which refer to certain verifiable
moments of his life-his trial, his imprisonment, and his death-come to
have a sort of introductory priority or precedence as compared with the
others. It is unfortunate, on the whole, that the term Socratic has not been
reserved for these three compositions-the Apology, the Crito, and the
Pheedo 23-exclusively; they are concerned so manifestly to illustrate the
Socratic life:-Such is the nature of the philosopher 24 as Plato understood
it; in such manner should he live; above all in such manner should he die.
On the contrary it is not impossible that we have cause to congratulate
ourselves on the failure of the Philosopher, which though projected was
never realized, if it was intended to sophisticate or subtilize that stalwart
advocate of good sense as its neighbors of the metaphysical or methodological period, the Sophist and the Politician, would lead us to suspect.
However that may be, I like to prefix the Euthyphro to these three biographical dialogues after the fashion of a prologue partly because of its
dramatic time and partly because of its subject, which relates it with the
indictment of the Apology, though strictly it takes its place in the next
group-and to affix the Symposium, not merely for its vivid evocation of
Socrates in his more festal habit, but capitally for the inebriate tribute of
Alcibiades, the apostate, bearing involuntary witness against himselfin vino veritas.
And there is one arrangement of the dialogues so curious that it is
worth mentioning by the way, where I must pass over others in silence.
I refer to Munk's chronology in accordance with the relative age of Socrates
in his several confrontations. But even if all the dialogues were "dated"
unmistakably after this fashion, it is hardly to be supposed that such an
order would be very significant; it would place the Parmenides at the head
of the procession, which would close, of course, with the Pheedo, the
Symposium remaining where it is now-somewhere near the middle, say
about 416 B. C. All that is of particular note in such consideration is the
circumstance that the dialogues seem to crowd dramatically about Socrates'
trial and death, the Theeetetus, for example, being "dated" also by the
arraignment. Though the fact is not extraordinary in itself, yet by way
of exhausting all the possibilities it might not be wholly without interest
23 Again I ignore the discussion of the ideas in the Pha:do, which may be looked
upon from this point of view as an accident of the date of its composition.
24 The veiiQU cpLA.OCJocpou, in Epictetus' phrase: Diatribes, II, 8, 29.

18

THE DIALOGUES

19

to see how such a "derangement" would look if consistently carried out.
However that may be, if we continue as we· began, disregarding chronology altogether and reading for the dramatic logic alone, as nearly as
may be, the passage from the first or biographical to the second or moral
group is easy and natural enough. No matter when they were written
it is apparently Plato's intention in these essays to ventilate certain views
and even theses of his master. Their general theme is virtue or perhaps
just that spiritual justice or righteousness of the good man whom no
evil can touch, alive or dead, into which the single virtues melt and are
absorbed-the piety of the Euthyphro ( which has thus a double content
in my mind), the courage of the Laches, the sophrosyne of the Charmides,
and the narrower political or civic justice of the good citizen and ruler,
over which the dispute in the Republic begins and which constitutes the
subject of the first book and suggests its titular separation from the others
under the name of Thrasymachus.
Of all these virtues and of all virtue at large the most obstinate and
insidious enemies, in the eyes of Plato, as perhaps of Socrates, were the
Sophists-the more dangerous by reason of the fairness of their professions and promises. That the appellation is a kind of Procrustean or
omnibus term their rehabilitators have had no difficulty in showing, so
diverse the characters and teachings of those designated thereby, though
none the less, if we are to rely upon the evidence-and it is about the only
sentiment which Plato and the Athenian bourgeois had in common-unanimously subversive of private and public integrity. In clearing the way
for the Socratic ethic which went before his own, it is not surprising, therefore, that Plato should run foul of this gentry sooner or later as his leader
is represented as doing also. Hence the space devoted in these moral dialogues to what may be called the anti-Sophistic elenchus. That their favorite instruments of seduction were rhetoric and art may partially account
for Plato's animosity against these subjects-together with the fact that
he was himself an :esthetic apostate. For though the elder Sophists (like
the Socratic theses which they debated) properly belonged to the fifth
century, it is not to be supposed that their current appeal in Plato's day
was purely dramatic or even historical. The circumstance with which he
treats them shows that their influence must have been prolonged into his
own time. They had their heirs, of course; 25 while their symbolic importance as impersonating the persistent forms of a-moralism was, as it
25 Compare Isocrates' discrimination of the good and the bad teachers in De Permutatione, 99 and following. To be sure he uses the term Sophists in the good old
connotation in contrast with the pretenders. But Plato would probably have lumped
them all together under the one designation, granting at most that some might not
be w bad as others.
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still is, tremendous. The Sophists and the charlatans are always with us.
And had they not been, and were they not still when Plato wrote, confounded with Socrates by the general public in a monstrous complicity
from which it was obligatory to vindicate his memory? In fact some of the
Socratics were by that time hardly to be distinguished from them-at least
in Plato's eyes.
From the dialogues strongly marked by the presence of this antiSophistic polemic it is convenient, it seems to me, to set off the other
members of the group-the Euthyphro, or "Piety," the La.ches, or
"Courage," and the Charmides, or "Sophrosyne." These latter are united
into an association of their own by their common anxiety for the Socratic
identification of virtue with knowledge, which appears, if I may use the
figure, as a species of minor intrigue or sub-plot, for it is a poor dialogue
that handles but one theme. The Lesser Hippias, whether authentic or
not, deserves a place, on account of its treatment of the same problem,
with these other discussions, at least in the modest r6le of a scholium or
appendix, particularly as it has a rather interesting bearing upon the
modern sense for the subject.
One wonders sometimes that Plato was not content to assert that the
knowledge which is wisdom is-if not virtue-a virtue in itself, as, indeed
it is and a rare one at that. Perhaps the manner in which the problem
was transmitted, and was still a living issue to his generation, precluded
such a summary solution. For undoubtedly in Socrates' mind the virtues
were more or less technological and involved a knowing how as well as
what. But that some such further notion of the virtue of wisdom as such
was fermenting in Plato's mind is clear enough from his increasingly persistent efforts, through the Euthyphro and the La.ches to their culmination
in the Charmides, not, indeed, to demonstrate the virtue of knowledge
exactly, but to condition morality somehow upon it almost as though
every virtue were a variety or species of wisdom. As a matter of fact, in
the Charmides he comes very near a positive conclusion to this effect. At
least he leaves the reader pretty well convinced that sophrosyne consists substantially with the knowledge of one's own measure. It is this obvious
advance in the development of the idea, together with the relative maturity of the argument, which leads me to place the dialogue after rather
than before the La.ches.
Now, it is just the point of the Lesser Hippias that it does assert this
virtue of knowledge unconditionally-maintaining paradoxically but consistently that the deliberate liar is morally superior, by virtue of his knowledge, to the unconscious liar, who lies through ignorance, not knowing
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the true from the false, 26 And at the same time it seems to brand the
apparent paradox as an illusion of that modern and romantic casuistry
which is forever trying to make the intention go bail for the act, to
condone the deed at the instance of the motive. Still what can be more
hopeless morally than the man who is unable to distinguish right and
wrong? There must be something singularly obtuse or perverse in a
generation which insists upon exonerating the wrong-doer on the score
of his ignorance, even entrusting their lives and their fortunes to his
bungling mismanagement on the ground and for the reason that he
knows no better! To be sure the Greek had his casuistry too, which was
busy in offering his wit in extenuation of his vices. But then the Greek
was an intellectualist while we are sentimentalists; and that, no doubt, is
the end of it; for how else is to be explained our rooted suspicion of
understanding as a .people and our tenderness for the fool and his folly
in spite of our lip service to education?
On the whole, then, whatever the authorship and the execution of the
Lesser Hi'ppias, its spirit and its contribution are not too un-Socratic to
disqualify it for serving as an epilogue to the discussion of the virtues in
their relation to knowledge. With regard to the three dialogues that are
unquestionably authentic, they are united among themselves by another
tie---their patent preoccupation with definition. It is an interest which
falls into abeyance with the Protagoras, but comes to the fore again in
the first book of the Republic and yet again in the T hetetetus and the
Sophist.

There is, however, a better reason for referring particularly to the first
book of the Republic at this juncture. Not only does it evince the same
concern for definition as the Laches and the Charmides, it also on the
strength of the bout with Thrasymachus participates with the Protagoras
and the Gorgias in their direct attack upon Sophistry, whatever name it
goes by, and in addition seems bent, in distinction from the other books
of the Republic, upon completing the tale of the cardinal virtues by a
treatment of justice as a correlative of piety, courage, and sophrosyne
rather than in the later sense as their integrator on general principle.
Viewed in this perspective this first book becomes a kind of intermediary
between the Charmides and the Protagoras. Possibly it belongs here or
hereabouts by date of composition. At all events it does no manner of
harm to multiply the associations of a dialogue.
Of the three members of the sub-group or section whose characteristics I
have been so hastily sketching, the most engaging is by all odds the Char26 The deliberate liar, if there be any such, since no man does wrong deliberately!
Xenophon argues the same thesis in a rather different way. [Mem. IV, ii, 19. But
then cf. the 11LO'O'Ot AoyOL.]
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mides, for its setting, its subject-matter, and its tone. For sheer charm there
are very few of the dialogues which surpass it. Its treatment, while simple
and elegant, is serious and mature. And though it is classed as one of
the dubitative or epochic discussions ( to adapt a Skeptic term) yet, as I
have said, it leaves the impression that sophrosyne consists in knowing
one's own measure and ensuing that knowledge agreeably with the thesis
that no man does wrong wittingly. Such is the position to which Plato
returns in the Republic; and if it seems to confound sophrosyne with
justice, it is into the higher justice of the sound and .noble soul that Plato
tends, since virtue is one, to run all the virtues. And though Socrates himself continues to exercise a skeptic reserve to the very close of the dialogue,
he does so because the conclusion has come to be entangled with certain
assumptions-in particular the assumption that happiness attaches to virtue
-which he thinks too important to be taken for granted and which,
as a matter of fact, he undertakes to establish later. And it is in the course
of this attempt that he finds the Sophists, the Expediency Men of the time,
like lions in his path.
In this manner the Charmides leads into that section of the moral
group which I have distinguished as the anti-Sophistic-the Protagoras,
the Gorgias, and the Thrasymachus, to which should be added as a
by-play, or possibly a preface, the Euthydemus. Their content is so imbedded with Plato's moral philosophy that it would be impossible, if not
impertinent, to discuss them in detachment. They are all directed in their
main issue to the final consolidation of virtue or righteousness with happiness (EMmµov(a), as I must call it for the time being in default of a
better English term and in anticipation of a definition, though it may
not be amiss to notice that this happiness or eudaemony is quite independent of pleasure in the ordinary sense and is not identical on the one
hand with content or self-satisfaction in the worldly signification usual to
those terms, or yet on the other hand with beatitude or blessedness in the
Christian acceptation, being more moral and intellectual than the latter and
more religious than the former.
The Protagoras, or the Sabbath of the Sophists, posing Hippias and
Prodicus as well as the titular character, propounds two problems: can
virtue be taught? and, is virtue one? The former is an extension of the
previous question, is virtue knowledge? For as knowledge it can be
taught; otherwise, not. And yet the second question of the Protagoras
is answered by the suggestion that all the virtues communicate in knowledge; while the first question is left, with apparent inconsequence, as a
quandary, despite the fact that on the principle developed an affirmative
answer would seem to be indicated. In extenuation of the absurdity of
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such an outcome, however, there are several more or less obvious considerations. The characteristic Socratic pose consistently maintained hitherto is that of the ironic know-nothing whose office it is to test the foundations of opinion, however imposing the superstructure. The elenchus has
two arms; what blame if Socrates continues as he has been doing to use
the left in this emergency against the clique of Sophists immediately confronting him? The thesis that virtue is teachable was as indispensable to
the Sophistic propaganda then as it is now-and is a concession that can
never be granted them. There is more to virtue, if not to knowledge,
than appears in the pedagogy of the Sophists, more than can be expressed
in the formula, as we put it to-day, that education is a science. It is but
a half-truth as so stated: and in the hands of Protagoras, or even a
Prodicus, to say nothing of a Hippias, a very dangerous and even fatal
half-truth indeed. Virtue consists not with the kind of knowledge that
they possessed or imparted. It is not only wisdom; it is somehow happiness too, as Plato had already begun to see in the Charmides. And it is the
dt'eper implications of this dawning idea that he reserves very properly
against Protagoras and his associates.
To .an account of this connotation of virtue as righteousness, then,
Plato addresses himself directly in the Gorgias. ,In; spite of apparent sideissues and digressions the event is clear. For once Socrates commits himself, now that the time is ripe, to, an affirmation, and in the final paragraphs, with their strength of the last judgment, summarizes in so many
words the results of the discussion. But again, before he can reach a
decision, he finds the Sophists barring the way. This time it is Gorgias,
the belletrist, with his hypocrite rhetoric, 27 and Callicles, the "naturalist,"
with his unabashed sensationalism, who dispute his passage.28 As against
Gorgias, abetted by his pupil Polus, he denies the legitimacy of his "art."
It is but practice-to play upon the Elizabethan sense of the word-or
craft-to play upon our own word-it is empiric and imposture; at best
it is a trade, not art. Its sole science is amathia, the assumption of a
knowledge which it does not possess; its hope is in the gullibility of the
ignorant; its profit in the masking and disguising of vice and the counterfeiting of virtue:-there is no health in it. Against Callicles, on the other
hand, he asserts, now that the way is cleared, his fundamental tenet-the
concurrence of truth, beauty, and goodness in happiness as contrasted with
27 I have not overlooked the distinction which Plato draws between Sophist and
Rhetorician in the Gorgias, 520b; but for practical purposes I disregard it in accordance
with Plato's more common usage; it is irrelevant to the present issue.
28 It is difficult to translate these terms without ambiguity. The association is sug•
gestive of Nietzsche's distinction of sch/echt and bose. The Greek words are 'tO
LO')tUQO'tEQO'V, 1:0 XQEinov,
tW,1:wv.-Gorgias, 488c-d.
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the Sophistic coincidence of strength, superiority, and excellence with
prosperity.
"Among the many statements we have made, while all the others have
been refuted, this alone is unshaken-that doing wrong is more to be
avoided than suffering it; that above all a man should study not to seem
but to be good both in private and public. . . . Take my advice, therefore, and follow me where, if you once arrive, you will be happy both in
life and death. • . . And allow anyone to condemn you as a fool and to
treat you despitcfully, if he wishes ... for you will come to no harm,
if you arc a really good and righteous man, practicing virtue. . . • Let us
therefore take as our guide the ·doctrine now disclosed which indicates to
us that this way of life is best, to live and die in the practice of justice and
every other virtue."29 In such wise he justifies his reserves of the Charmides
and the Protagoras at the same time that he discloses his own position.
The Gorgias-in Renouvier's just expression, "certainement un des plus
beaux et rares ouvrages des litteratures de tous les temps et de trms /es
peuple/'80-is Plato's masterpiece. It contains not only the Platonic credo
but the essentials of Platonism as well. In discriminating between pleasures
and in disengaging happiness from material prosperity and attaching it to
virtue, the dialogue seats morality upon a firm and intelligible foundation.
In this respect Plato never surpassed or outdistanced it; he could do no
more than develop and reinforce it. If anything, the first book of the
Republic-sometimes called the T hrasymachus-would mark a retrogression, as I have already noticed, by its insistence upon the particular and
singular justice of a part rather than of the whole man, if, there were not
some reason to believe that the first sketch of this one book antedates the
rest of the work. In compensation the first part of the second book, with
its recognition of the absolute self-sufficiency of that integral justice which
is the health of the whole soul-that virtue which is one-may perhaps
be counted an actual advance.81 To be sure, the acknowledgment is made
by Adeimantus hypothetically as a thesis for demonstration. But what of
that, since Plato accepts the challenge and assumes the burden of proof?
Such is the sense of the Republic. Ostensibly it is a similitude; actually
it is a double entendre (in the literal sense of the words), and not without ambiguity for the modern mind as the writer appears· to become
entangled in his own figure. Taken as a symbol it is a· magnification, the
majuscule or capital of the inner or spiritual city, the city of the soul.32
Taken literally it is an image of virtue or justice in man as a social
29 Gorgias, 527b-e. Substantially Lamb's translation.
80 Philosophie Analytique de l'Histoire, t. I, p. 456.
81 Republic, 367c.

s2 71 Aav-iou n:61..t~, Republic, 592a.
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being. On the whole, it may be said roughly to seek a solution to the
problem of the happy state or society as that in which its members are
regulated by the measure of justice. What confusion there is may be
explained by the fact that our double justice-the personal': and the social,
the moral and the ethical-did not exist for Plato; for him the good
state was the state of the good man.32
That Plato's doctrine of ideas is affiliated with his moralism is a
reasonable supposition. Certainly the ideas themselves, in their first intention, are not a necessity of epistemology but of morality. The originals
have all something of the character of moral standards. Piety, courage,
sophrosyne, justice-even phronesis, or intelligence, and beauty connote an
obligation, as does all knowledge; they are at least suggestive of what we
should call duty. If virtue does not subsist by favor either of man or of
gods, it must have being somehow in itself. In this light the dialogues of
the ideas appear as supplementary to the dialogues of the virtues. And
with a little good will the Greater Hippias may be taken, together with the
Euthyphro, as an introduction. It still holds to some of the earlier threads:
it is intolerant, in the same old fashion, of sophistry masquerading as
wisdom, and culminates with the confusion of Hippias, the "knowledgeable"; it is equally ardent in the pursuit of definition and equally inconclusive in the upshot. But in particular, while simple and plain-spoken,
it is conversant with certain turns of phrase and thought peculiar to the
doctrine and is familiar with the general notion of participation.34 It is a
sprightly dialogue too, whoever wrote it. One might do worse than to
read it before proceeding to the Meno, the Symposium, and the Phtedrus,
with which dialogue the Phtedo is to be properly affiliated.
While the subject of these dialogues is too vast for this sort of cursory
analysis, the ideas in their broader significance may be loosely defined as
those lovely forms ( µo()«.pat), those beautiful apparitions ( Etl>ri, ll>Em) of
reality to the soul by whose assistance it is enabled in some sort to make
the world of sense intelligible so far' as it happens to resemble them. Their
presence to the mind is explained in the Meno by the supposition of
reminiscence. Use and wont notwithstanding, I hesitate to speak of it as a
doctrine; for taken literally it carries little or no conviction. It is rather a
mythic expression, a figure, for the common experience wherein our happier
conceptions seem, not to be invented or excogitated, but discovered--or
3 3 I should like to cite /as in point an open letter from one of our great American
politicians, reputed a stateman, before a late Presidential election, urging the voters to
let the moral issues alone, and to direct their attention, where it belonged, to economic
ones.
34 For example, a:irto To ,wJ.ov oTt foTl, 286d; and a.u'to To ,mMv, qi ,ml

'tUAA(J. ltU.V't(l xo<1µ1,i:'tm xal xaA.u <pULVE'tat, Z·89d.
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rather, recovered, so that the perception of truth appears as a recollection
of something known long since and lost awhile.35 It is a kind of symbolism
akin to that which distinguishes the Symposiumi and the Pha:drus among
the other writings of Plato; and as a characteristic it marks the close of
the period in which Plato was able to rest satisfied with the spiritual
apprehension of truth, untroubled by rationalistic misgivings.
As for the Symposium and the Pha:drus, they are directed rather to
the process and discipline whereby the soul may come to a better appreciation of these divine manifestations, the ideas. With the Apology they
are probably the best and most widely known of the dialogues and are of
themselves mainly responsible for the romantic Plato, the mystic and
ecstatic Plato of common report. Like all symbolic or allegorical presentments they are, it must be acknowledged, fluid and elusive, as it were
images or reflections in water; the worst that can be said of them, even
by one who sympathizes rather with the severity of the moralist, is that
they are poetry. Nevertheless they have, each of them, a solid core of
actuality. No more dramatic representation of life and character was ever
written than the Symposium. The Pha:drus, on the contrary, is a curious
medley, with its idyllic setting undet the plane tree, its' ode and palinode,
it& rhetorical criticism, its passing comments on current and contemporaneous authors, and its lofty myth of the charioteer and splendid vision
of the celestial clime ( -rov 'U:ltEQO'UQCI.VLOV -r6:1tov, 247e ), the region of
truth (-ro w.'l]'3dai;: :1tEMov, 248b) and the abode of the ideas.
It is at some such point as this-perhaps, with the very vision of the
Pha:drus-that Plato's philosophy culminates. Not that the remainder of
his course is unillumined; but that the spirit-I am tempted to call, it the
justice-which makes him what he uniquely is, that balance of faculties
which constitutes his greatness as a moralist has been disturbed. His
respect for the rights of good sense ( the xowal evvotm of which Plutarch
makes so much as a good academician against the Stoics), his appreciation
of actuality, his faith in insight-in a word his feeling for the just measure
begins to fail him; and he inclines more and more to prefer "intellection"
before intelligence ( dianoea before noesis) and to put his trust in that
"false secondary power" of the reason which ignores or neglects the primary distinctions of consciousness in the interests of an artificial logical
consistency. The problem of the one and the many degenerates into the
"Pythagorean" dogma of the "mixture" or "composition"; the doctrine of
M For the romantic notion of truth and its apprehension compare Emerson: "When

good is near you, when you have life in yourself, it is not by any known or accustomed

way; you shal\ not discern the footprints of any other; you shall not see the face of
man; you shall not hear any name:--the way, the thought, the good shall be wholly
strange and new.''--Self-Reliance. The italics are mine.
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ideas is metamorphosed into a grammar of predication and a logic of
categories ( YEVl'J); the nature of truth and error, of reality and unreality
(the very foundation of Plato's dualism) becomes hopelessly involved in the
umbrageous mazes of ontology; definition is stripped to a skeleton of
dichotomy-the whole Platonic ideism totters precariously on the brink of
idealism-what we call idealism.36 It is with this Plato and his works
that the epistemologists and the whole busy army of rationalists of one
stripe and another find their affair. But for the reader whose interest is in
the moral interpretation of life a hasty summary of this period should
here suffice.
That Plato was more or less subject to distraction in a manner which
makes him appear inferior to Socrates in the article of character is a
fact which his admirers have to make the best of. It is accountable, to a
certain extent, for his unsystematic treatment of his ideas-fortunate though
in this instan.ce we may esteem the consequence; and to this extent we
have been reckoning with it in following the windings and meanders of
his philosophy. To the impatience of youth and the impetuosity o{ manhood some degree of desultoriness is excusable. But Plato's two visits
to Syracuse as a sexagenarian, in the fourth decade of the century, are
another matter. To the former it is probable that he sacrificed the
Thea:tetus, upon which, there is reason to suppose, he was working at
the time, and whose spirit he never succeeded in 'recapturing after his
return to Athens. But be this as it may, is it unreasonable to see in these
two inconsequential excursions an index to his state of mind, corroborated
as it is by the unhappy exposures of the seventh epistle-a momentary
vacancy of vision, a consequent vacillation or self-distrust and a susceptibility to irrelevant 'suggestion, which his lack of any great popular success
or general influence-let us say with his Republic-may have tended to
aggravate?
Under the· circumstances, then, since his entire philosophy-a practical
moral philosophy and way of life-had come to depend finally on knowledge, it is hardly astonishing that he should have felt a certain anxiety
for the cornerstone of his structure and that a teacher, the head of the
Academy, exposed to objection and confrontation, he should have found
himself driven to seek, over and above the inarticulate testimony of the
spirit, some rational account of this knowledge upon which he had built
his house. Nor does it seem improbable either that the searching and
86 With these facts in: the immediate foreground it strikes me as not wholly unnatural to feel more sympathy than irritation with Huit (La Vie et l'<Euvre de Platon:
see t. II, pp. 261-311 in particular) in his summary rejection of the Parmenides, the
Sophist, and the Politician from the Platonic canon; the scenery would be so much
more regular and comfonable without them.
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expounding of the philosophers his predecessors which his duties imposed
upon him, should have confirmed him in this rationalizing vein. So Parmenides, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, even Democritus appear, in the evidence
of his own writings, to have swayed, if not to have shaken, his own mind
successively or alternately. And since to Plato knowledge was essentially
knowledge of the ideas, the Parmenides, which impartially covers the difficulties of the doctrine, may as well be read in advance of the dialogues
which I have huddled together under the title of metaphysical.
Considered light-heartedly, the Parmenides is one of the funniest things
in philosophy-the youthful Socrates, the future champion of sound sense
and right reason, taking a lesson, open-mouthed, in ontological rigmarole
from the old Eleatic dialectician, in the company of Zeno, the subtle
juggler of apory and paradox! And what is the sense or the symbolism
of Socrates' posing not merely as one of "the friends of the ideas" but
as their responsible proponent? Is it part of the comedy of the situation?
Or a pretext, in compliment to Parmenides, to run the ideas into his harbor
and under his guns? Seriously, however, the dialogue does seem to dispose,
in ironic wise, of the Parmenidean unity, as the Thea:tetus supplementing
the Cratylus reckons in a corresponding portion with the Heraclitean
mutable, which is, to all intents and purposes, a multiplicity or many.
Whatever the force of the argument as such, the impression finally results
somehow that neither of these two principles, the absolute and the flux,
being and becoming, is adequate individually as a complete account of
reality in the extensive sense of the term.
By this time-with the second part of the Thea:tetus, to be more exactthe Platonic genre has begun to lose its character. Philosophy appears; no
longer as a way of life capable of dramatic representation. Dialogue and
dialectic have parted company; discussion is supplanted by disquisition.
The responses of the auditory become scanty and perfunctory or lapse
altogether; while like "an imperfect actor on the stage," the old inquisitor
himself "is put beside his part" or elbowed aside by some docent or
other with a cut and dried system or Methodenlehre. The genial pursuit
of truth with its companionable give and take has ceased forever. The
Socratic conversation has stiffened into a set and apathetic convention.
For the rest, the Thea:tetus, apart from the suggestive conceit of Socrates' midwifery and its attack upon Protagoras, is overshadowed by what
has now grown to be pretty much of an obsession with Plato--the problem
of epistemology. Not that he ever finds a positive answer to the question,
what is knowledge. The only answer possible to his philosophy he has
already given in the Symposium and the Pha:drus; for "it is not definable
like the sciences; but after being long brooded and dwelt upon it springs
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up of a sudden in the soul, as light kindles on the throbbing of a fire,
and there maintains itself." The pity of it is that he should have wasted
so much of his precious time in searching for a definition that when found
would have been at best only a definition of science after all. For the
Sophist and the Statesman too, though their bearing is quite different from
that of the T heeetetus, betray the same preoccupation. It is apparent in
the dichotomy, that abortive attempt at methodology, peculiar to the two
later dialogues, to say nothing of the curious quirk given to the discussion of truth and error in the Sophist, as well as 'in the Theeetetus,
whereby the contradiction of reality and unreality is rationalized into the
complement of some and other ·in the predication of being and not being.
As for the Philosopher, the final member of the trilogy ( or tetralogy, if
the Theeetetus is to be counted in) which was to draw, in contrast with
the Sophist and in extension of the Statesman, the portrait of the genuine
ruler or legislator, no trickster or bungler, but master of the royal art,
the kingly man who knows and is able (in Carlyle's dubious but suggestive etymology )-as for him, it may be that in default of such a
rationalistic definition of knowledge or truth Plato felt in his mood of
disappointment too heavily handicapped to undertake him. Or did he
hesitate in despair at last of the philosopher's competence to deal with the
vice, intolerance, and folly of this sensible world? 'It is inconceivable that
he could have voiced the doubt so eloquently as he has done in the
Theeetetus and elsewhere37 if it had not lain so cold and heavy on his
old age.
Defeated, then, in his attempt at a "critical" philosophy-a failure to
which he frankly confesses in the Philebus38-he drops, with his usual
impatience at difficulties, the plan for a Philosopher altogether, and turning from knowledge itself to its subject-matter or content, launches in the
Timeeus upon an account of creation, the metaphysical kernel of which
is discernible through the account of the mixture ( 'tO µtx't6v) as it is figured
in the Philebus.39 Call the Timeeus myth or metaphor or what you will,
there is still a doubt in my mind whether Plato for the nonce was not
the dupe of Empedocles and Democritus.40 To the Plato of the Meno
and the Pheedo, the Plato of the ideas and of the reminiscence, for whom
the mystery of being lay within, in the soul of man, absolute commencements were at best absurdity; and it is tempting to ascribe to the Plato
of the Timeeus a consistent sentiment: "That for your physical genesis!
But since there is no certainty about becoming, nor any sense or knowledge,
172-177.
59a and b.
39 Philehus, 23-27.
40 See Eva Sachs: Die fiinf platonischen Korper.

37 ThetEtetus,
38 Philehus,

29

30

PLATO

let us conceive of actuality genetically, as men are ever prone to think of
nature, in this patricular way, as if and as though." 41 And yet agreeable
as such a subterfuge is, still in view of the sources and the chronology of
the dialogue, it strains my credulity to believe that Plato did not attach a
positive or even scientific value to this cosmology, as the last recourse, it
may be, of his rationalizing speculatioru. To think otherwise is to misrepresent the character of this particular stage of his development. Partic•
ularly in view of the renewing ascendancy of science after its "bankruptcy" in the fifth century it is difficult to see the Tima:us otherwise than
as an attempt on the part of its author to produce at last a Natur-Philosophie, a complete deductive account of natural phenomena. The speculations and experiments of Archytas, Theodorus, Thea!tetus, and Eudoxus
-the comprehension of the five regular bodies, the discovery of irrational
numbers, the foundation of stereometry, the deduction of the form of the
earth and perhaps of its mobility-were all of a nature to arouse Plato's
curiosity, and in his state of mind to stimulate his faculty of generalization
and synthesis. How otherwise are we to account for the final transformation whereby the ideas incline to become a kind of concepts which can be
formulated as number-that is to say as ratios comparable after their kind
with our H20's and ½MV2's? 42 No, whatever you may make of this
period scientifically, it is impossible to dispose of it philosophically otherwise than as a period of gradual though fairly constant decline.
Nor is the Laws, at the end of the long procession of dialogues, exceptional in any way or out of order. Taken as a whole-if what is properly
a collection of remains, a Nachlass, may· be so taken-it represents in
another field the rationalism of Plato's final period: as compared with the
Republic it is so unmistakably practical and mundane in temper that it
amounts to little less than a palinode of the earlier dialogue. What has
become of the gold and silver men who graced his earlier polity, and of
the higher education which was to elevate and sustain them? Where is
the noble aristocracy of philosophers, legislators, and guardians of the commonwealth? For these regimented colonists of the Laws are all alike and
of one sort, without distinction, hence without justice-as it were the
third estate, the estate of concupiscent or average sensual men, drawn as a
pis-aller from the obscurity in, which the Republic had left it-a Platonic
Philistia. To the impartial reader the main interest of the compilation,
for which we have to thank the pious cares of Plato's famulus or pupil
41 Compare Philebus, 59a.
42 I say nothing further of

the Platonic doctrine of mathematical figures and ideal
numbers as it may be inferred from Aristotle; whatever it amounts to it lies at all
events outside the dialogues. See Leon Robin: La Theorie platonicienne des ldees et des
Nombres d'apres Ari.tote.
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Philippus, must consist in detached sallies and aperrus, of which there
is naturally no dearth, for the voice is still the voice of Plato, though
some of his accents, it may be, will sound sufficiently disconcerting to the
student of his prime.48
Such, then, is the way in which I read the dialogues-or rather, think
of them when I think of them all together and in the mass. That they do
not form a sequence like the chapters of a book, that they are not severally
links in a chain, requires no demonstration. And it is this method, or
want of method, of composition which compels us, when we would examine Plato's thought, to sift it somehow or other into topics. Whatever
the light behind the medium through which he has chosen to transmit it,
it has been broken up and dispersed, as by a kind of literary refraction,
into a diversified spectrum of dialogue, from which it is necessary to pick
and match the several colors through all their bewildering gradations of
hue and shade. His conceptions of immortality, of the soul, of reality;
his opinions of rhetoric, art, education; his views of virtue, wisdom, happiness are not revealed completely in a single dialogue or consecutively in
any set of dialogues, but must be sought from one to another and composed at the reader's discretion. That the task of organizing all these
partial syntheses into a single inclusive and consistent system seems to me
impracticable, I have already declared, since I do not believe that such a
system existed whole in Plato's head. Still I would not deny that such
a construction is possible as a tour de force. I would only suggest that it
is much more reasonable and more agreeable with the spirit of Plato to
look upon these traceries and recollections as images, not so much of a
single Platonic idea, as of that one transcendent truth of which Plato's
thought itself was but a faceted reflection.

43 For example, the manner in which he compromises the good old Socratic thesis
that no man does wrong knowingly.-Laws, 860d, et seq.
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I
Of all Platonic themes the doctrine of ideas is the most profound and
serious. Not that I pretend to understand it save in a general way; very
likely it is one of those intuitions which are never to be understood exactly
even by their author. But I have a suspicion that if I could get to the
bottom of it, I should find myself not only at the root of Platonism but
of all philosophy and religion as well-perhaps "within the eventual element of calm" itself. So much of stability amid "the wheel and the drift
of things" does it seem to promise. How it may be with others I cannot
say, but for my own part I am unable to find very much satisfaction in
the perpetuity of change, or take any great comfort in the eternity of
progress. Even the contemplation of illimitable imperfection and the prospect of unceasing process fail to inspire me with enthusiasm. A life that
slips through our fingers moment by moment, a world that shifts uneasily
from one inconceivable transformation to another-such contingency, to
my mind, carries but slight assurance of reality. It is not that I deny the
existence of what we call an outward or extended world, a world of fact
or event; what I question is its credibility. Its secret, if it has one, I doubt
we shall ever learn. And so we busy ourselves with our little myths and
fancies, just as Plato did when he too was at a loss-poetry, art, metaphysics, science. In such a world I can put no greater faith than in the
fictions which purport to represent it. It affords me no security or peace;
it only fills me with incredulity and misgiving. Nor, indeed, if I may
rely upon my own convictions, is this the only world in which I live.
I have at least intimations of another, not of my own making either, for I
must claim no greater originality for consciousness than for sense. They are
both witnesses, as both worlds are presentations. Only as the eye perceives the visible, may the mind discern the intelligible. But the intelligible
has at least the advantage for me of being the more authentic and trustworthy. Such, as I understan~ it, is the teaching of Plato in his doctrine
of ideas; such, its gravity and consequence.
"Change and decay in all around I see;
0 Thou who changest not, abide with me."
"Denke class die Gunst der Musen
U nvergangliches verheisst,
Den Gehalt in deinem Busen
Und die Form in deinem Geist."
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When it is remembered that Plato began his career as a moralist and
so continued for the greater part of his life; that he turned logician and
metaphysician only in what are admittedly his very late if not his latest
dialogues; that in the dialogues which are generally acknowledged to
intervene between the two periods he is occupied with the ideas-when
these considerations are mustered and reviewed, it would seem like the
veriest chronological blunder to search for the origin of his ideas amid
the logical and metaphysical speculations which engrossed his declining
years. The evidences point so unanimously to another antecedent. Even
his dabblings in logic and metaphysics and rationalism in general, when
viewed in their natural perspective, appear but the result of the perplexities
of the moralist, as witness his constant references, when engaged in such
discussions, to difficulties already incurred and admitted. And this documentary testimony to the moral genesis of the doctrine is confirmed by
a recollection of its author's character and situation.
The pre-eminence of Plato is established in his moralism. If anything
were needed to prove the ascendancy of the moral motive over his spirit,
the Republic alone would serve the turn. The projected polity is a moral
institution founded upon the moral constitution of the individual and for
its advantage and improvement, while the governors or rulers are qualified
not merely by the superiority of their moral character1 but by their knowledge of thei good itself as essence or idea. In Matthew Arnold's phrase,
life was to Plato in all its concerns a moral affair. As a logician and metaphysician he has been surpassed and superseded; as a moralist he belongs
in the succession of .iEschylus and Sophocles, and that is as much as to say
in the great indefectible1 tradition of human culture.
For an exposition of the views of the two dramatists this is hardly the
occasion. 1 It is enough to say, what perhaps no one will feel like disputing
when stated in general terms, that their tragedy may be conceived philo"
sophically as an attempt to illustrate the operations of a moral law inherent somehow in the ultimate constitution of reality, if not constituting
the ultimate itself. Very likely I should be better advised to call it a
principle, since it was thought of neither as a statute nor as a formula,
the two notions which we commonly associate with the word law to-day.
Rather it was looked upon as a character or nature, the nature of the
cosmos as the institute and seat of order, and hence itself the principle
or essence of that cosmic seemliness and propriety. To be sure, it might
find tentative and partial expression in some semi-articulate sense of paramount or "divine" obligation or duty, like Antigone's ayQM'ta v6µtµa;
but on the whole it was not to be comprehended in prescripts or edicts or
1

I have already discussed the subject at some length in my Romance and Tragedy.
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to be otherwise defined or circumscribed by words. Indeed, what strikes
the reader of 1Eschylus and Sophocles is in the last resort the atmosphere
of baffling and impenetrable mystery with which it is invested.2 But for
all that it had its evidences. Whoever neglected or omitted to conform
to this order or organization-whoever failed, that is, to participate in its
nature or virtue-was automatically determined to disaster or destruction.
He was unfit and invalid; and his activity was bound to be a source of
moral offense and frustration.
Nor, it is only just to remark, are glimpses of such a morat disposition
wanting to the "physical" speculations of the early philosophers-the last
place where one would be likely to look for them who allowed his mind to
be swayed by the tyranny of scholastic names and classifications. To heap
up citations would be easy; but one or two should serve the purpose. Take
for example that fragment of Anaximander's in which he declares that
"into those things out of which all are generated, into these they decay
again, as is meet; for they make reparation and compensation, for
their wrong-doing, to one another, according to the order of time." 3
And may I be excused the rather obvious reference to Heraclitus' observation, "The sun will not overstep his measures; otherwise the Erinyes, the
handmaids of Justice, will find him out"? 4 As a religious teacher Empedocles is not so much to the point, perhaps; still the following fragment is
interesting in this connection: "But the law for all extends far and wide
through the wide-ruling air and the measureless splendor of heaven." 5
But these are adumbrations, or perhaps reliquite. It took the genius of
1Eschylus and Sophocles to disentangle the principle from the physical
clutter in which it was involved and to apply it to the problem of human
happiness and misery. And even they, for all their powers of divination,
succeeded in tracing it but darkly through the envelopes of exceptional
circumstance and in, the dubious fortunes of particular men.
That is the disadvantage of art. At best it is but "the illusion of a
higher reality"-but still, as Plato saw, an illusion after all. It may illustrate truth; what it purports to represent are facts, whose authenticity is
open to question and whose interpretation is subject to doubt. Its actuality is a fiction; its reality, a similitude. It is only a symbol, and its
2 Observe how studiously Plato at a much later and more advanced date declines
Adeimantus' and Glaucon's invitation to define the good, the supreme moral reality
or idea.-Republic, 506.
3 Diels: Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 2, 9.
Cp. Burnet: Early Greek Philosophy,
3d ed., p. 52, note 6.
4 Bywater, xxix; Diels, 12B, 94; Burnet, p. 135.
5 Diels, 21 B, 135; Burnet, p. 225. For the incubation and gestation of these
notions I am not here concerned. Anyone who is will find sufficient pasturage for
curiosity and amazement in F. M. Cornford's From Religion to Philosophy.
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significance is always implicit and equivocal. And yet beneath the mask
of Attic tragedy it is possible to detect more than one feature which
should put the reader in mind of Plato-the conception of a universal
moral frame or structure ( and what else is implied by the Platonic terms
form and idea) and of the cosmos as a system existing in view of a
supreme or spiritual6 good; together with the notion of this moral principle
as a kind of essence communicating reality or being to its participants and
in its regulative aspects or activity insuring the virtue or order of the
universe by the inevitable force of a native bent or propensity.
It may be objected that in what precedes I have been arguing the
obvious. Every human being, I may be told, is convinced in his heart
of the moral administration of the world. And to a certain extent, perhaps,
the reproach is just. But to the popular imagination such policing has
usually been done by one or more superhuman beings in their own
interest and in accordance with their own will or caprice; it has been pretty
much the conveniency of the mighty; and with them it has been possible
to bargain and compound. With the decline of religion, however-a transitory aberration of the human spirit in any case, I shall probably be
assured-the edifice of morality is securely reforming on the foundations
of social convention, somewhat after the conception of the Sophists; mankind may have doubts about the day of judgment, but they are certain
of public opinion, and the approval or condemnation of their neighbors,
with the rewards or punishments accruing. But all this is very different
from a faith in an impartial moral constitution or nature, to which all
men are as liable as they are to gravitation ( whatever that may be) and
which they can neither browbeat after the fashion of Thrasymachus nor
cajole after that of Euthyphro; it is not a belief in a cosmos fundamentally
moral in character and operation. Nor does Matthew Arnold's "power
not ourselves that makes for righteousness" bespeak just such a confidence
either. Very likely there is a sense of virtue in all but the most debasedor so we are pleased to think. Incredulous as man may be of moral consequences, he will nevertheless recognize and even admire goodness; he
will probably, like Polus, consider the state of the just man more respectable, possibly more desirable, than that of the wrong-doer. But this
is to make of righteousness an ideal, as Grote seems to think that Plato
is trying to do in the Gorgias. 7 And it was in none of these ways that
those earlier sages who had the vision conceived of the good. For them
it was neither a superstition nor a convention nor an ideal; it was neither
incidental nor accidental nor wilful: it was an essential and fatal reality.
And it is for this reason-because Plato enters upon this faith and makes
Such is the sense of the Greek word divine.
7 See Grote's Plato, Chap. XXII.
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it his possession-that I have written him m the succession of 1Eschylus
and Sophocles in the place of Euripides, who sold his heritage for a
portion of rationalism and took up his dwelling, though the greatest of
them, in the tents of the Sophists.
One other name it might have been necessary to interpolate in the
series, if Socrates had had the genius or knack of authorship. Perhapsfor it is not impossible that Socrates' philosophical powers have been overrated. It is so hard to lay hands on the man himself. There is the Socrates
of Aristotle, the inventor of definition and "induction;" and the Socrates
of Aristophanes, the "meteorologist" or physicist; and there are the Socrates'
of Xenophon and Plato, not to say of Antisthenes and 1Eschines, moralists
all of them, however they may differ among themselves. But what are
the respective contributions of sitter and painter? It is curious at least
that the attempts of the Platonic Socrates at definition are so generally
abortive. 8 Curious, too, that the Xenophontic Socrates deems physical science
not only useless but impious,9 while the philosophical stock in trade of
both the Xenophontic and Platonic Socrates consists of several commonplaces of fifth century controversy. What transpires through the representations-at least those of Xenophon or Plato-is not so much a philosophy as an influence, not a doctrine but an inspiration.
As a matter of history there are few teachers who have been successful
in uniting so many diverse suffrages-Euripides, 1Eschines, Euclid, Ph.rdo,
Xenophon, Aristippus, Antisthenes, Plato himself; Socrates must have had
a side, if not several sides, for each of them. Indeed I sometimes wonder
whether his various elements did not to some extent balk one another, as
the rain flattens the sea and the wind checks the frost. After all, say what
you please, there is too often a kind of one-sidedness or immoderation
about great achievement, be it what it will; it is seldom the result of a
perfect equilibrium. Certainly there must have been a good deal of the
rationalist about the man Socrates, or he would never have found so
ready an audience in Euripides. That he was hard-headed, shrewd, ironic,
skeptical, all his witnesses agree. And if he seems a little nai'f, as well, as
he does to Aristophanes, the note is not wholly incompatible with the
character of rationalism either. The interview with Theodote the courtesan, wherever it comes from, must have been appropriated by Xenophon
8 I need refer only to the Charmides and the first book of the Republic with their
defective definitions of sophrosyne and justice; though at the same time it must be
added that Socrates occasionally brings off a definition by way of illustration, as in
the Meno, 75b and 76a. But for that matter, if his chief merit lie in the discovery of
definition, why are not the genuine Socratic dialogues, for example, the Sophistes and
the Politicus? Cp. Stenzel: Studien zur Entwicklung der platonjschen Dialektik tton
Sokrates zu Aristoteles, pp. 47-48.
9 Memorabilia, I, iii. Cp. the Phtrdo, 96-100.
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for cause.10 It may seem like caricature; but the impression is rectified by
one stroke and another-of a curiosity whetted with inquisitiveness, avid
of all kinds of miscellaneous information; the common-sense appetite for
odds and ends of knowledge with its vexatious questioning and disarming
simplicity-a "picker-up of learning's crumbs." Nor was his intellect
without astringency either; it is always slightly styptic-a contractile mind,
as is illustrated in Antisthenes. Whence his taste for definition-for whatever his dialectic skill, his penchant for that sort of exercise cannot be
gainsaid. He has a passion for neatness, definiteness, exactness; for the
right line and the truci edge-for the just level and the plumb. And unfortunately much of Plato's philosophy was loose and unknit and elastic;
it was the price he paid for reality-an extravagance at which Socrates
would not unlikely have boggled.
The so-called Socratic theses into which Socrates' moralism would
seem to have knotted itself in accordance with this disposition of his
spirit are three or four in number. The questions to which they served
as answers were moot questions of the fifth century, the spring-time of
Greek rationalism or enlightenment, and subjects of debate particularly
among the elder Sophists. It would be surprising if Socrates, being without a system or framework of his own whether by principle or temperament, should not have sought to define his convictions by reference to
such "burning questions" of his day, so that the propositions by which
he has done so may be taken to reflect, in a manner, his whole moral
philosophy. Nor is it any less natural that Plato at the beginning of his
career, himself in turn wanting as yet a settled habit of belief, should
have picked up such pregnant sentences with the idea of clarifying his
own thought in the act of expounding and illustrating his master's.
Where he innovates and originates it is not always possible to decide
with certainty. There are those who would have us believe that the
single hand of Plato is at work only in the logic and metaphysics of the
latest period. But on the whole it seems unprofitable to attempt to separate decisively the Plato and the Socrates of the dialogues. After his
derivation has once been noticed it is saner-certainly it is easier-to look
upon the Platonic Socrates as a dramatic character and to follow the
thought rather than the thinkers. What discriminations we do make,
when we must discriminate within the dialogues themselves, are much
better made in the sense of tradition. At best they are only hypothetical
and suggested in the interests of a thought to which Plato, in salvaging
it, has established an indisputable title, no matter from what port it first
sailed. In fact, if I dare express myself to that effect, I think the historical
10 Memorabilia, III, xi.
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Socrates' contribution to the dialogues much smaller than we generally like
for sentimental reasons to believe-with the exception I have just mentioned
in favor of his inspiration.
"Virtue is one," "virtue is knowledge," "virtue is happiness," "virtue
can be taught," "no man does wrong willingly"-these maxims named of
Socrates, represent at all events Plato's point of departure. That' he is not
certain as yet in just what manner they are to be taken is evident from
the dubitations and contradictions of the earlier dialogues-it is very
largely from this source that Socrates has drawn his ironic reputation of
the know-nothing; 11 he is downright and opinionated enough in Xenophon.12 It results clearly too from the same premise that in Plato's eyes at
least these aphorisms served to formulate the Socratic creed, whatever
might be their proper interpretation. There is between them an obvious
2nd matter-of-course connection which could hardly have escaped his notice.
If virtue is knowledge-and it certainly presupposes some sort of discrimination, just as knowledge in turn implies and carries an obligationit must be one and capable in so far of being imparted; while if it
ensures well-being or prosperity, as the phraseology of experience seems
to argue-to have done well is as ambiguous in English as in Greekno one will deliberately traverse it save in ignorance of his own interests.
But such an argument is wholly superficial. And Plato must have often
wondered, even while the voice of Socrates was yet in his ears, what
knowledge this is which is virtue; that it is any kind of common or
technical knowledge he explicitly denies, Socrates' constant suggestions to
the contrary notwithstanding. For us, with our after-information, to answer
the question for him is easy enough: knowledge of the ideas, we should
say, and of the idea of good in particular. But it took Plato a great while
and a great many steps to reach this conclusion; in a sense his whole
philosophy may be viewed as the result of his attempt to solve the problem
in its several developments; most of his first and some of the succeeding
dialogues are concerned with it specifically. Such is the theme of the
Charmides and the Laches; it underlies the Protagoras, the Euthydemus,
the Meno; in short, it was always more or less in possession of Plato's
mind. Nevertheless, while this very possibly is the spur which incites
his moral speculations, it is not always in his flank. Indeed he can
hardly be said to have slighted any of the questions raised by his master.
But the subject which gradually comes to predominate over the others
and engrosses his interest is rather that of the relationship of virtue and
happiness. It is the topic of the Gorgias and in a large way of the Republic.
11 See

The,ztetus, 150c.

12 Possibly through the influence of Antisthenes?
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If we are to judge from the length of his journey alone, he could
not have taken the solution ready-made from Socrates. And in addition
there is the character of Socrates to be reckoned with. For Socrates, with
his practical prejudices and his good- sense, the well-being which was the
reward of virtue was not wholly divested of worldly advantage or at
least of physical satisfaction,13 for the Greeks were naturally men of
this world. I will not deny that he had transcended the vulgar notion
of material prosperity or that he had discriminated among pleasures and
gratifications. Ilut his conception of happiness must have been a great
deal more like that of Aristotle than that at which Plato finally arrived:
his virtue was at best a kind of policy, a relatively sublimated policy, but
still a mode of insurance:-"No evil can happen to the good man alive
or dead." It is fair, I think, to argue that such at least was Plato's understanding of his code, and that at first he was swayed by it as in the
Protagoras, where he is identifying good with pleasure. But in the end
and by the time of the Republic, very great evils and very many of them
might happen to Plato's good man without affecting his happiness. He
might be poor, infirm, and despised; in "disgrace with fortune and men's
eyes;" in pain and misery; imprisoned and in danger of death; he might
even fail to win the approval or consideration of the gods-and his
felicity would remain intact with his virtue.
That Plato actually proves any such proposition, however cheerfully
he undertakes the task, as that man is or can be happy absolutely and
independently of circumstance, is not a fact. In the nature of the case
such a demonstration is impossible. The sentiment must be taken as a
forensic paradox such as Plato, like his compatriots, was so fond of. At
the same time he, and I think Socrates also, would have preferred the
rack to the throne of Archelaus.14 In any case Plato's conception of justice
would deny the permanence or continuance of any such fate for the
righteous; it would have contradicted his belief in the structural justice
of reality and his doctrine of ·reminiscence and the persistence of the soul,
to say nothing of subverting his theory of ideas and of the supreme good
by which the connection of happiness and virtue seems to him to be guaranteed. So difficult is it to divest oneself of all the prepossessions of one's
faith that Plato, I fancy, was incapable of arguing the question in its
stark nakedness at all. But at all events the assertion has this much truth:
not only does it evoke the memory of the Christian martyrs, but it points
unmistakably to Socrates himself, whose practice so far kept pace with his
13 Precisely

as his good was not without a strong tincture of utilitarianism.
'tt dya~ ..otlla, 8 µ'1'jllevo1: dyaitov fo·nv,
oih' o[lla, ecp'l'j, O\l'tl! lleoµat. -Xen., Mem., Ill, vm,. 3.
H See Gorgias, 470d.
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precept that it was upon his example, as we can hardly doubt, that Plato
drew for his own philosophy of the happy man.
Already there is a little something elusive-or as the worldly might
think illusory-about such a conception of virtue and happiness. 15 It
reduced happiness to a spiritual state. And to Plato the horror of wickedness or evil was precisely in this effect-the condition to which it inevitably
by a kind of moral fatality reduced the soul; he likens it again and again
to disease, as he compares righteousness with health. 16 To the grosser
mind of his contemporaries such a notion of virtue as consistent with a
happiness totally insubstantial was wildly fantastic. None the less it was
to Plato the fundamental and final reality; and it is in the attempt to
make a place for such a transcendent causality-to show that virtue and
happiness are states of the soul, the former as its health, the latter as its
well-being-that he found himself led to the discovery of the ideas.
To appreciate the novelty it is necessary to remember how strange to
the Greeks was the conception of an incorporeal reality. Even to Plato
the higher soul was material still-wonderfully fine and tenuous and
subtile-a simple, unitary, indissoluble substance, but by no means immaterial.17 It is the difficulty which Plato has to meet over and over
in arguing his philosophy-the inability of his auditors to grasp the
reality of the idea as such independent of its particular embodiments and
concrete manifestations.18 As far as they were concerned, ideas might
just as well be things; very probably the ordinary Greek would have
thought of justice as a kind of thing, if he had thought of it as a reality
at all. So far then from Plato's introducing a "reification" of abstractions
in the usual sense, he actually spiritualized the commonplace acceptation
of reality by detaching the ideas from their reflections and images
at the same time that he insisted upon their being, as attested in particular
by the conjunction of happiness and virtue, which he accepted finally
as an ultimate datum of consciousness. On this point, where the matter
hinges for the modern, since the immateriality of the ideas is not likely
to disconcert him-on this point there is no chance for mistake, as the
demonstration of the Republic is undertaken to show; in the absence of
other conditions virtue alone is capable of producing such an affection of
the spirit, so that in the rendering of Plato's thought it is hardly too
15 Grote, for example, seems to have difficulty even in understanding it. See his
chapter on the Gorgias again.
16 Cf. Gorgias, 477-478 and Laws, 731c-d.
17 Compare St. Paul's oiiiµa '\l)U)Ctx6-v and oiilµa ii:veuµa,:txov, I Corinthians, XV,
44-45.
l8 See his retort to Meno, "Stop making many out of the one," etc.; Meno, 77a.
Cf. 72d; and on the other hand the compliment to Thea:tetus for his ready comprehension of this sort of conception, Thea:tetus, 147.
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strong a figure to say that virtue is happiness. What is doubtful is
its status with reference to the sensible world. What kind of reality is it?
And what is its mode of influence?
That Plato ever answered these questions, even to his own satisfaction, it would be idle to maintain. They have no answer. But they did
lead him directly to the recognition of a moral nature. If virtue is productive of happiness, if there exists such an intimacy of relation that the
two are found to be inseparable like health and nourishment, can we
go further in the one case than in the other? As well ask why is gravitation. Such is the fundamental order of the world; such is its diathesis.
For after all it is a world of human beings as well as of things, and in so
far it is moral; such is the nature of it. And in this sort it is presided
over by a higher and greater idea even than justice or righteousness-the idea of good.19
And here it seems but prudent to interpose a word of caution with
regard to the use of the term idF-a. In current parlance our idea of good
is the notion that we entertain of it, or pretty nearly what we think
about it. In Platonic language, however, the idea of good is the good
itself, as we speak of the quality of mercy or the science of chemistry.
In this signification the existence of the idea and the good are conjoined-though the kind and manner of its existence may of course
remain doubtful. Whereas in our common nomenclature the existence
of the idea does not imply the existence of its object, or that of which
it is the idea, but merely of the idea alo1,1e; or if we identify the two,
the existence of the good becomes notional as in the Cartesian argument
for the existence of God, which reduces, in our minds, the existence of
God to the existence of the idea of God, and, if anything, rather discredits it in that it is an idea. The matter is elementary, but, as the successive philosophical transformations of the word itself show, it is all
the same an insensible cause of a never-ending confusion, and is responsible
for any amount of nominalistic and conceptualistic misunderstanding and
misrepresentation. On this account the employment of idea for Et~o~ or
t~fo has been unfortunate--as well as for the reason that it fails any
longer to render that suggestion of form or figure which still clings to
the Greek as a synonym of µoQ<pTJ and which is at least illustrative of
Plato's notion of the ideas as giving shape, if only exemplarily or informatively, to the sensible and visible world. To be sure, the Greek word
was as confusing as our own, though after a different fashion; but in
view of our particular quandary it· cannot be insisted too often that Plato
does not differentiate the idea from what we should call its content or
subject. Nor does he mean to attribute to that content or subject the sort
19

Republic, 509.
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of merely abstract existence, the ghostlike reality or subsistence with
which we have come to fob off our ideas and "essences;" in his mind the
two are one and are both real objectively.
As far, then, as there is required an intermediary and connecting term
between virtue and happiness it is supplied by the idea of good. Beyond
this reach, however, Plato does not go. The good is what gives the
world a decisively moral and hence intelligible disposition, what informs
it with significance and relevance-as far as the world has sense and
reality, it is the idea of good which confers that character upon it. I have
spoken hitherto, perhaps, as though Plato thought the universe to be
moral through and through. But there is another side to it. In addition
to the presence of good his philosophy admits a second presence, the
presence of evil-or to mince matters no more than he does, a principle
of indiscrimination and illusion. "It is impossible to be rid of evils," he
says, "for there needs must ever be something opposed to the good." 20
And for him this other is &vaywr1 or necessity, the senseless obstinacy of
change and mutability, that inveterate perversity which makes what we
have come since Aristotle to call 'UA'l'J, or matter so intractable, obdurate,
and unmanageable-yes, and incomprehensible. Viewed in this way it
is identifiable with physical causation, "the realm of law;" for what
is such causation but; the unreasonable persistency of things in their own
shifty and alien ways? In short, it is indistinguishable from matter considered in its principle rather than its material-for Plato had conceived
no substratum for that change which constitutes the subject of necessity.
Or to be free of modern connotations which have reversed him so bewilderingly, it is mere becoming, the flux itself, flowing forever in swift vertiginous eddies and counterfeiting in its fleeting swirls the ideas of reality
which transcend it while incapable of retaining more than a momentary
resemblance to their inalterable perfections.
Such is, according to Plato, the nature of the phenomenal or sensible
world, that world for which we now reserve the name nature exclusively.
In some way or other, which he never succeeded in explaining, this
world of particular things arises by reflection, as it might be, from the
supervention of the ideas upon an originally indeterminate or undifferentiated medium, which is to Plato hardly more than a place or locus
( ,:6:n:o; or )'.O>Qa) as it were the visionary depth of a mirror or other
featureless receptacle (u:n:oao:x;~).21 At all events, whatever it actually was
or is to which Aristotle later gave the name of hyle or matter, it is still
to Plato little better than a simulacrum without permanence or solidity,
without form or consistence, a mere insubstantial screen or impalpable
20 Thea:tetus, 176a.
21 Tima:us, 49 ff.
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background of smoke or shadow, unintelligible in itself, assuming or
rather receiving shapes and appearances mimetically after the pattern of
the ideas alone which impend upon it. 22
But whatever the mystery of its origin or its natural state, the universe,
or rather the aggregate, divides into these two distinct parts or regions-the moral and intelligible and the sensible and conjectural. On the one
hand Plato was too much of a Parmenidean to credit the reality of the
flux in its endless perturbations; on the other, too much of a Heraclitean
to deny its sensationality-if I may coin a word to cover an implication in
which our vocabulary seems wanting-namely, the impudence with which
the phenomenal forces itself upon our attention as though significant and
veritable in its own right. Even to Protag~ras he is willing to concede,
as far as this latter world is concerned, a modicum of truth to the dogma,
"man is the measure of all things." 23 What he will not grant is the
adequacy of this relative as a ground of certainty and a subject of knowledge. Such is the function of the ideas-to serve as the form of knowledge
and of being or reality. With regard to their independence and transcendence he never wavers; they are distinct from the world of concretions
(XWQLCJta) and beyond it (1btbtttva). What perplexes him is their manner
of intercourse or communication with this world, which he denotes by
such vague terms as immanence ( rt<XQOUcr(a) on the side of the ideas
themselves, and participation and imitation (µ(µytcru;) on the •side of the
sensibles (µt3E~tc;), and association (%otvwv[a) of either indifferently,
though rather curiously, while he uses a wealth of illustration drawn from
images, he seems never to have thought of the flux realistically as a kind
of uncleal" mirror or obscure reflection of reality.
Such then is the genesis of the ideas. The core of the Platonic philosophy is stated in so many words by Adeimantus in the Republic and
is accepted by Plato as the thesis for demonstration. The happiness of the
just or righteous-this is the central tenet of Platonism; and it involves the
entire doctrine of the ideas, for it presumes a belief in the objective
reality of virtue as something beside a purely human ideal or a social
convention, and along with it a belief in a congenial moral and intelligible
order. It was a conviction which Plato had reached with the assistance,
perhaps, of his conviction of happiness as the health of the spirit, subject
in the nature of the case to conditions analogous to those of the bodily
or physical soundness. Either there is this efficacy in goodness alone;
or else what passes for justice must be reducible to other terms--expedi22 I need hardly call attention to the fact that under the ministration of our recent
scientific and mathematical metaphysicians philosophy seems to be receding, with the
dissolution of matter, into a pre-Aristo~lian, though I doubt into a Platonic stage.
23 Theiztetus, 166-167.
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ency, utility, convention-in which alternative the universe itself ceases
to be moral or intelligible in the proper sense and turns out to be merely
"natural" in the sense of the Sophists, or as we should say physical ( though
as a matter of fact our own use of the word natural is hardly distinguishable from that of the Sophists themselves) and hence subject exclusively to
blind and inscrutable necessity.
His problem, therefore, is the problem of human happiness-the only
study worthy of the philosopher-the end and aim of living, the summum
bonum. The morality of Socrates is his starting point, which in some
way or other effected a conjunction of virtue and well-being. His first
concern is, after the manner of his master, for a definition-not so much
of virtue (he has not come so far as yet) as of the individual virtues.
And he is inclined to follow his leader in the conjecture-was it much
more to begin with?-that they all have a common ground in knowledge.
To a certain extent his first attempts are miscarriages. The Euthyphro,
the Charmides, the Laches throw him back upon his first position and its
defence-particularly against the Sophists, whose pretensions to the secrets
of knowledge, virtue, and happiness he undertakes to confute. It is a
controversy which results in the deepening and purifying of his own
conceptions: happiness is detached from pleasure and success and refined
of all worldly admixture and dross. Knowledge is liberated from common
opinion or conjecture ( Mi;a); righteousness or justice is separated from
calculation or policy and associated as a higher reality with the supreme
good. Unfortunately, in the case of such a subject, anything in the nature
of demonstration in the ordinary sense is out of the question. It is a kind
of ideal construction upon which he is forced to rely, in lieu of proof,
for the justification of the conclusions at which he has arrived and consistently with which he erects his spiritual polity, his inner city or city
of the soul. His plea reduces finally to something like an appeal to
the idyllic imagination of his auditors.

II
It is impossible, however, to proceed without clearing away what are
bound to appear from this point of view certain misapprehensions and
misrepresentations of Plato's conception. Nor is such a labor merely
negative. Any serious discussion of Platonism, however mistaken its
conclusions, ought to be instructive in some wise. Even this history of
error is of service in turning up the soil and loosening a few of those
obstinate aftergrowths which in gradually fastening themselves upon our
minds finally come to seem an integral part of philosophy itself. We
have travelled a great way, much of it circuitous, since Plato's time, and
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have undergone a great many dubious experiences, until it is one of the
most difficult undertakings in the world to recover the directness and
simplicity of consciousness which was undoubtedly characteristic of his
thought.
Now, of all such distortions or perversions the most humiliating is
that which would make him and his associates the dupes of language and
would see in them the hapless victims of a tricksy vocabulary. It is in
this manner that the ambiguity of such expressions as to do well (
E'O
:rq_>cinetv) is supposed to account for the Socratic identification of virtue
and happiness.
But while such a supposition is too absurd to deserve serious attention, particularly when it -is recalled how perspicaciously Plato sees through
the duplicity of not-being (-ro µiJ ov), it is not so easy to dismiss the
critics of a more philosophical stripe who incline to reduce his philosophy,
wherever possible, to terms of grammatical and logical predication.24
Inasmuch as languag<; is representative, after a fashion, of thought, there
is nothing unreasonable in supposing that some of the problems of mind
should have become implicated in its structure and should in turn be
recoverable from it. In this way metaphysics may come to appear, as
sometimes it is, a pure logomachy or pother about words; but on the other
hand, language may not be incapable on occasions of giving philosophy
itself a lesson. Hence it will perhaps be worth the time and pains to see
what sort of vista such a grammatical or syntactical view of the ideas
is capable of opening.
That all language embodies a sort of general or popular psychology
nobody will dream of disputing. Everyone who undertakes to express
himself through such a medium, tacitly adopts for the purpose a whole
i:et of ready-made hypotheses or assumptions regarding sensation, perception, cognition, and the like. But ancient and even elementary as
some of them may be, the character of these beliefs and conjectures becomes
evident only on reflection at an advanced stage in the development of
the tongue and of those who use it. In this manner we may if we, please
imagine Plato-or if we have scruples against compromising Plato himself,
we may imagine someone else in his place, some Aristocles or otherwithout formal grammar or codification of usage, beginning to concern
himself for the signification of his phraseology.
With regard to that class of words which we know as nouns and
which was one of the very few divisions of speech for which Plato may
have had a distinctive designation,25 though there is some question of
the exactitude of his knowledge even in this case, the general sense was

,:o

24 Gomperz, I
25 See Sophist,

think, is a fair example.
263d.
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superficially clear. Such words appeared names attached to persons and
objects or associated with them, as Aristides or horse. For I take it that when
the Greek, including Plato himself, said, "That is Aristides" or "That is a
horse," he believed that he was referring to an actual man or beast, the
conception of mental figments as the subject of reference being a late,
even a modern, subtlety, although it was forecast by Protagoras. Nor
was he doubtful, either, of the purport of his answer when he replied
appropriately to a certain type of question, "Aristides is just."
At this point, however, he might begin to lose confidence. To be
sure, the interpretation of Aristides offers little or no difficulty, or that of is
-so far. Subject and verb seem perfectly simple and transparent at first
sight-though later they were to make trouble enough and to spare. But
how about just? Suppose our Aristocles under examination, as by the
old inquisitor himself, with respect to the predicate: "What is just?" In
order to frame a reply, aside from the difficulties of definition which are
out of our way at present, he has now to turn his predicate into a subject.
His method of doing so, whatever ingenuity it might have cost in the first
place, had come to be easy enough in the end. He would prefix the
definite article to the neuter singular of the adjective, as we speak of
"the beautiful" or "the just," and he was prepared to make statements
about his predicate too: "The just is so and so."
But how long would it be possible for him to dodge a Socratic crossexamination concerning the status of this 'to St1(mov or the just? Other
subjects appear to be names-ostensibly of persons and things; what is this
'tO S[1(aLOv the name of? 26 As long as the form of the adjective was
retained-as it was for a great while in some instances-this sort of interrogation was not likely to importune the curiosity of the average Greek
citizen unduly, quick-witted as he might be-at least Hippias in the
Hippias Major has difficulty in appreciating the force of it as regards
'to 1(aA6v or the beautiful; and his perplexity is not without parallels in
Plato.21 But in those cases where the neuter adjective had been already
supplanted by a noun or paired with one,28 even the most heedless could
hardly remain insensible of the point when pressed. What then is the
significance of such a subject as justice, and what does it name, if anything?
Now, it is conceivable that in calling such subjects ( or rather their
reference) as the just, 'to SE1(atov, and the beautiful, 'to 1(aA6v, ideas, our
26 With the logical legitimacy of any such performance as I am sketching, I have,
of course, nothing to do just now. The question at present is one of Plato's actual
procedure--did he or Socrates arrive at his ideas by turning predicates into subjects
(not, is it justifiable to do so)? or at all events, how far is such a supposition likely
to illuminate or add to the understanding of his doctrine?
27 Cp. Meno, 72d.
28 As happened to 'tO O'O>qJQO'V, the temperate, and O'COqJQOO'll'V1J, temperance.
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Aristocles-for I still hesitate to commit the Plato of the dialogues-it is
conceivable, I suppose, that he, in place of Plato, might have meant
nothing more, to begin with, than to provide a convenient handle for
this new or newly acquired variety of subject. Nor is it wholly impossible
that in insisting upon their reality and independence he would simply
be affirming their genuineness and distinction as subjects in comparison
with other subjects. "To be sure," he might reply to his Socratic questioner, "they differ from other subjects like Aristides and horse; but at
the same time in the sense of subject they are equally real and viable."
And it may be too that in originating expressions like airro ,c.a{}' a'U't6 he
would have been emphasizing, at first, this contrast as between subject
and predicate, noun and adjective; though by the time he had reached
this point-if he ever had-ho should have been on the verge of a much
more considerable discovery.
I have no desire to be otiose; but since I have spent so much! breath
on this topic already, I may as well run the risk of carrying it a little
farther. Let us suppose, then, that our Socratic quiz, impatient of the
predicate adjective forl the time being, has shifted his questioning to the
verb: "You call M,c.mov or the just an idea, do you? Well, pray what
do you make of the is when you declare that Aristides is just? What
is this is the name of?" There is but one way out; if such a question is
to be answered at all, it is necessary to recognize the is, after some fashion
or other, as an expression of being and to represent it by some form of
words capable of serving as a subject in its turn-'t'O sivm or something
of the sort. On reflection, however, such a conception is seen to branch
in two direction-into existence ( 't'O ov) on the one hand, and into essence
(oi,a(a) on the other. 29 And from these premises this Aristocles of ours,
who by this time is by way of being a metaphysician as well as a logician
and grammarian, may be trusted to argue that in the assertion, "Aristides
is just," he is affirming of Aristides not merely existence and substance but
essence also or that whereby he is and has his being; that is, since he is
just, he is, and is so by virtue of justice.30 Whence it follows that the
ideas, which began as predicate adjectives, turn out to be essences, from
which the sensible world derives its significance by participation.
Thanks to the nature of language, which lends itself so obligingly to
a confusion of words and meaning, it is but a step at most from a belief
in the relative reality of ideas as subjects to a belief in their absolute
29 I omit the notion of identity as inconvenient, since my remarks are only illustrative anyway. As the reader has noticed already, I am making no effort to be exact,
much less exhaustive. Besides, identit}I is another matter altogether.
30 Cp. Hippias Maior, 2'89d: aui;o 'tO atxoo.ov cl> ,;i£'1.'1.a atxoo.a .rtllV'ta <pULVE'tOO.
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reality as substances. There is no difficulty about such a transition-least
of all for the supposititious author of the foregoing reflections, particularly if we assume, as we must by hypothesis, that he shares the Platonic
view of reality as identical with the intelligible-a specification to which
the ideas answer perfectly. While further, since reality is one with the
ideas themselves, its nature must be open to the same instrument of
research and investigation-namely, definition, which thus becomes the
sole means for the apprehension of being.
To this conclusion I imagine my logico-grammarian to have come
as it were in the first burst and enthusiasm of discovery. But with the
outlines of his system spread out before him, it is impossible that he
should not awaken little by little to its difficulties and embarrassments. A
genuine reality has certain claims which it is not always easy to satisfy
speculatively. Such a reality is not wholly unwarranted, for example, in
asserting a right to some sort of individual consistence and even local
habitation. And while it may be possible to endow these logical
notions with transcendence and relegate them to a region of their own,
like "the intelligible place," the procedure fails to stifle objection completely. Nor is it altogether clear in what manner such an idea may be
shared by a number of participants and still retain its integritn not to
speak of the complementary hardship involved in a single individual's
owing his character, like Aristides, to a number of different essences
at once, for Aristides is not only just but unpopular, at all events
temporarily.
Into these apories, however, I must decline to be led by this particular
route. Since this manner of discussion seems to me impertinent to an
understanding of the authentic Platonism, it is unprofitable to give it
more than passing notice or to allow it to arrest our attention.31 But
with regard to two difficulties I must make an exception-namely the
inclusion in the system of such substantives as those of identity and difference, and the extension of the doctrine to include generalities or classes
like man and horse.,
Everyone who has read the Sophist in immediate connection with the
Republic must have been struck with a sense of confusion, if not of
dismay, at finding such logical or ontological categories as being, rest
and motion, identity and difference supplanting or at least ranking the
moral and intelligible realities of the earlier dialogues, justice and the
rest of the virtues ( fJ lHJ.:n <lQE'trJ), above all the good, in contravention
of Plato's e:xpress statement in the Republic of the superiority of the good
31 Gomperz has viewed the landscape pretty thoroughly o'er from this point of view.
See for instance what he makes of the hobgoblins of predication and inherence in his
Greek Thinkers, Eng. Trans., Vol. II, Chap. VIII.
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over being. To be sure Plato at first appears to distinguish these interlopers by a designation of their own; he begins by calling them YEV'l'I or
genera. But he ends by including them among the ideas proper.32 And
yet that the two are mutually incompatible is clear on inspection. If good,
for instance, is an idea it must. exist in itself, by virtue of its own being,
and not by participation in another. In other words being is a relative,
not an absolute, and exists according to all his previous teaching in
function of the good.33 It is, in Plato's own expression, only as it were
the namej of a name.34 While the confusion is worse confounded by the
circumstance that in the course of the dialogue these genera, as I shall
call them for the sake of distinction, are shown to shift their natures from
time to time in a manner inconsistent with the stability ascribed to ideas
essentially, so that not-being turns out to be other or different and hence
comes of itself to partake of existence together with the same or identity,
and being in like fashion may be either at rest or in motion, to say nothing
of other transubstantiations equally or even more anomalous.35
Now, however Plato succeeded in reconciling to himself these discrepancies between the genera and the original ideas, if he ever did-for
his attack upon "the friends of the ideas" in thiS! same dialogue, if taken
in its plain and obvious intention, is\ not particularly reassuring-11 6-still, it
is clear enough that he had smuggled in these aliens, so much must be
conceded, by the way of predication. There is always a strong temptation
-perhaps it is the besetting sin of intellectualism-to confound discourse
with fact, to mistake the structure of language for the structure of reality.
Such, as Santayana seems tOJ think, is the error of metaphysics, to substitute grammar for physics, as Pythagoras substituted arithmetic for itor at least to erect the parts of speech into ontological substances.37 And
this inclination was tremendously strengthened by the Sophists, whose
existence depended upon their ability to, pass off words for things. How
far Plato may have succumbed in the end to their example, is an open
question; but it is distressing to find that in the very dialogue which he
undertook for the purpose of demolishing Sophistry in its principle he
ll!2 See 247a and 255e. For example, llw. 'to J.1,l!'t6l(EL'V 'tij~ t6fo~ 'tij~ -&a'tSQOU;
such is the manner in which he comes to speak of them. And cf. the discussion of
'to xaMv, 257d, e.
33 Republic, 509b.
84 244d. "The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent."-Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part II, Section VI.
3li For a summary discussion of these perplexities see Bonitz: Platonische Studien,
190-195.
86 248a, etc.
81 See for an amusing illustration Life and Finite Individuality, edited by H. Wildon
Carr, Symposium II, wherein the reader is invited to consider whether the soul is a
rohject or an adjective.
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himself should have become entangled in the Sophistic fallacy-and that
in spite of the fact that in the Republic, as though in prevision of the
danger, he invalidatedi such speculations by his discrimination of the two
minds and their functions (v6'1'}«ni; and auxvoia), the latter the organ of
judgment or predication, the former that of divination or insight. Hence
if Platonism is fundamentally a search for reality, it cannot be referred,
on Plato's own showing, to the formal subjects of grammar and logic.
Platonism proper is not in predication and cannot be got out of it. In a
word, Plato at the moment when he is most himself protests that reality
--a fortiori the all or aggregate with its mixture of the intelligible and the
unintelligible-is not a logic, to say nothing of a grammar.
The fact is that Plato at the close of his career had saddled his philosophy with three passengers, none of which rode very comfortably with
the others-the ideas proper ( s'i'.a'I'}), the genera or categories ( yiv'I'}), which
though themselves relatives he insists upon treating as absolutes, and the
common or class notions. These several conceptions, which were gradually forced upon him by the pressure of his own thought, he never attempts explicitly to reconcile ( for the Parmenides can hardly be considered in such a light); but after his habit simply neglects or ignores the
others when engaged with any one in particular. With the general or
class notions he had indeed little to do at any time; they appear to interest
him only incidentally as in the Parmenides. But of the genera (yiv'I'})
he makes a good deal in those of his later or Eleatic dialogues that have
won the regard of the commentators by their air of profundity as well as
by the problems which they offer for the exercise of the critics' ingenuity.
And it is the labor of such exegetes in bringing together by hook or
crook what Plato himself has discreetly kept asunder which has caused
not a little of the confusion befogging this portion of his teaching.
In view of these considerations it seems unwarranted to assign to the
doctrine of ideas, whatever excrescences it may have grown, a purely
formal or methodological origin. Not only does such a supposition falsify
its character; it also violates its obvious chronology. The substitution of
categorical relatives for the ideas marks a decline-or at least a later and
elderly age of Platonism. It was only when embarrassed with the empirical
difficulties of his philosophy-in itself a kind of defaillance or defectionthat Plato had recourse to the expedient of bolstering up his doctrine by
a kind of rationalistic mechanism, or rather, perhaps, of distracting attention from its difficulties by a sort of confusion or ignoratio elenchi
such as he not infrequently practiced on other occasions.
On the other hand, if it is a mistake, for all these perplexities, to
confound the ideas in their purity with predicates or predicaments, it is
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hardly better than a blunder to identify them with concepts or abstractions or universals. If such were not the case, there would be no problem
in the questions propounded by Parmenides touching the ideas of man
and fire and water and even of hair and ordure.38 If the ideas wiere
nothing more than generic or class notions the apory which had at this
time begun momentarily to unsettle Plato's mind would never have
troubled him. But no matter what his later embarrassments and how he
undertook to be rid of them, it is he himself who discriminates, in so many
words, against conceptual notions; and behind his own words it should
be unnecessary to go.
The text for the statement is the well-known passage in the sixth book
of the Rcpublic,39 the work which is authoritative for the maturity of
Plato's thought. It is the passage in which he divides the all into two
worlds or realms-the sensible or visible, and the intelligible or noetic.
The former, which is the realm of opinion or common knowledge, corresponding to the field of modern science, he subdivides into two portions.
The lower or the region of similitude consists of images, which he defines
both as shadows and as reflections in waters and solid surfaces, in such
things as have a close and polished consistency .40 The upper portion or
the region of belief or conjecture comprises the actual objects themselves,
whose images constitute the plane preceding. Such is the inferior or
phenomenal realm, the world of becoming that never is. The superior or
intelligible realm is likewise divided into two sections. But in this case it
is not so easy to understand or explain the principle of division. What it
amounts to, however, is something of this sort. The higher region of
the intelligible realm includes the ideas proper. As to the lower subdivision, the actual things or objects themselves in the upper level of the
phenomenal world on the plane just below become a kind of images, in
their turn, or reflections of a yet higher sort of something which Plato
illustrates by the mathematical conceptions of the square, the diameter, and
the like. Those conceptions are drawn from visible objects and things
but are not identical with them. Nor are the figures that the mathematician actually describes the subjects of his reasonings; he is reasoning
rather about what these figures represent or symbolize-the square or
the triangle in itself, of which no sensible figure is more than an image
or refl~ction, though taken in itself such a figure is a denizen of the
phenomenal world and in this sense is capable of casting its own shadow
within that world like its fellow members.
38 Parmenides, 130b. Cf. Julius Stenzel: Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen
Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles, s. 27, et seq.
39 Republic, 509c, et seq.
40 EV 'tOt~ ooa m,xv6. 'tE xat <pava (11JVEO'tYjXEV.-Republic, 510a.
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Now, when it is remembered that at the time mathematical conceptions were the only abstractions or general notions or universals in good
standing, the significance of the preceding classification will become clear.
By this lower division of intelligibles ( Ta µa{h1µamu:i) Plato seems to
mean what we have come in a comprehensive sense to call concepts or
abstracts-and while including them in the section of intelligibles he
intends to distinguish them from the ideas, which he places above them
in the higher division, the superior range of all. And as though to provide
against misunderstanding he assigns to each its own faculty; to the conceptions or concepts, intellection (~u:ivota); to the ideas, reason (voiii;),
whose exercise he characterizes by the term insight or vision ( mjni;, -Ofo)
and whose activity alone is capable of yielding a knowledge of reality or
wisdom.
About the general sense of Plato's distinctions there is little doubt.
That the lower intelligibles should be designated mathematic ( Ta
µa&rjµau,u:i) is an accident of nomenclature due to the state of learning
at the period. The explanation puts it beyond question that they are
things ( that is, visibles, Ta OQa'ta) reduced to the nature of abstractionsas by geometry, since geometry was the only authoritative science in existence, and had in fact arrogated to itself the mathematic or science, as
distinguished from E:rttO''t'llµ't'), exclusively. For these reasons it would
seem as though the mathematics (Ta µa-011µaux&.) were more understandingly translated in this connection by scientific than by mathematical
in our acceptation-scientific concepts being the nearest approximation.
As for what further conclusions may be drawn from Plato's arrangements, that is a matter of discretion. Is it permissible, for instance, to
infer that the same relation existed in,. his mind between the upper and
lower intelligibles as that actually specified between the two visibles or
sensibles? That is to say, are the concepts ('ta µa&rjµaTLXa) to be taken
as a kind of images in their own province of the ideas-discursive or
rational duplicates ( duplicates of reflection, if I may use the words without levity) of the divine ideas? 41 Unquestionably Plato saw a possibility
of ascending to the ideas by this route, though it may have been merely
disciplinary, a kind of training of the philosopher's sinews that he was
thinking of and not a progressive acquisition or extension of knowledge.
Be that as it may; one of the most striking features of the passage,
aside from its purely doctrinal aspect, is this illustrative use of images.
That Plato found them a source of wonder and admiration is not surprising; it is rather surprising that no one else should have been affected
so strongly by them. In themselves they are still puzzling enough in
all conscience. But before mirrors were a matter of course, when reflec41 Corresponding to the distinction that he seems to have drawn later between
mathematical figures and mathematical ideas [ or between mathematical numbers and
ideal numbers}.
52

THE IDEAS

53

tions were more or less accidental and imperfect-usually surprised in
streams and pools under conditions of constant disturbance, or glimpsed
in vague surfaces; how mysterious and baflling they must have appeared!
Where is the image that glimmers for an instant and vanishes? Which
seems but is not? Which is visible to the eye but impalpable to the touch?
Which is so specious and so furtive? What is it but an evidence ot the
phenomenal-the other itself? Like becoming, it is unreal and illusory,
here an instant and gone the next, a fertile subject of uncertainty and
conjecture, quite sufficient to inspire and explain Parmenides' book of
opinion on -co µit
It is so apt a symbol that one is half inclined to
take Plato to task for not representing the phenomenal flux in such terms
as a shifting reflection of the ideas. To anyone who has watched the
rufiled effigies of trees and clouds and sky in running water and has
turned his eyes upon their untroubled originals in the air above, the figure
seems almost inevitable. And yet it is only a figure after all; and these
apparent realities that look so secure and self-sufficient are but apparitions
and manifestations of sense themselves. And Plato was not likely in so
serious a matter to content himself with a superficial metaphor for the
inherence or immanence of the ideas.
The fact that the general disposition of Plato's universe is so different
from ours in so many respects, does no more, perhaps, than raise a presumption against its identity in any one other respect. But it ought to
count for something. Where the topography is so diverse, it is hardly
fair to assume that a certain configuration is a counterpart of that which
we are used to. At all events it is worthy of notice, in face of the modern
mclination to decorate Plato with an honorary degree in science, that the
province which we have taken for the subject of certainty is just the opposite for him-a limbo of opinion and surmise composed of counterfeits
and their inconstant correlates; and that the latter, in particular the
modern type of solidity and assurance, is to him the subject of belief
(31fo-cti;), to be taken on trust, as a matter of guesswork. Under the
circumstances is it likely, aside from his direct deposition to the contrary,
that the ideas, the highest and unique reality and subject of knowledge,
should be nothing but our subjective abstractions from this conjectural
patchwork of the senses?
·
Nor does it help matters to refer to hypostasis-to use a word beloved
of the whole Platonic faculty. 42 In this view the ideas become creations
of the mind, and projections from it, having an existence indistinguishable from that of Shakespeare's Hamlet and relying for their being upon
the imagination. So considered, they challenge comparison with the idees

ov.

42 This,

on the whole, is Zeller's system.

53

54

PLATO

forces of Fouillee, whose philosophy owes not a little to his early study of
Plato, and with the illusions of art and literature. The difficulties of such
an account, when taken literally, are two-fold. It restricts the actuality of
the ideas to a sort of hypnotic influence or obsession; and at the same
time it retains their conceptual origin and nature. And neither of these
positions is good Platonism. That Plato may have been wrong is quite
conceivable; conceivable too that we may not be able to make anything
of the ideas save so many glorified quasi-personifications. But that is not
the point. The point is whether Plato meant by his ideas what we mean
by concepts, or more broadly, conceptions. And to that question the
answer-Plato has given it himself-is No.
What hinders us in understanding Plato's thought (and this is our
main reason for offering so many substitutes for the ideas-that we do
not understand them, though we should probably reject them just the
same even if we did), what stands between us and Platonism nowadays
is the fact that we have no appreciation, no conception of an effective
moral order. We do not believe in moral consequences. Ethics we regard
with Protagoras as a convention or expedient. Morality, so far as it is a
reality for us at all, is the work of society, as it\ were a kind of etiquette
and not very much more serious. In our eyes society makes morality; not
morality society. And we have an idea that by ignoring or making
light of crime-like murder-we shall somehow or other render it of no
great account, as though we were passing off a gaucherie, a kind of! social
solecism. In the same manner we have convinced ourselves that we can
commit injustice with impunity; there are so many ways of doing wrong
and escaping the consequences-if not alone, by the connivance of others
-it is but a matter of stipulation or agreement, a bargain anyway.43 We
are blind to the fact that the issue is always out of our hands. Peace is
the health of nations as happiness is the health of the individual soul,
and its essence is justice. The nation or the polity or the society or the
individual that deviates or diverges from the idea of justice is diseased
and vitiated; all alike· they have forfeited their being; their reality has
departed from them with their virtue-they have become merged with
the flux and are playthings of necessity and chance, of corruption and
decay, accident and mishap.
Such is the law of the ideas. And in such a sense I am quite willing
to speak of the ideas loosely in the same breath with law-though I should
prefer principle if I must use one or the other. At any rate, so far as
43We make a dozen Alsace-Lorraines in Europe where there was one before, and
we expect to maintain a permanent peace arbitrarily on such a basis by conspiring

together to· that intent against our victims.
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they are comparable at all, it is with moral law or principle that they
are so; and as inherent in the nature of reality above man and his invention, they are religious or, as Plato would say, divine obligations, and
have nothing in common with our mechanics or with our scientific methodology. They are regulative of man, not of matter. For law in our
sense Plato had indeed no very high regard. At best it is but an affair of
necessity, the stupid inveteracy of that mysterious something-call it matter
or energy or clan vital-which we shall never know save in as far as it
resists our efforts, and like a: blank illimitable void blocks our vision and
defies our penetration. For him necessity, then, is characteristic of the
Bux and is one with accident or chance, strange as the conjunction may
seem to our minds. They are both immeasurable, incomprehensible, and
amoral and inhuman. The statue falls upon the head of the bystander,
or the traveller is killed at the crossroads.44 That is necessity, the senseless obstinacy of that refractory something indeterminate or a:n:EtQOV which
lies behind the phenomenal-or rather, which is the very phenomenal
itself. But this is accident or casualty as well. If it were an intelligent
principle, it would recognize and provide for the emergency. If it were
intelligible, it might be foreseen and avoided. The two are but diverse
faces of the same event. We prate of prediction and prevision as though
science had the future under its thumb, and yet we suffer thirty-five
thousand-odd deaths a year by "unavoidable accidents," powerlessly one
might say, with idiotic complacence when one considers the disparity
between our professions and the facts, until civilization so called has
become more hazardous than was ever savagery itself. Such is the "reign
of law," as we understand it. But so monstrous was such an ethics to
Sophocles and Aristotle that they could not rest until they had harmonized the death at the crossroads and the fall of the statue with justice;
necessity is no explanation.45 As for Plato there may be a law of the ideas
though he never stated it; but one thing is certain, it has nothing in common with our law. An invariable operation, like one event to the righteous
and the wicked without discrimination or distinction, was bound to seem
to him utterly senseless, and iniquitous too. To speak of law in connection with Heraclitus, now, is much less inappropriate; he was concerned
with incessant variations, and had very possibly conceived of such variations as concomitant. But the Platonic ideas, in themselves and as they
stand at the height of Platonism, are another matter. At loosest they may
be described as determinations or determinants, exponents or indices by
44 Make it but the tourist and the railway crossing, and you will have a modern
instance.
"" Reference to <Edipus Tyrannus is unnecessary. For the statue of Mitys sec
Aristotl~'s Poetics, IX, 12. Moliere after Molina has made the tragedy suggested.
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which matter is affected-but such language is purely figurative and cannot be taken literally.
I have not perhaps given this subject of the equivalence of idea and
law the space or the attention which it may seem to demand in view of
the vogue which such an interpretation of Plato's doctrine has momentarily acquired.46 But frankly, the case of law and concept appears to my
mind to be bound so tightly by the tie of generalization or induction that
they must stand or fall together. And Plato is so obviously not attempting
to generalize or induce his ideas from observation that it looks a little
gratuitous, in spite of plausible analogies, to carry the argument any
farther. His procede is fundamentally deductive, the procede of definition.
And the same sort of criticism is true, I believe, of the methodological
explanation,47 with the additional objection that such a view affiliates
the ideas not only with generalization but with predication and judgment
also. It is at bottom a conceptual interpretation. That the ideas are
somehow or other principles of intelligibility, Plato himself declares. But
they are so, simply because they are principles of reality-and let me add
principles of moral reality at that-while they are, further, active principles and not merely epistemological. They involve in some way an obligation, even a duty, and they penalize its dereliction. That they are but
methods or means or forms for unifying a perceptual manifold, as the
phrase goes, a bare mechanism or mould or systematization of the mindingenious as the suggestion may be-such an exposition is at variance with
their author's own account of them. It is possible that he was edging
toward such a compromise with rationalism; there are passages which
indicate that he had coquetted with the notion of intellectual schemata
or even logical figures. But for that matter did Plato ever believe with
Kant that knowledge is in any sense of our own creation? Such at least
is not the Platonism of the Republic; and for that reason, if for no other,
the notion may be dismissed from this particular consideration.
All these efforts to pass off some modern substitute or other for the
ideas themselves are in principle mischievous enough. They are in their
sort no better than subterfuges, undertaken in the not wholly unlaudable
desire to modernize Plato in the hope of conciliating those who can not
46 For an unusually perspicuous example of this sort of jugglery whereby Platonism
is made over into a philosophy of change, see C. E. M. Joad's Essays in Common Sense
Philosophy, pp. 143-146. My stricture, I may add, is meant to cover only this passage
and those akin to it, for there is much sound Platonism in the essay as a whole, it seems
to me, as well as in that entitled "The Objectivity of the Concept of Beauty," though it
should be added that Plato's
xa.Mv was a moral reality too.
'
47 As sponsored, for instance, by Natorp, who looks upon Plato as a pre-Kantian,
so impossible is it for a German to free his mind from Kant-though as a matter of
fact it is rather the Sophists who were the pre-Kantians.
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or will not understand him as he is. All alike they show an unwillingness both to reject or repudiate him outright and to accept him freely and
frankly at his own estimate. They are compromises and accommodations,
and do their subject more harm than good. But while those of which
I have been speaking try at least to rationalize their original in reducing
the ideas to terms of mind, in some sort or other; much less scrupulous
and much more vicious is the inclination, so agreeable with contemporary
laxity of thought and conduct, to debase them to the irresponsible level
sentiment and caprice by confounding them with ideals and the doctrine to which they belong with what we like to call idealism.
To define a state of mind as nebulous as that which passes popularly
under the name of idealism is pretty difficult. If it consists with anything at all, it is with nothing more definite than the glorification of
velleity and whim. Whatever we think desirable under the circumstances,
whatever we believe would gratify our present mood, whatever seems to
be after our own liking-such is the general sense of an ideal. Peace, as
it happens, is, or appears to be, an ideal for the time being, and so does
democracy-not, alas, justice. As an expression or term of discontent, of
dissatisfaction with things as they are and of a hankering after something quite different, a sort of moral nostalgia, an escape from reality,
our ideals are nine times out of ten based upon a false conception, if not
a total negation, of experience, or an unwillingness to face it, and are a
source of error and disaster. They represent, as a rule, nothing but an
instinctive revolt from actuality. Whatever truth they possess is at best
a pragmatic truth-in fact, ideals are the sole standards of the pragmatists. Being non-existent they are such stuff as dreams are made on, and
the enthusiasm which they inspire depends on their illusoriness. Even
when an ideal is realized, as we say, by some process of pragmatic selfdeception, there is no surety that its possession of our minds may not be
injurious and even ruinous-as is quite conceivable-yes, very probable,
in the case of democracy. An ideal may be and usually is evidence to
nothing but impotence or perversity or distaste.
On! the contrary-is it otiose to say so again?-an idea in Plato's conception is not a fancy, not even an aspiration-not a contrivance of our
own at all. As far as we know it, it is a discovery and we ourselves partake
of it or participate in it. Inasmuch as we do so, we are members of a
moral and intelligible order; inasmuch as we do not, we are creatures of
physical or mechanical necessity, subjects of cause and effect, playthings
of evolution or whatever name you choose to confer upon the remorseless successions of change and decay, of generation and corruption. It is
not our ideals that will save us; they are but the effervescence of change,
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breaking and reforming incessantly. Peace without justice, democracy
without virtue, luxury without happiness-they have neither stability nor
efficacy; they are but blown from the stream and fall back upon it.
"The earth hath bubbles as the water has,
And these are of them."
To search out the ideas, to meditate them, to honor them, to pattern after
them-this is the Platonic wisdom and morality and religion.

III
To recommend such a programme to the generality of mankind would
be no light, if not an impossible task. With the aims and ambitions of common experience Platonism, has little or nothing to do. It is not a receipt
for getting on or making a figure in the world, like the Nicomachean
ethics. And to those engaged in such an affair it will seem impractical
and preposterous as it always has done.48 In fact Platonism was a failure
after this kind in its own day. Few readings are sadder for the anxious
optimist than the passage in the Thetetetus, composed not impossibly after
the second visit to Syracuse, in which Plato appears to accept the fact.
It was Aristotle, the mentor of Alexander of Macedon, not Plato, the
censor of Dionysius of Syracuse, who succeeded in gaining favor with
the powers of this world. And yet with a little good will something may
be done toward that sort of mutual tolerance which results from the
assignment of its own rights and titles to each party of a dispute.
Jn their purity, then, the Platonic ideas, as l havei been doing my best
to show, are characterized by several notes in conjunction. In the first
place, they are realities in their own right, independent of the mind
which apprehends them, and of the matter, as we call it, through or
in which they may be darkly and uncertainly discerned and to which
they lend an illusion of reality in as far as becoming happens to fall for
an instant into this form or that and take on the appearance of objects
and things"like a water vexed with storms
Pale tempestuous reflections of a higher world of forms."
To that extent they may be said to impart to generation a transient significance, though they can hardly be spoken of as efficient causes or even laws,
-since necessity remains the sovereign of the flux. In as far, however, as
matter-to give a name to change considered substantively-is capable of
conforming to the pattern of the ideas, it becomes related for the time
~8

Crito, 49d.
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being to another nature, which, after Greek usage, we should have a
right to call divine, as is the case with man ( as well as "the heavenly
bodies"), who has not merely an animal but a spiritual nature too.
With regard to the being man, I confess, I am not entirely at ease.
Thus much, however, seems certain. In agreement with his dualistic convictions, Plato thinks of him as a combination of body and soul, partaking of generation and decay by the former constituent, and of real
being by the latter. Of the soul he appears to conceive as a simple, subtle,
indecomposable element, akin to the ideas but not an idea itself, in
accordance probably with the ancient axiom that like alone can comprehend like.49 As for man's activity, it must be confined effectively to the
moral nature, for as far as he belongs materially to the flux he lies under
the ban of necessity or determination, though with some capability, perhaps,
of influencing the phenomenal as far as its refractoriness allows. But this
at least is his office and function-"as he sees the beautiful through that
which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue;" 50
and as far as he fulfills this function he has his part in the incorruptibility
of the ideas; as far as he fails to do so he fails to attain to the proper
virtue of his kind.
In this aspect the ideas are after their several kinds not merely beatitudes but duties. Even about a table or a bedstead-if we take Plato's
illustrations as anything more than analogies or images in languagethere is something which a table or a bed ought to be if it is to be a table
or a bed in good earnest, and falling short of which it is by so much
the less a table or a bed and by so much the more an indeterminate and
undifferentiated nonentity or Unding. So much is it the case that knowledge involves an obligation that Plato is unable to conceive the possibility
of a man's doing wrong save from ignorance-since the good is obviously
a good-and affirms that righteousness consists in such a knowledge without further qualification. And why not, if the ideas are such as have
been indicated? The man who derogates from the virtue of humanity
becomes a moral outlaw. No longer informed by his proper essence, he
falls under the sway of necessity; he is the sport of irrational forces and
circumstances-he ceases to be a human being, a little less than kind, and
turns into a thing, a part of the huddling indiscriminacy of the flux.
It might be instructive to compare briefly this reading of the ideas,
which represents approximately the spirit of Platonism at its peak, with
49 Cf. Pha:drus, 230a, Sophist, 248a, Pha:do,
sistency, as I see it, between this view and that
spirit as developed in the Republic, the soul of
the foremost or uppermost member of the trio,
Note 40, "The Sophists," p. 96, infra.
50 Symposium, 202a.
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..£schylus' and Sophocles' treatment of their erring protagonists and the
ruin which overtakes them. For such, if I am right in my understanding
of Plato's doctrine, is the explication of their tragic philosophy. Whether
they ever formulated it to themselves or even exhibited it with perfect
clearness to their audiences, it was some such vision of human responsibility and defection which they had at the back of their minds and which
they were intent upon illustrating in their drama. The incompatibility
of error and well-being, the fatality of wrong-doing, the ethical consistency
of character and its consequences-these are Platonic as well as ..£schylean
and Sophoclean motives. And about the fate of the offender there is
something wild and irregular which is equally Platonic. It is not only
pitiable as an instance of mortal frailty but it is horrible because it is
irrational and inhuman. And it is so, as Plato makes clear, because the
transgressor is literally, in our expressive metaphor, a lost soul, an abandoned creature-one who in lapsing from righteousness has passed beyond
the pale and in overstepping the bounds of virtue has delivered himself
into the confusions of accident and chance. He has lost his portion in the
"divine" and in becoming a thing among things has made himself obnoxious to their law, to the necessity of change, in whose interminable vortices
he is helplessly involved. Hence the bafllingness of Attic tragedy-the
unfathomable obscurity of its catastrophes. It is the wrong-doer that
perishes; justice has thrown him to the wolves of chaos and turned her
back upon his dissolution.
But Plato has done more than annotate the tragedy of his great countrymen. He has seated the evil in the soul, not in the act. It is the
spirit of the culprit that harbors the lie and without correction becomes a
source of infection, a miasma. As in so many respects, his thought in
this particular is not without its Christian analogues. For stranger as he
may have been to the conviction of sin, he was no stranger to the sense
of duty. Granted that no man does wrong willingly as no one willingly
makes a mistake, yet for the ignorance by which he blunders he is alone
accountable, whether by sloth or conceit of wisdom. His ignorance is
his fault; and that he does not err with intent to err-as who does?is no excuse for the defect of the knowledge which he lacks of his own
volition. Whatever the immediate object, it is ultimately the intention
that counts and adjudicates the blame, call the transgression by what
name you will. The sun of good is in the heavens and the transgressor
has chosen to act with his eyes sealed.
Such is the verification of the ideas.· Whatever is, maintains itself for
a longer or shorter time by virtue of its association with the good. The
limits of the idea are broad and inclusive. Not impossibly-in fact, quite
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certainly-Plato was prepared to find merit, as I have mentioned, in a
table or a bed. Even his -ro xaAo\l or the beautiful is not an exclusively
a:sthetic reality by any means, as appears from his condemnation of art
for art's sake as an imitation of an imitation. That Plato, if not; Socrates
himself, had hoped for an explanation of the universe on such lines from
Anaxagoras' nous is evident from the P,luedo.51 Such a relation, as is
virtually stated in so many words, would have consisted of a redintegration of "physiology" or physics in terms of the idea as comprehensible
alone; that is to say, it would have amounted to a final reason, a kind of
teleology. That it was not forthcoming was as sore a disappointment to
Plato as to his Socrates, if we may judge by his constant preoccupation
with the quandary of the one and the many and his inability in later life
to resolve it or to rid himself of the second member of his dualismthat something else standing over against the moral and rational, the
irreducible "other."
For Plato, then, the universe in the broad sense, the all or aggregate,
divides into two worlds, the intelligible and the sensible. The principle
of the former is the idea of good. The principle of the latter is necessity. It is the principle of change and variation and multiplicity; it accounts for "progress"-for generation and growth and decay. It is the
element of incoherence, confusion, and indistinction-the source of error,
illusion, and insecurity. As far as this world is explicable at all, it consists of simulacra of the ideas, which are comparable in this respect with
their own images or reflections in water, constituting our objects and things
-or what we are coming for the nonce to call with greater propriety
"events." But while the ideas are of themselves each one and simple52
as well as eternal and immutable, the copies or imitations, which make
up the phenomenal world, are not only transitory and impermanent but
many, perhaps innumerable, in accordance with the nature of indetermination and illimitability, for infinity was to Plato as to the Greeks in
general a, property if not the essence of imperfection.
As shadows or effigies, however inadequate, it is not impossible that
objects-or should I say space-time events?-possess a certain or rather
an uncertain semblance of realitY' which lends them some sort of relative
significance or importance; they have their uses for the moral nature if only
as reminders of the ideas. If they are considered perspectively as subjects
of observation, it may be said without excessive impropriety that jnasmuch as they are manifested as sensible imitations, owing their phantasmal
existence to the ideas, the ideas themselves come to appear amid them in
111 96-100.
52 See Meno, 72d, and notice the peculiar form of the question.
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the semblance of essences, which, as we catch their fleeting appantJ.ons,
seem to us to inform the flux without being intrinsic to it. The effect is
illusory, to be sure, since of the inner character, the self of that world
we know nothing. The stuff of it, if it has a stuff, we are acquainted with
only as phenomena, and these phenomena are only similitudes, while to
ideas and phenomena there is no common ground but this fugitive and
accidental resemblance.53
With the exception, therefore, of the ideas, which are the sole deni7..ens
of the intelligible world, and as such constitute the only\ genuine reality,
experience consists exclusively of the "other," the sensible or phenomenal,
which has the sort of existence attached to becoming and, aside from its
transience, is irrational, and on that score unreal and specious. It may
force or coerce or compel us as far as we are partly engaged in it; but it
fails to convince us. We may sense or feel it; we may conceivably recognize certain of its phases, even when they bear no resemblance to a
celestial archetype; we may possibly formulate certain of its concomitants
of change, as Plato thinks in the Philebus; but our "laws" are only
problematic notations, as it were of chance and probability.54 Its affiliation
is with the mechanic mind, which is itsc:M a parallel of the mutable, as
William James' expressive phrase, "the stream of consciousness," recognizes, and which moves with it by a habit of association in a kind of
"bastard reasoning." From our higher nature and being it is, however,
hopelessly estranged.
On the whole, then, we shall not be so very wide of the mark if we think
thus of this sensible world, this seat of unreason and necessity, of impermanence and mutability-we shall not go far astray if we conceive
of becoming in its ceaseless unrest as falling occasionally, like a reek of
vapor or a fume of smoke, into certain patterns, distinguishable from the
usual meaningless huddle proper to it. As dispositions or forms these
patterns are not in the nature of the flux at all, nor do they belong to it
any more than the constellations belongi to the celestial topography. They
are counterfeits or simulations, like the figures we see in the clouds,
though the closer the resemblance the more real the apparition (if I may
use such an expression), the phenomenal in such instance being not
merely an appearance but as it were an evidence, and borrowing in that
manner a sense which it does not possess of itself but which remains the
exclusive property of the idea that it happens to resemble, while any concourse or confluence, any whirl or eddy that fails to effect such a conthe cave at the opening of Book VII of the Republic.
to note that J. M. Keynes considers induction a proper subject
for treatment in his Treatise on Probability. All our "laws," therefore, would reduce
lo statistical averages and necessity itself to chance, as seems indeed to be the direction
of modern thought.
53 See the parable of
54 It is not irrelevant
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figuration, as well as any wisp or outlying fringe that fails to conform
to the implicit design, is likely to escape attention as meaningless and irrelevant. In short the ideas are patterns to which objects and things-or
events, if you prefer--conform. These are the patterns into which the
latter fall. Whenever we find what falls into a pattern, or conforms to
an intelligible order, there we may be sure that we are looking upon the
imitation or similitude of an idea-only an imitation, but still an indication-an evidence to real being.
So it is, for example, by the recurrence of such fortuitous patterns that
we become confirmed or at least reassured of our belief in such another
world, a world of ultimate reality. Indeed, it is only by such recurrence
as feigning a kind of persistence or permanence, that mimetic forms which
are never twice alike exactly but only approximately, come to seem important or pertinent in the first place. The very fact that they are repeated
in some fashion gives them a sanction or guarantee as though symbolic
and purposive, like a recurrent dream. Possibly, if such a combination is
repeated frequently, it tends to become a habit, maintaining itself loosely
and precariously but with a relative degree of stability (in the midst of
the flux) as we see a civilization or a culture doing, though absolute
security is not to be expected or hoped for, and for that it has come
together, it must dissolve again. Nevertheless there is a possibility, since
we are swimming in the same medium, that we may do something, when
we have recognized a contour as of an idea, to preserve it for a span
like a bubble, or blow another in its place, or even, as Plato would do in
his Republic, create something of the sort deliberately after a model laid
up in heaven.
On the contrary, injustice, to take a specific instance, is merely in the
concrete the want or absence of justice. It is a negative or chaotic state
or condition, though a positive evil. It is not-being, essentially, or unreality ( -ro µ~ ov); the lack of pattern or form, sheer indetermination and
chaos. In this respect not-being is, to be sure, "other," something else than,
with reference to justice; but from the point of view of reality it is neant,
or nihilism, too, just as Parmenides took it to be. It is an inconsequent
swirl or eddy, the rheum of change, comparable with a crowd of human
beings who have happened together somehow-by force of necessity, by
dint of the whirl-on the corner of the street, but who consist in no one
purpose or end and can be covered or taken up in no one expression, who
as a crowd are nothing at all, neither a family nor a society nor an association nor aught else save illusion. But of what mischief is such a congeries capable! And the comparison will hold of; all the vices in contradistinction from the virtues. As a life loses the pattern of its virtue, it
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falls apart and disintegrates into a shapelessness and confusion; it becomes
as it were a center of disorder and demoralization. Hence in this sense
there need be no ideas of evil at all, so Plato thought, since evil is merely
the incoherence of becoming-illusory in respect that it is irrelevant and
unavailing, that it means nothing and points to nothing, that it fails to
compose and is dissolute, but maleficent too in that it is conjoined with
necessity and subversive of reality.
Of the moral world, therefore, the world of ideas, it is possible, according to Plato, to learn, something. Or this world, however, we know
and can know little or nothing. Of its self we are quite ignorant and
always shall be. Only as it happens here and there and diversely to
resemble the Platonic forms may we hope to make anything of it. Hence
the ideas may be spoken of, not as, phenomenal causes, but as causes of
the intelligibility of phenomena, since it is solely by such resemblance that
they appear at all and are distinguishable from the formlessness of change
as such. And further, since without this resemblance there would be
no phenomena, only a nebulous lapsing, it is permissible to speak of the
ideas as the cause of the existence of such phenomena, or simply of
phenomena.
In what precedes I have been trying to take a general survey of the
doctrine of ideas as Plato himself, so it seems to me, saw it at the summit
of his discovery. In so doing I have touched upon several points which
I should by good right have reserved for: detailed examination elsewhere,
if they were to be mentioned at all. But then I am not trying to be
exhaustive; I have been rather concerned to comprehend and discriminate, to catch, as best I could, the feature and expression of the doctrine
before it was altered by the cast of afterthought. The title doctrine,
therefore, is itself almost a misnomer for what I have been trying to get
at. As every philosophy should be, it is a vision, and like all vision it
is subject to the conditions of mental perspective. For practical purposes
it requires, as its author admits in the Philebus, the collaboration of that
vulgar science which enables us, when once abroad, to find our way
home again; for I do not know that Plato would deny that becoming
has its own ways and hence its own "laws" and formul~nly that those
ways are ultimately knowable and have to do with human happiness or
well-being. In itself his philosophy is not a map or chart; it is a picture
of the vista which is opened before the eye of the mind by the moral
consciousness at its proper elevation. Suppose that we had to represent
all the features of nature by mechanical drawing, geometrically, without
point of view or atmosphere, in a single plane or projection? Such is
analogically the task of rationalism, scientific and metaphysic, realistiC' and
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idealistic.55 The result may be uniform and consistent, it may even have a
deceptive air of completeness and finality, to which its self-complacency
contributes not a little. But it is hardly recognizable; it is not a likeness. It is a tabulation, a plot or graph. The association of philosophy is,
not with science, or even with metaphysics, but with ethics and religion.
And to the simple moral sense Platonism, inexact and unfinished though
it may be, presents a sketch of consciousness more convincing than the
labored diagrams of metaphysics.
IV
Nevertheless the story requires an epilogue, unfit though I am to
write it. That Plato did not rest in thei general conception which I have
been outlining so roughly, I have already suggested. Anyone who has
read below the surface of his language can not have failed, in spite of
his partiality for the world of ideas, to realize how severely his spirit was
exercised by the riddle of becoming. Formally there are distinguishable
amid the folds of his development as a whole three cares or anxietiesone, ethical or moral; another, logical or dialectic or epistemological, however one elects to lay the emphasis; and a third, cosmological or scientific.
In the earlier dialogues through the Republic the moral is the paramount
or predominant issue, the dialectic being incidental and ancillary. In
the T hecetetus and the Sophist the second concern is in the ascendant
and the difficulty is to reconcile its interests with the preceding and to
harmonize the two orders of consideration-a difficulty that is perhaps
more serious for the reader than for Plato himself, who has at times a
rather disconcerting way of cutting old acquaintances when they threaten
to become inconvenient. Finally in the Timceus the third theme or motive
comes to the fore and is fused with the first in a fashion which, I must
confess, I do not find wholly satisfactory or free from ambiguity.
For Plato, to begin with, the ideas are essentially moral conceptions.
This is to me with my limited sympathies, I may as well acknowledge,
his significant moment, and it is this moment that I have tried to sketch
with its more serious implications. But as Plato saw them at this time,
the ideas-there can be no doubt on this point-were for him the source
and principle (the UQX~) of knowledge and reality. Hence he found
himself involved first in an epistemological and second in an ontological
quandary.
The epistemological problem made it necessary for him to assign
ideas, not merely to moral values and obligations, but also to everything
55 That l am justified in lumping them is shown by the tendency of current
science to convert itself into metaphysics and vt'ce versa; while as for realism and
idealism, what in the world are they up to an}way?
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knowable or even perceptible, ordures and what not, as well. With this
difficulty he wrestles in the Parmenides-it can hardly be said triumphantly. All that he succeeds in showing at best is that his system is no
worse than its rivals ( and involves no more glaring inconsistencies than
they do). As for the methodology of cognition, the manner in which
the ideas are to be supposed to lend intelligibility to phenomena, the subject is barely broached.
On the other hand for the solution of the ontological problem he has
to thank what I can only call a recourse to a kind of theistic religion, such
as is quite foreign to his earlier thought and the whole context of his
speculation. In order to supply his ideas with the efficiency wanting to
their original conception, and in order to account for the coincidence of
the intelligible and the sensible worlds, he finds himself reduced to the
invention of a demiurge whose sole office it is to shape and order creation
after the pattern of the forms, which now appear undisguisedly as architectonic models or paradigms. In this manner he is able to explain to
himself at last the apory that had vexed him for so many years, the
resemblance of being and becoming.
To this curious synthesis of religion and positivism which characterizes
the Tim11:us he was prompted not improbably by the revival or rehabilitation of science during the first half of the fourth century, particularly
under the influence of Archytas and the so-called Pythagoreans.56 The
discovery of irrational quantities, the inscription of the last of the five
regular solids in the sphere by Thea:tetus, the conjecture of the general
shape of the earth and the distrust of its immobility, the foundation of
stereometry, the ingenious schematization of the planetary movements by
Eudoxus-all these innovations and renovations undoubtedly had the effect of whetting Plato's curiosity and inducing him, in reversal of his
position in the Ph11:do, to undertake, like so many later metaphysicians,
such as Schelling and Hegel, for example, a complete Natur-Philosophie,
as though nature were a branch of mathematics-a notion that he seems
to have fastened unshakably upon our thought.
It is important, however, to notice that even to the end there is in
Plato's cosmological construction no material substratum, no matter proper,
as there is no matter in the "solid" geometry so called by which it was
inspired. It is a stereometry and consists exclusively of forms ( Et<>ri) and
simulacra, reducible in the last analysis to triangles of one kind or another.
All that is required for such a world is space or place for the figures that
constitute it. In short, Plato's physical existent, his perceptible world,
reduces ultimately to figure; it is exactly the configuration of space, as
56

See Erich Frank: Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer.
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correlative with the ideas or Et<'>f) themselves, devoid, as it were, of mass
and inertia and such adscititious properties as we have invented from time
to time in the interests of ponderability and impenetrability and persistence.
Nor is it difficult to visualize space to ourselves in this manner, to perceptualize the OQ<l't'OV,-after the fashion, perhaps, of the ideal figures
and numbers in which Plato may then have been thinking. From this
point of view it is possible even to glimpse a kind of rationale for what
is no doubt the most bewildering of his transformations, the substitution
of the ideal numbers for the forms. If the ideas are to be patterns of
actuality, then as long as they remain qualitative as they began, actuality
as far as it is intelligible must be qualitatively constituted too. But with
this interpretation a geometrical world would have been inconsistent.
Before such a world could come into existence, even in discourse, it was
necessary that its patterns should assume a quantitative or mathematical
character. And this condition Plato apparently tried to meet without
sacrificing the qualitative character of his UQ)Cr] or first principle altogether. Hence the baffiing intricacies of the final numerical doctrine with its
commingling of quality and quantity, its confusion of figures and symbols,
a doctrine which no one has ever succeeded in adequately expounding or
even stating.
And there is still another element of bewilderment. In his dialogues at
least, it is to be noticed, Plato has kept his mathematics intact. They consist
invariably of definitions, axioms, and postulates, together with the deductions therefrom. But as time went on, he failed to keep his ontology
equally clear. To illustrate my meaning in an elementary way:-suppose
in geometry he had finally ceased to reason from his definition of parallel
lines as equidistant to the conclusion that they never meet; and had taken
to measuring the distance between their representations in the drawings
of the mathematicians, by the best substitutes that he possessed for instruments of precision; or better suppose that he had ceased to demonstrate
deductively and on principle that the sum of the three angles of the
triangle is equal to two right angles and had taken mechanical measurements instead57-what would have been the result of such a sort of
operation? Mere proximation and average as in the case of "scientific
law," or else some sort of compromise or evasion for the sake of "saving
appearances" such as we are familiar with in current scientific metaphysics.
But as a matter of fact what else is happening to his ideas in their ontological aspect in the course of the Sophist, if not of the Thetetetus, when
57 "Es konnte die Forderung ge~tellt werden, au£ die geometrischen Ideale zu
verzichten und sich lediglich im Kreise des Sinnlich-Wahrnehmbaren zu halten."Ernst Cassirer: Das Erkenntnisproblem, 3. aufl., Bd. II, s. 371.
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not-being ('to µ~ ov) shifts into the other ({hhEQOV ), and the genera
( yivri), if not the ideas themselves, betray an equally alarming readiness to
change their spots by a kind of inductive contamination under our very eyes?
At the same time Plato's reversion to scientism in these respects must
not blind us to his accompanying conversion to what appears like a
creative religion. That Plato's was ever a religious nature I take to be
beyond dispute. But the religion of his earlier years, if I may so put it,
had always been a diffused religion. It consisted in a rooted conviction
of man's intellectual kinship with a something in the universe-an order,
a propriety, a nature ( or structure) not unlike his own and partially
comprehensible by it, but higher and greater and better-and together
with this conviction a devout acceptance of the obligation imposed by that
relationship. It was a feeling that had for long been satisfied by the ideas
and supremely by the idea of the good. For Plato they had constituted
the divine; for his Parthenon is after all either myth or poetry-his manner
of realizing verbally and imaginatively, of picturing, if you please, these
influences and presences. Nor is his creator a substitute for the Zeus of
popular belief or superstition. As a demiurge he is obstructed, if not baffied,
by the intractableness of necessity, the recalcitrancy of the flux, and can
at best work only in conformity with the ideas, which exist independently
and in their own right. Whether he is in any sense a personality of
himself is questionable. And the question, fair or not, will obtrude whether
he was in the first instance much more than an expedient for coordinating
ideas and phenomena-for the resolution of Plato's ontological problem.
And yet perhaps to look upon the introduction of the demiurge and
his activities as a mere device to explain the immanence or presence of
the forms is to ignore the optimism of Plato's old age. I would not
speak of Plato with disrespect; but I can not overlook that characteristic
of advancing years-it may be (L speak humbly and in ignorance) but a
kind of ripeness and wisdom to which I have not attained"Man must endure his going hence
Even as his coming- hither-ripeness is all--"
but at all events I cannot ignore that trait of age which so often induces
a man to build a great house when he has little or no time to live in it,
and which leads him so often to shut his eyes to the menace of evil
or the horror of the shades, or to seek for hope and consolation in the
promptings of his own desires, as it were the instinct of self-preservation
in extremis, as though one could build a fortress against death and by
denying render it of no effect. But whether I have put the motive properly
or not, it is clear from the Timteus and from the tenth book of the Laws
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that Plato was moving out of his former courses toward a kind of monistic
optimism prefiguring in many respects the philosophy of stoicism.58
But this is not the phase upon which f prefer to dwell. It might very
well be that my view of the later dialogues is mistaken. But in\ any case
I would always return to those clear and simple colloquies in which the
splendor of the ideas remains forever untroubled and untarnished.

58 I may add perhaps in apology of my presumption that it is in some such light
that Constantin Ritter finally sees him too.
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IV
THE SOPHISTS
It is to the early Greek thinkers, to the Ionians and their successors, I
suppose, that we are indebted in the first instance for the conception of a
physical nature, that aggregate of "things and their forces," in Huxley's
phrase, which for reasons of our own we have come to regard as the sole
reality of any particular importance. Whether we ascribe this result
to discovery or invention or discrimination will depend very largely on the
character of our philosophy. Undoubtedly primitive speculation had little
sense of those distinctions, obvious as they now appear, which we have
resumed in such terms as physical, ethical, social, political, religious, and
the like. Not that the original Greek observer was destitute of such ideas
but that he had still to segregate them; his universe, like his consciousness, was relatively undifferentiated. The order of nature and the course of
justice, mind and mechanism, causation and conation, perception, cognition,
conception mingled in inextricated confusion not only for"physiologists"
like Anaximander and Anaxagoras but for later comers like Heraclitus
and Empedocles. And yet by the middle of the fifth century at least
philosophy had succeeded after a fashion in isolating the germ of materialism-the notion of an exclusively mechanical system, the atoms and
the void, comparable if not identical with our own.
But significant as this achievement may seem from our point of view
-for it is not impossible that we have exaggerated its "scientific" importance-we owe at all events an equal, if not a still greater debt to that
loosely associated band of itinerant publicists of whom Protagoras has come
by force of his ability to serve as a kind of unofficial leader and spokesman
and who are known ambiguously enough as Sophists. To be sure, the word
publicist is as much of a misnomer as sophist, the Sophists themselves having
no common specification as they have no common definition. But while
collectively they formed no school or sect, each playing pretty much for
his own hand, yet in spite of their extreme individualism they did at
least form a kind of clique or coterie, more or less connected and affiliated
by their business; and in trading upon the ambitions of the public upon
whom they depended for their livelihood they acquired at all events the
unity such as it was of their clientele. In as far as their customers possessed
a common mind and taste, they were professionally bound to cultivate
that particular stripe of opinion under penalty of losing, their trade. And
as their patrons were grouped, so would they naturally group themselves. In the event, then, though they were neither sages on the one
hand nor on the other statists or politicians, their anxieties were social
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and practical, "real" and "timely," within the current meaning of the
terms-a circumstance that accounts perhaps for recent attempts, beginning with Grote, to rehabilitate their memories after so many centuries of obloquy. Without going so far, however, we may in justice accord
them this one merit at least: in spite of their shortcomings they were the
first to expose in something like clear relief the outlines of that conception of "men and their ways," to quote Huxley again, which we now
designate in its various aspects by the Procrustean title of humanism.
Of the elder or first generation Sophists, whom Plato dramatizes after
his usual fashion in his dialogues, the most prominent are Protagoras,
Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias. To complete the list there may; be added
Gorgias's understudy Polus and the otherwise obscure Callicles, much as
the latter might resent inclusion with some others of the gentry. Nor
should the inimitable Euthydemus and Dionysodorus be forgotten-to say
nothing of the obstreperous Thrasymachus, who is capable of speaking
sufficiently for himself.
How equivocal is the name of Sophist, in any event, is clear from the
circumstance that even after the word had developed its invidious connotation of a mere pretender to learning, it was still used more or less
indiscriminately of sage and charlatan alike, not infrequently by the same
author, and was never again fixed, like our term, in a single denotation.
And while Plato employs it pretty consistently, though he does on occasion draw a distinction between Sophists like Protagoras and rhetoricians
like Gorgias, whose instruction was oratorical and forensic, still even his
application of the term was in any particular instance a matter of discretion and open to dispute and contradiction. Nevertheless on a single point
the users of the word in its pejorative sense are unanimously agreed; their
Sophists have one common characteristic: whether taking part in public
affairs or not, they all pretended to impart the secret of success to those
who would do so-in a word they were all professed and professional
teachers.
It has been remarked of them by one of our own critics that in reference to their time, they combined the two modern roles of "journalist"
or editor and professor. But the comparison, while ingenious, is not quite
accurate in introducing a meaningless distinction. Their nearest counterpart is the present-day "educator," with his appetite for publicity and his
turn for propaganda-especially the professor of pedagogy, as he used
to be called before he had the nai:ve assurance to confiscate the whole
province of human culture for his own. Nor is the word "educator"
without its own duplicity either. An educator properly would be and
once was a teacher of any sort or kind, one engaged in the onerous, if
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no longer honored, service of education. But by some hocus-pocus the
designation, with all its question-begging implications, has been arrogated
to their own use by the members of a self-constituted profession who
pretend, like their ancient prototypes, to have reduced education-in
imitation of other interests of our time, not excepting literary criticismto the status of a "science," more or less exact or at least terminological,
and have come to figure in their own conceit, not as mere educators themselves, but--the quirk is curious-as educators of educators. In their hands
"education" so called has become, like rhetoric ancient and modern, a
purely formal subject, pretty well indifferent to matter and concerned
mainly for method-a knowledge of knowledge, the knowledge "which
conveys no other knowledge than itself,"1 such as Plato contemptuously
turns his back upon in the Charmides and Euthydemus. The parallel is so
nearly exact that we are in no great danger of aiming wild if we think
of the Sophists in their popular r6le as the "educators" of their time,
intent, like those with whom we are personally acquainted, on making
of education not only a trade but a business.
Now, if it is true that Socrates, as many of his analogies suggest,
looked upon every occupation, even that of statesmanship, as a kind of
craft, requiring for its successful practice a certain amount of technical or
specialized skill, then it is difficult to understand why he should have
quarrelled with the Sophists for making of education a trade in its turn.
In this respect it is not impossible that Plato has given us in the long
run a false or exaggerated impression in his own sense. On the evidence
of the Memorabilia and the earlier Platonic dialogues themselves it hardly
appears that Socrates viewed the Sophists with the unrelenting animosity
that came to characterize his disciple's later years. His tone is at worst,
rather, one of ridicule sharpened with sarcasm, as in the Apology,2 and
at best one of indulgent tolerance; on occasion he even recommends them
to inacceptable candidates for his own fellowship. Plato, for his own part
we must suppose, exhibits-is it much worse than a kind of grudging consideration for Protagoras and certainly for the aged Gorgias in the dialogues which bear their names, though to be sure he displays little enough
regard for Hippias and the smaller fry.
No, what offended Socrates and Plato, to begin with, was undoubtedly
the Sophists' habit of teaching for hire rather than the nature of their
ideas.8 Had they not themselves dabbled in the same questionable sources
-as pupils, Socrates of Anaxagoras and Plato of Cratylus the dumbshow man, the disciple of Heraclitus the Dark? And had they not lain
Euthydemus, 292'd.
19e-20c.
8 Memorabilia, I, vi, 13.
1
2
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under the same imputation of skepticism and innovation? It was only later
when Plato's clairvoyance was sufficiently developed to detect the mischievous consequences of the Sophistic propaganda, as they too began
to discover themselves undisguisedly-for after all it was the Sophistic
inheritance that Plato was best acquainted with-it was only then, when
the genuine issues became clear to him, that he came to resent so acrimoniously the entire movement and its proponents near and remote.
In the first instance, however, the traffic in learning, as though education were a commodity that could be peddled for a price, would appear
in itself sufficiently vicious to inspire distrust of the whole profession
even in the insensitive minds of the general public. As indeed it is.
With the possible exception of subjects of a strictly utilitatrian or "vocational" sort such as may be turned to the pecuniary advantage of the
purchaser, the practice was felt to degrade all instruction to the level of a
staple, subject solely to the law of supply and demand. And while at the
present time education has become so thoroughly commercialized that such
a custom no longer seems shocking, yet in the case of the original Sophists
it was still hard for the unspoiled intelligence to reconcile their claims
to the possession of a knowledge indispensable to human happiness and
well-being-to say nothing of their pretensions to high-mindednesswith their willingness to trade upon that knowledge or even to withhold
it until their cupidity was satisfied. So at least many of the Athenians
felt. Hucksters and hawkers are the least unflattering names that Plato
finds for them; while innumerable are his jibes and scoffs at their venality.
Professional hunters of young men for fees on the pretense of preparing
them for citizenship, such is the manner in which he describes them in
the Sophist and to the same effect the Socrates of the Cratylus: "If I had
only been able to afford his fifty-drachma course of lectures," 4 so he sneers
at Prodicus, "I were capable of telling you all about this matter of language;
but unfortunately I have only had the benefit of his one-drachma lecture."
To be sure, these rates do not seem particularly exorbitant nowadays-a
drachma being worth about a shilling; and though tradition has it that
Protagoras charged his pupils the round sum of a hundred mimr: or
in the neighborhood of two thousand dollars, 5 still Isocrates remarks of
Gorgias, who appears to have been his leader, that in spite of his long
life-he lived to be over a hundred-and his unusual opportunities for
amassing a fortune, he left but a few thousand dollars behind him at
his death.6 Nevertheless, so touchy were the Greeks on the subject, particularly if tradition is to be trusted, in this case of Prodicus, who had
Cratylus, 384b.
Diogenes Laertius, IX, 52.
6 "A thousand staters"-De Permutatione, 155-157.
4

5
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agents to search out young men of family and wealth for him,1 that
Plato finds it well within the dramatic proprieties to put into the mouth
of his Protagoras a kind of apology of his own fair-dealing with his pupils
in the matter of fees. For his part, he says, he has arranged his charges
on a special plan. "When any one has had lessons from me, he pays me
the sum that I ask if he like; if not, he goes to a temple, takes oath to
the value he sets on what he has learned from me, and disburses me
that amount." 8 And this trait may be regarded, I think, as indicative
of an uneasy consciousness oi! their vulnerability at this point on the part
of the more scrupulous members of the profession. What was likely to
become of education under this system we can see by comparing the state
of things at present.9
As for Socrates in: ,his own person, it is not unlikely that he felt even
for the most eminent representatives of the clique that sort of amused
contempt which common sense has for those who preach without practising. Unquestionably his idea of education was influenced in no small
measure by his relation of master workman and apprentice, the master
being qualified as an instructor by his application, as well as by his possession, of knowledge. In fact some such scruple may have lurked behind
his own disclaimers of competence as sage and teacher. For if right action
is impossible, as he believed, without exact knowledge, it is not entirely
unreasonable, since the two are correlative, to look upon the one as the
sign of the other. Of such proficiency at all events as he was willing to
recognize, the Sophists, with the possible exception of Protagoras, had
given little or no proof; they were neither the statesmen nor even the
citizens whose craft they undertook to teach; they were strangers in a
strange land, without residence or domestication, travelling salesmen and
touts for their own concerns. And while an exception might be taken
in the case of the rhetoricians, who were eloquent enough in all conscience, still their subject itself was empty of instruction, a bladder of
flattery and persuasion, an imposture equally with sophistry, like cookery
and cosmetics-an opinion which Plato, no doubt, would share with him.
But, after all, Plato's. suspicions, when he began to write, must have
gone deeper than a mere distaste, call it snobbish or priggish if you like,
for the Sophists' mercenary motives, deeper than a respectful deference
to his master's prejudices or prepossessions. As teachers or educators for
hire the Sophists were under the necessity of deferring to any wind that
gave promise of filling their sails. For their experience of human nature,
7 Philostratus. See Diels, 77 H, la.
8 Protagoras, 328b.
9 Pythodorus, general in Sicily, 427, spent 100 minz on a Sophistic trallllllg
(Camb. Anc. Hist., vol. V, p. 225). Proxenus the Breotian, the friend of Xenophon's,
was a pupil of Gorgias.

74

THE SOPHISTS

75

from which their humanism was in great part derived, they were unavoidably indebted to those with whom they were most intimately associated. And reciprocally, in the very process of adapting their knowledge
to their pecuniary advantage, they were likely to be affected to a greater
or less degree in their own characters. In particular were they warped
in these respects by that portion of their public to which they immediately appealed, those ambitious and not always over-scrupulous young men,
like Alcibiades, upon whom as followers and disciples they depended for
their reputation and income. They were obliged at the same time to deprecate, as far as possible, the disapproval of the general, which might otherwise have imperilled their security, as it did Anaxagoras', and to adapt their
teaching, revolutionary though it might be, to the social conditions in which
they found themselves, not merely for the sake of safeguarding their own
persons but for the sake of satisfying the political ambitions of their pupils.
That they were not completely successful at all points is no great matter
for amusement. On the whole Gorgias appears to have been the most adept
at this sort of thing, for tradition preserves a note of admiration for his
adroitness in recommending Hellenic unity to the Athenians, while he
dexterously avoided shocking the Athenian passion for empire by any explicit reference to a friendly understanding with the other cities, dwelling
on their triumphs over the Persians with the implication that victories
over the barbarians were occasions for rejoicings in contrast with those
over Greeks.10 But Protagoras, on the contrary, who was confident enough
in boasting of his occupation, suffered the mortification of being expelled
from Athens and having his books, all that could be collected of them,
burned in the inarket-place; while Prodicus for all his precautions is supposed to have died of hemlock no less than Socrates.U Under the, circumstances it is intelligible enough that none of them should have been able
to avoid the danger of degenerating into charlatans on the one hand or
trimmers on the other and opportunists on both.
To the Athenian of the period in which Plato was personally interested
man had become in the words of Aristotle's famous definition, a "political"
animal almost exclusively. That is to say, in modern terms, he was not
merely an intellectual, moral, and social being, though he was all these
too; but he was essentially and above all a public character. Not only did
he feel himself most at home when abroad in the city-in the agora, the
gymnasium, the palrestra, the theatre; as a member of a small and exigent
democracy he was a citizen the greater part of the time-not by fits and
starts as with us, at odd moments of a periodic election or the like; he
was continually in service, as a soldier, a dicast, an ecclesiast, a liturgist.
lives of the Sophists, I, 9.
give this gossip for what it may be worth-as a posterior recognition of the
perils to which the Sophists must have been exposed from the general public.
10 Philostratus,

11 I
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So narrow were the dimensions of the state that all its interests were
bound to seem peculiarly instant and pressing, as all its members were
bound to appear in the light of neighbors, in the guise either of personal
friends or rivals. As a free man, if this be freedom to live without privacy,
his privilege as well as his duty was the government and on that account
he guarded and cultivated it jealously. His own interests were inextricably
bound up with the policies of his country, if not completely absorbed by
them. And as his existence so was his ambition-to attain authority in the
affairs of his city and among his fellow-citizens.
That Plato himself inherited what had come to be a kind of tradition
in his day and in his family is clear enough from his constant preoccupation with statecraft and the constitution of society. Nor is there much
doubt of his chagrin at finding himself debarred from a public career,
whether by virtue of his own conscientious scruples or by force of adverse
circumstances, so that in taking up the cudgels against Callicles in favour
of the philosophic as contrasted with the political life as he does in the
Gorgias he has perhaps a little the air of making a virtue of necessity.
But however he may have come by his final conviction of the viciousness
of democratic politics, the sincerity of that ·conviction is unquestionable-as is the depth of his aversion for those whom he felt to be responsible
for it.
For it was to this very vice, as he: saw it, that the Sophists had catered
in their address to the young men who Bocked about them; and in so
doing, if they had not directly and at first hand infected their own contemporaries, had fastened the evil upon their countrymen. What they
offered in exchange for their hire was a complete preparation for public
life, or in our language, "citizenship." To be sure they had not the
foresight to anticipate the modern cant of "service" as a cloak for the
self-seeking activities which they encouraged; they had few pretensions to
altruism or humanitarianism-that was reserved for the Antisthenic heresy
of Stoicism. But they did, the cannier of them like Protagoras, make a
great pretense of virtue. "Young man," he says to Hippocrates, who is
thinking of joining his classes, "on the very day you first attend them
you will go home a better man; and so on day by day you will continue
to improve unceasingly."12 Even Gorgias, who is praised among his
fellows by Meno, with the tacit concurrence of Anytus, the Sophist-baiter,
for his freedom from this sort of hypocrisy,13 is driven to admit, when
cornered, an esteem for justice as a prerequisite for public life, and a
willingness and ability to impart it to his pupils.14 Prodicus finds his affair
12 Protagoras, 318a.
13 Meno, 95c.
H Gorgu11, 460a-b.
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in a highly edifying apologue of the youthful Hercules and the solicita•
tions of the forward Kakia, alias Eudaimonia, who is finally dismissed, we
must suppose, for her more respectable, if less seductive rival Arete.15 Of
such disguises, however, convenient as they may have seemed to men of
greater prudence like Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus, their hardier and
bolder colleagues and admirers Polus, Callicles, and Thrasymachus were
frankly disdainful. And not only so; they were equally free in proclaiming
the incentive by which they actually drew and held their youthful clientele
-the possibilities of personal advantage and promotion opened to their
ambition by the prospect of democratic leadership.
Democracy and leadership! And what, pray, we may ask with Plato, is
leadership in ~ democracy but demagogy? Whose instrument is oratorynot philosophy or "science" either in the Greek or in the English sense,
but rhetoric, the art of flattery and persuasion, or, as Plato has it, the trick
of inducing irrational belief. Such, to make a distinction rather than a
difference, was the special subject of the rhetors, like Gorgias, who boasts
-they are always boasting-that it was< the orators not the architects that
built the walls of Athens. And while the Sophist might be supposed in
strictness to busy himself after a braver fashion with legislation or statecraft, our "political science" so called, yet in the nature of the case every
Sophist was perforce a rhetorician too. Like the rhetorician he gloried,
after the example of Protagoras, in his ability to speak on either, or for
that matter on both, sides of every question and to make the weaker
cause appear the stronger. In short, there is so little to choose between
rhetor and Sophist that Plato finds his own distinction untenable and
abandons it in the long run. Not virtue, not justice-however they might
shuflle when pushed-was their common means and aim-but expediency
and success, policy and preferment.
Naturally the youth of the period were not immune to the kind of
virus which the Sophists had to administer-if it were not that the latter
chosei their toxin with particular reference to their patients. It is hard to
say whether the victim invites his exploiter or vice versa; probably the
election is mutual. But the youth with whom the Sophists had to deal
was a peculiar one. Youth is a disquiet and uneasy age at best. And
yet as long as the spirit of the age-what we used quaintly to call the
Zeitgeist-is strong enough to engage their activity and to impart a favourable bent to their activity, their restlessness is rather an advantage than the
contrary. Their impetuosity and enthusiasm may as likely as not make
them agents, even advance-agents, of progress-provided the current which
carries them is setting in that direction. But unfortunately the age of the
15 Xenophon,

Memorabilia, II, 1, 21.
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Sophists was itself a backwater, a period of unsettlement and indirection.
The very causes that had so recently brought about the material prosperity
of Athens were already at work upon her moral undoing. Hardly had
the Persian wars left her pre-eminent among the cities of Greece than she
began to take advantage of this supremacy to enrich herself by a kind
of fraud with the revenues of the Delian Confederacy and to use them
for her own aggrandizement. Wealth, luxury, power, and art had begun
to sap the integrity of the national character. The traditional simplicity
of manners and the ingenuous piety of the past were lost forever. Politically she had become in fact that most anomalous of human institutions,
a democratic empire, exacting tribute from her former allies and wards,
and subject to all the ignominious shifts, evasions, and equivocations incident to a false position, until she acquired the cold-blooded cynicism to
throw off her disguises and appear to the Melians as what she actually
was-a despot. Nor was the Peloponnesian War with its ghastly sequel
the Sicilian Expedition so far below the horizon that its ominous shadow
might not have been visible to the far-sighted eye of a philosopher. And
to all these unsettling influences must be added the gradual incursion
of natural or physical philosophy or "science" and its disintegrating effect
upon the national consciousness. And yet foreign and inimical as it was
to the Athenian genius, that philosophy contained at worst a tincture of
animism, a strain of "pan-psychism," that sufficed to lend it an illusion
of intelligibility and ethical significance; it had held out to the open minds
of its day like Socrates at least a mirage if not an adequate image of
reality--only to break down at last into the "flowing science" of Heraclitus, the first of those hopeless time-philosophies,; that seem to supervene
fatally upon the wreckage of all these grandiose systems of nature, whether
metaphysical or positivist. Of the consternation with which the event
must have been viewed by serious inquirers it is possible to form some
idea from Plato's moderate and measured account in the Phtedo of the
perplexities of Socrates,

rcoU&.; 6'66ou; EA:Oov,;a (f)QOVl't6o; :nid.vot;,
after the disaster, supplemented meagrely as it is by the Memorabilia.
"When I was young," says Socrates, "I was tremendously eager for
the kind of wisdom which they call the investigation of nature. I thought
it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing
comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists at all. . . . Then
one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said by Anaxagoras,
that it is the mind which orders and causes' all things. And I was pleased
with this theory . . . and delighted to think that I had found . . . a
teacher of the causes of things quite to my taste. . . . But my glorious
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hope was soon snatched away from me. For as I went on with
my reading, I saw that the man had made no use of intelligence and
did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned
as such air and ether and water and many other absurdities. . . . And
so it seems to me that most people, using a name that is utterly inappropriate, when they speak of that sort of thing as causes, are but groping
as it were in the dark." 16
But why insist? Have we not ourselves been sufferers of a like stupefaction from a very similar disappointment of our own? Have we not ourselves suffered from a similar sense of loss and vacuity, chagrin at the
"bankruptcy" of our own grandiloquent science and its specious promises?
And yet for the Athenian-if like us he had not taken it already-there
was still a further step to go with Leucippus and Democritus, who were
to leave him with nothing substantial but the atoms and the void and to
reduce morality, if not reality itself, to an affair either of convention or
of nature.
To such conditions may be assigned in the main the rise and ascendancy of the Sophists. By them those young and eager spirits who had
been so recently bilked of their confidence in "science" were offered a
new interest agreeable not only with the temper of their years but with
the distemper of the times. While Socrates was trying-not with complete success it must be acknowledged-to find a remedy for the incredulity
and libertinage which seem the inevitable outcome of such moments
of disenchantment, and by suggesting some principle of personal integrity
and control was endeavoring to fill the vacancy left by the lapse of religious and moral conviction and to encourage man to set up of himself
a law against his members-and to establish an ethical autonomy or
autarchy against the anarchy of self; it was the weakness of the Sophists
that they found nothing better to do in the emergency than to flatter the
passions and instincts that were reigning at the instant, a source of confusion to their possessors and of danger to society and to culture itself.
The quibbles and ingenuities and doubles entendres of Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus, the contempt of Thrasymachus and Callicles for decency
and their identification of virtue with temperament and of happiness with
pleasure, so like our own contumacious paradoxes, are indicative of the
mood of their youthful contemporaries-no less than the rhetorical duplicity of the orators with their conscienceless indifference to subject or
theme--and their disregard for consistency in truth. In fact there is preserved in the so-called ~wcrot A6yot or "The Double Tongue" what
amounts to a text-book compiled as it might be by a graduate of the
16 Pha:do, 96a-99c. Cf. Sophist, 242c-243b; Memorabilia, I, i, ii, etc.
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school for the instruction of students in the politic art of facing both
ways. Of the good and the evil, the just and the unjust, the true and
the false it furnishes arguments to prove alternately their identity and
difference and with equal facility demonstrates that wisdom and virtue
are and are not capable of being taught. Whoever the author of this
invaluable educational compendium, not so very unlike a modern manual
of debate, he would seem to have taken his cue from Protagoras, whose
boast to make the weaker reason the stronger (-rov i\-r-rw 'Aoyov %QEL-r't0>
n:otELV ), insincere if not actually deceitful in itself, was fated to lead into
this very kind of ambiguity and confusion, the weaker and the stronger
soon becoming precedents for the worse and the better with a complete
reversal of normal values.
Nor are the meagre fragments of Protagoras' works that are preserved
to us wholly reassuring with respect to his ingenuousness. "About the
gods," he remarks, in his essay "On Divinity," 17 "I can be certain of
nothing,-whether they are or are not or what they are like ( on:oi:o( nvE;
lMav) for there are many hindrances in the way-the obscurity of the
subject and the brevity of human life." There is, of course, no little
danger of interpreting such detached and scattered dicta, wrenched, as
they frequently appear to be, from their context and quoted in connections
and for purposes controversial and other which their writers would never
have approved. But in this instance the author's practical agnosticism,
which would debar the gods from citation in human debate,1 8 is attested
by the complementary pragmatism of what was undoubtedly his most
famous utterance, that sentence from his "Truth" or 'A1.11{}ua which strikes
the key-note of Sophistic humanism-"Man is the measure of all things;
of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not." After this fashion,
in denying the existence of a general or universal truth, says Sextus Empiricus,19 he first introduced relativism into philosophy. 20 And to much the
same effect Gorgias in his treatise "Concerning Unreality or Nature" 21
undertakes to maintain three theses: first, there is no such thing as truth;
second, even if there were such a thing, it would be unintelligible and
past finding out; and third, even if it were intelligible, it would be incommunicable and inexpressible-contentions which he proceeds to demonstrate in a style of reasoning not a little like that of Plato's Parmenides. 22
While Prodicus describes the whole circle, disposing of divinity and reality
17

18
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i;tihJcrt 't(l lj)<lL'VOµEV(l E%<lO''t<p µova.
20 i;o ltQO~ 'tL, Cf. Diels: 74 A, 14.
21 II £Qt i:ou µ-iJ <>"V"to~ t\ iteQt 1pucrEro~.
22 Diels: 76B, 3.
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at a single stroke by making man the measure even of the gods, whom
he held, so it is reported, to be merely the apotheosis of whatever and
whomever mefi\ have found useful or beneficial to themselves. 23
Now, whether the Sophists were altogether sincere in such expressions
or spoke and wrote solely out of a vain delight in literary ingenuities and
verbal coquetries, for the sake of displaying their rhetorical skill and
cockering the self-conceit of their youthful auditors is no great matter.
In the latter case it is only their character which is at stake; in the former
their philosophy-the one being exposed at worst to the charge of levity;
the other to that of shallowness. In neither event is their influence particularly affected. Whatever their convictions, they were at all events, like
Huxley, great popularizers. And it is seldom indeed that a popularizer's
influence is dependent either on the depth of his thought or on the elevation of his principles. He needs only to cocker his hearers' self-esteem
by echoing distinctly what is already ringing confusedly in the recesses of
their inner consciousness. The great system-makers are not as a rule those
who have had the strongest appeal even with the intelligent public. Had
the late William James never written so compendious a work as his
Psychology, his vogue would have been diminished no whit. His versatility and his timeliness would have seen him through; he knew the
word and the season, above all that XatQ6i; upon which the original
Sophists were always harping. And in whatever manner we take them,
as exhibitionists or sciolists-and the two characters are by no means incompatible-the gravity and extent of their influence is unquestionable.
The dialogues of Plato are alone sufficient evidence; he at least was not
one to expend his strength in an empty bout with shadows or men of straw.
With the extrusion, then, of the divine or spiritual the Sophists had
pretty well succeeded in delimiting humanity at the one extremity, and in
establishing a precedent of which humanism has seldom or never rid
itself. It was not that Protagoras and his immediate followers, any more
than their later-day successors, abjured the gods outright; that would
have been too impolitic-professed atheism was no more in fashion at
Pagan Athens than it was in Renaissance Europe or Victorian England
or than it is at present in Methodist America. What they denied of
spirituality was relevance tacitly or explicitly. Possibly, like Huxley or
Spencer, they would have allowed it a figurative or symbolic sanctuary
in poetry or, following the suggestion of William James, would have
relegated it under strict censorship to the subconscious. But practically,
like Montaigne, having once made it obeisance, though with rather less
ceremony, they were content to ignore it and go on about their business,
which was so pressingly with this world and its denizens.
23
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And yet clear as their pos1t1on appears in this respect, they failed
signally to define the other end of the scale with anything like equal
precision, being satisfied-for reasons of their own, no doubt-to leave
it in an obscurity which continues to becloud it to this day. That it is
man that is the measure of all things, and not the pig or the tadpole
with which Plato twits him, is so far forth to Protagoras' credit; and
Plato himself retracts the taunt on reflection. But there are so many
slippery gradations between man and animal-as witness Pyrrho's pigthat practical humanism has never been quite sure of its footing since,
or secure against sliding insensibly even past the tadpole to its native
ooze.24 In so far the advantage-the argument of historical tendencylies with Plato, whose sneer had thus much justice in it, despite his
retraction, that it did recognize what was indeed the bearing of the whole
movement, whether of conventionists or naturists, to confound sooner
or later nature and human nature in a single amalgam, obviously and
directly on the part of the naturists; but equally so, though less immediately on the part of the conventionists, in denying any sanction to morality
other than pure convenience or utility. And this, it must be granted, was
equally the inclination of the Renaissance-namely, to run the two natures
into one and to integrate man with physics, or mechanics-machina mundi
-only the Renaissance, it would appear, with the assistance of science,
carried the work to a successful conclusion, upon which Protestantism
with its natural law in the spiritual world, seems to be setting the seal.
So life becomes not a psyche but a blind elan.
Aside from such confusion, incidental perhaps to its Heraclitean sensationalism-vigorously as Plato protests it on this score-could Protagoras'
dogma-for dogma it has virtually become-have ever been anything
but anathema to him? "Man is the measure of all things." Whatever
else the formula may mean, it means at least that man is the sole makerthe "creator" as we like to say-of values, even-as Prodicus would add
pragmatically with William James if it were not humanly impertinentof divinity. "The noblest work of man is god." As a result justice and
"the other virtues" are deprived of objective attestation; the whole edifice
of ideas collapses; and truth and reality, like sensation and perception,
become subjective and fail of other authority or sanction than can be
found in the convention or the nature to which the Sophists referred. As
between these two horns of the dilemma upon which they had cast themselves, it would appear from their own utterances and from Plato's hints
and innuendoes that the former alternative was elected by Protagoras,
24 1'0 what particular humane category, for instance, is to be assigned the refined
pleasure of scratching oneself incessantly [ Gorgias, 494d], or for that matter those
delights for which Polus envies the Great King and Archelaus of Macedon?
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Prodicus, and possibly Gorgias, the latter by Thrasymachus, Polus, Callicles,
and Hippias.
To judge by Plato's off-hand and allusive references to it the distinction between nature and convention had become a commonplace by his
time. At all events it was sufficiently matter of course to furnish point
for a jest.25 But to the historical Socrates it was no doubt a novel polemical
weapon and one of which he was not indisposed to avail himself in a
pinch, as Plato's Callicles, speaking in character and with verisimilitude,
presumably, is shrewd to observe. "And this ... is your smart trick for
getting the better of us; when anyone speaks according to convention you
smuggle nature into your interrogations; and contrariwise, if one mentions
nature you switch to your convention." 26 Evidently it was not always
Socrates' methods that distinguished him from his adversaries-the confusion of his contemporaries on that score is not unintelligible-but his
principles and, be it added; his conclusions likewise. In the first instance,
the controversy would at any rate appear to have revolved about the
sanctity of law and custom ( the v6µot). And it is not impossible that
the original turn was that given to it or recorded by Xenophon in the
discussion between Hippias and Socrates as to whether such institutions are
to be considered human or divine in origin-a debate in which Socrates,
like Montaigne at a later date, distinguishes, as he does so often. 27 Some
laws, he is sure, are divine, and unlike those of human provenance,
ineluctable.
In Sophistic circles, however, with the abrogation of divinity common
to the unqualified humanism of an age of enlightenment, the interest had
shifted from the question of legislation as such to that of the law or principle proper to man. As with Socrates it had become an ethical as well as a
legal or juridical problem. In this division of opinion Thrasymachus and
Callicles come forward as the counsel of nature. "Justice is the conveniency of the powerful;" what is agreeable to the strong-that is justice.
Like Nietzsche after them they explain existing customs as in the main
a defensive or protective mechanism on the part of the weak against the
encroachments of the strong and as such subversive of natural-that is,
of genuine-right and equity. In effect one' party is by all accounts quite
as selfish or "instinctive" as the other; so that Socrates is well within his
rights in retorting upon Callicles that the weaker and inferior actually
turn out in that case to be the mightier.
But while this general attitude of both Thrasymachus and Callicles is
very much similar, still it is possible to discriminate, since Plato is hardly
25 Protagoras, 337c-d.
26 Gorgias, 483a.
2 7 See Memorabilia IV,

iv.
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likely to have intended a duplication of character in the two of them.
Obviously, then, as Socrates' retort indicates, the Sophistic relativity is
capable of serving as a principle of democracy as well as of autocracy.
If man is the measure of all things and what appears to each is what it
appears to him, there will be as many goods as there are individuals. And
further, inasmuch as there is no standard, no authority by which the
priority of one or another may be settled other than the good-seeming
of the individual-since all interests are themselves on an equality, equally
good and equally valid-it follows that the only possible decision as between conflicting interests will be some form of might-that of the
superior individual, the bedeutendes lndividuum, at the one extreme, or
an overwhelming combination of inferior individuals at the other-tyranny
or democracy. In either case indifferently might makes right. But while
Thrasymachus for his part is prepared to accept the consequences of the
premise and to recognize by force of necessity the might of confederated
numbers and the might of native superiority; 28 Callicles is willing to
acknowledge the latter alone, resenting bitterly the former as a kind of
usurpation or abrogation. In other words, Thrasymachus, who seems the
more skeptical, the more annihilatory character, considers justice to be
but a figment of the imagination, a mere ideal, while Callicles identifies
it positively with nature as the Sophists understood it.
At the same time there is no more doubt of Thrasymachus' position
as such than of Callicles'. For them both the standard of human nature
is set by the "original" spontaneous, the unspoiled "impulsive" primate
with the will to power. It is this first of animals that is the "natural
man." And Hippias differs with them only in entertaining a more benign
and sympathetic sort of primitivism. Like Rousseau's his human nature
seems to be endowed with a larger proportion of innate sentimentality.
Whatever we may have become by custom we are all kinsmen, he
declares, by nature.29 In other words this measure of all things is softened
in his thought, as in Wordsworth's, into the innocence of a "child of
nature." Indeed, Hippias might have felt at home among the Stoics or
even the modern humanitarians.
From this view of human immediacy or "instantaneity" Protagoras and
Prodicus dissent-the former, at least, widely. Without transgressing the
bounds that he has fixed to humanity he thinks of human nature as
capable of correction and rectification by reason and experience, though
how this desirable end is to be attained-let alone sighted-in the absence
of a determinate standard he unfortunately fails to explain. Pragmatist
28 Compare Thrasymachus' protest or appeal against the encroachments of Archelaus
upon Larissa in Thessaly about 400 B. C.
29 Protagoras, 337e.
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and sensationalist as he is, he believes the race to be improvable-to some
extent. Curious that the notion of human "progress" never broke in all
its splendor upon the vision ,of these ancient speculators. Was it that they
knew human nature so much better than we do or that their sense of
moderation would have shrunk before the illimitable vistas of such a
prospect? "Ka-r' livOQcmtOv <pQOVEt!" And thinking neither as a go<l nor
yet quite as an animal Protagoras is evidently not altogether satisfied of
the perfection of humanity in its "natural" and untutored state. He even
conceives of a better nature in contrast with a worse, though to save his
face he is obliged to deny that the one is "truer" than the other. "In
education," he would say according to Plato, "it is necessary to effect a
change from one state to a better . . . though no one ever made a man
who once thought false think true, since it is impossible to think what
is not [
µ~ ovi:a] or other than one feels. But I believe that whereas
a bad state of mind will give a man bad thoughts, a good state will give
him thoughts of the contrary sort. Such ideas to be sure some call by
inexperience true but I call them merely better, the latter than the former,
but not true by any manner of means."30
I assume as usual that Plato's proponents speak after the mind of
their historical namesakes and that Plato's evidence to the views of the
latter is at least as good as any other second-hand testimony to that effect
which has come down to us. And although in this instance he is confessedly putting his own interpretation upon Protagoras' philosophy, he
could hardly afford, in the interest of his argument, to misrepresent its
general tenor while it was still so fresh in men's memories. And yet for
all his ingenuity-for I take it that in this passage from the so-called
Apology of Protagoras Plato is making the best of Protagoras' case,
feigning, as he says, to hold a brief for him-still for all that, he fails
to extricate his client for the moment from the toils which the latter
has spun for himself. In fact they are unescapable. What to the pragmatist of the Protagorean stripe is the better or the worse but an opinion,
which, as Democritus pointed out, may be invalidated by another opinion
to the contrary? And while there may be states or conditions whose relative
merit no sane man would dream of disputing, as health in comparison
with disease, still in default of an objective criterion-like Plato's-such
unanimity of opinion constitutes merely a fashion like another. Who
knows but that in a community of ascetics or visionaries such values
might be reversed just as they are with respect to health of soul in the

,:a.

30 Thei:etetu!, 167a-b. I read JtOVT)Q~ 'lj.lU)Ciji; ilf;Et rather than JtOV1]Qiii;, and supply
ilf;ti; rather than 'ljlU:X:f] with :X:Q1JC1't1] as more agreeable with Protagoras' reasoning. I

should like to call attention also to Protagoras' predilection for the words dµdvrov,
as more or less characteristically Sophistic. Cf. Socrates' summary of
Callicles' creed in Gorgia!, 488.
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every-day world? And yet, although the best to which Protagoras dare
consistently aspire is but a "seeming good," still we must in fairness give
him credit for catching through his envelopes of error a glimpse of an
acquired and superior habit, "a second nature" and a better as within
the possibilities of humanity.
In somewhat the same way it is possible to detect on the part of
Prodicus a recognition, however cloudy, of man's double nature. To be
sure, he externalizes it, but that is inevitable under the circumstances.
What else is the point of his apologue of Hercules, already referred to?
As it is reported by Xenophon the young demigod is represented as turning
alternate ears to the importunities of Kakia and Arete, vice and virtue,
who incite him, the one to a life of indulgence and pleasure and sloth,
the other to a career of toil and labor and usefulness. And while he
fails in this the sole version of the fable to come to a final decision, the
event could hardly have been other than a foregone conclusion in the
minds of those already familiar with his legendary biography. From this
rather stilted and chilly fancy, which was long admired as a model of
elegant invention, there emerge two ideas-both of which are totally foreign
to the naturalists or naturists-whichever you prefer to call them-the
reality of temptation and the efficacy of choice or "free will." To Callicles
and those of like kidney the one idea would appear as inadmissable as the
other. How is it possible to be misled by the infallible promptings of an
impeccable nature, or what is to be preferred before her faultless perfections? Nor is it going too far, perhaps, now that we are trying to make
the most of the Sophists' possessions,-to suggest that in the case of the
former idea, the idea of temptation with the accompanying implication
of duty that seems to haunt it, this Prodicus, the verbalist with his meticulous concern for the discrimination of synonyms, had stumbled upon a
conception in advance of his age and contemporaries, even the majority of
the Socratics themselves?
But this, very likely, is to be too sanguine. And I am content to rest
the case for those whom I have distinguished, awkwardly enough, as conventionists, upon what is clear on the face of the evidence-particularly
since Gorgias for his part has little or nothing to contribute. He does,
to be sure, betray a rather queasy sense of justice-at least he is ashamed
to acknowledge that rhetoric is wholly conscienceless; in defense he would
shift the blame for the faults in which it is detected to those who use it
improperly. But beyond this rather timid compliment to the v6µoi he
hardly ventures-possibly in awe of his strident young associates Polus
and Callicles, who have no hesitation in asserting that this subject is
valuable just in proportion as it enables its practitioners to evade the law,
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and to do_ as they like with impunity. In the upshot, then, the evidence
for this brand of Sophistic, taken at the foot of the letter, hardly carries
beyond a politic deference for fashion-that is, for official received and
accepted opinion-whether re-enforced or not by legislation.31
There is no use in arguing. The only possible philosophy for an age
without standards, "an age of ideals," is some form or other of pragmatism. Without standards there are but two virtues-the virtue of
nature and the virtue of convention. And how rickety are their foundations we have had an opportunity to see in our own instance, and in
what danger they stand of collapsing into moral solipsism or protestantism:
"my own mind is my own creed," which is again but another anarchy
of self.
Nevertheless it was upon some such philosophical ground that the
ancient Sophists proceeded to erect their "ethics" of citizenship. No doubt
to some of them such an end seemed to be1 the most satisfactory within
the reach of human endeavor and politics, indeed to be "the good life"
itself. Such was the case with Callicles. But fortunately they constituted
by no means the sole party in Athens--they and those who sought to
them from one motive and another-the young and ignorant and ingenuous, the dissatisfied and disaffected, those who had broken with the
past and despaired of tradition and "the wisdom of the ancients," placita
majorum, and were desirous only of new things, the restless and disquiet
and unruly, the irreligious and skeptical and unprincipled. A veritable
motley, comprising, as we know, many a naive and simple spirit like
Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus, who rouses Socrates before sunrise with
the inspiring news of Protagoras' arrival in Athens--as well as many an
amateur and dilettante and tuft-hunter like Callicles, who dissipates his
patrimony in toadying to the intellectual snobbery of knowledge-to say
nothing of such perverse and lawless resolutes as Alcibiades--parasite and
host, knave and dupe. To all the confessors of the modish time and flux
philosophy, "the partisans of progress"-to these mobilists in particular
the Sophists served as a centre and rallying point. But however they
might, as no doubt they did, flatter themselves after the manner of their
kind upon their advanced ideas, they had still to reckon with an obstinate
and formidable mass of the citizenry, "the great beast" of the Republic,
inert and sullen of itself but rousing to dangerous activity at the proddings of the Aristophanic or old Athenian faction. As an opposition that
particular coterie had on the whole one advantage. Composed variously
enough of the reactionary and conservative, the belated and backward, the
timid and stupid, the pietistic and superstitious, the formalists and ob81 See for Gorgias' attitude, the Gorgias; and for the conclusion of the paragraph,
the T hetetettiJ.
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scurantists and precisians, it was solidly welded by a unanimous desire to
strangle speculation in its cradle before it had done all the mischief it
was capable of. Not that as a body they were themselves any more deeply
religious, in spite of their professions of orthodoxy, than were many of
those with whom they quarreled. And for all their solidarity they had
the counterbalancing disadvantage of being on the defensive; and conscious of fighting a losing fight with their backs to the wall against the
spirit of advance, they abused and hated indiscriminately those whom
posterity has in the long run approved as prophets and condemned as
charlatans. For the Sophists as compared with these obstructionists there
is a good deal to be said; and it is only fair to take this point of view into
account in appraising their apologists. For my own part I seem to see
in this indiscriminate hostility an explanation of Socrates' indulgence of
the dissidents and dissentients. The intemperance of the "puritans" and
"fundamentalists," as we should call them in our barbarous jargon, in
the confounding of him and his companions with the Sophistic profession
in a general condemnation was surely enough to stir him to a measure
of compunction as against a common persecution. Certainly, it was a
sympathy without approval-a kind of ironic rapprochement as it is made
to appear in the Apology and the Meno, 9lc-92c; for the conjunctiofli was
at best too artificial to bear examination, as Plato's analysis showed when
it came time to draw the distinction which was destined to make of the
Socratic group, mainly through his own agency and in his own person,
the saving remnant of humane culture and civilization.
At the time of Socrates' death in 399, however, it cannot be said that
such a distinction had been satisfactorily drawn or even discerned, in
spite of a generation of effort on the part of him who was undoubtedly
its originator. Unquestionably' the character of Socrates was exemplary of
the humanistic idea at its best. But about his thought there was evidently
something incomplete, a failure to follow through, such as is illustrated
in the earlier dialogues of Plato, and about his expression there must have
been something indecisive and equivocal, that his spiritual heirs and assigns
should have come to speak in his name to such various effect, and, upsetting the balance of elements which had been harmoniously blended in
his nature, should have become so widely estranged in their own persons.
It may be that the fault, if his lack of didacticism was a fault, lay with
his method, his dialectic-with his preference for stimulation over instruction. Or possibly his curiosity was to blame, which, willing to discuss
every question under the sun, was unwilling to trancher any. His profession of ignorance and skepticism gave to his philosophy the appearance
of a bare form-a blank cheque which his followers were free to fill in at
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their own discretion - if indeed that were not just what he himself
contemplated.
At all events he had hardly drunk his cup of hemlock in the prison,
when his companions began to disperse in their several directions, each
bearing with him his portion, as much as he was capable of carrying,
large or small, of the Socratic inheritance, leaving Antisthenes and Plato
to divide between them the bulk of their master's estate; for relatively
insignificant as the former may now appear and actually was, to give
him credit for all that can possibly be claimed for him, it is true that the
two great systems of philosophy as a guide to life have ever since remained
the Stoic and the Academic.
Of the principal survivors of the little band the story goes that fearful
of the Athenian <k!mos they sought a temporary asylum with Euclides
at his home in Megara-Aristippus to betake himself in the fullness of
time to the court of Syracuse; others to return sooner or later to Athens,
where 1Eschines cut for a while something of a figure as a composer of
"Socratic" dialogues, much admired in their day, and· Antisthenes set
about the not ungrateful task of indoctrinating pupils of his own with
the seeds of cynicism. As for Xenophon, he had already departed on that
course of adventure which in spite of its precariousness yielded him an
interval of repose and recollection on his farm at Scillus in the plain of
Elis. Of the remainder of the original company the greater part appear
to have settled like Phredo into what is for posterity a decorous if inglorious philosophic twilight-o ;cavrrov d.Q1ta%-rfii;;.
That Plato was ever so far forgetful of propriety, to say nothing of
his own dignity, as to embroil himself overtly with these old associates
of his, who had shared his intimacy with their revered and martyred
leader, is a notion too discordant in itself to be seriously considered in
the absence of conclusive evidence. And yet it was quite the fashion for
a while, and may be still for aught I know, to set him and his former
companions by the ears on the flimsiest of pretexts or indeed, on no pretext
at all. In particular there has been a disposition to sprawl Antisthenes all
over the Platonic record and to use the names of Sophists, like Protagoras
and even Euthydemus, as "masks" for the author of Sathon. But no
matter what the provocation on the part of Antisthenes-and provocation
was his metier-such a contention, in default of anything like proof, is
enough to strain the elastic limits of credulity to the breaking point.
Under the circumstances, then, the matter may be left, with this brief
mention, to the good sense of the general reader, who, whatever his disabilities in the eyes of scholarship, has at all events no thesis to grind.
Nevertheless it is hardly conceivable that Plato should have found in their
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individual careers either anything like a complete way of life or a thoroughly
satisfactory expression of human nature. Upon Xenophon he must have
looked as pretty much of an outsider, if not an actual deserter or renegade.
Notwithstanding his personal regard for Euclides he has shown again
and again his impatience with the arid eristic which his friend under the
influence of Zeno and the later Eleatics was grafting upon the Socratic
tree of knowledge. Nor would the authorship of .i'Eschines have been
likely to impress him as much more considerable dialectically than the
belletrie of Isocrates; not impossibly he had good grounds for deprecating
still another Socratic travesty. While Aristippus' complaisant accommodation of Socrates' eudaemonism with the sort of hedonism for which
Sicily was notorious would only have confirmed such suspicions as he
may not unreasonably have formed already of the man's mind and character. As for Antisthenes, whatever respect he may have felt for the
moral seriousness of him who alone can be regarded as in any sense a
rival, it would have taken a stronger digestion than Plato's to stomach
the crudeness and acerbity of "the strong man" of Cynicism. His intemperance, his narrow-mindedness and impatience of learning, his insolence, his un-Attic unmannerliness and rudeness and vulgarity-in a word,
his thorough-going dogmatism-if I may allow myself the parody of a
pun in his own mannerl 2-was quite enough to revolt an Athenian of
the old stock, a patrician and aristocrat, albeit a philosopher, a man of
taste and refinement to boot. To Plato he must have appeared, for all his
sincerity, as little better than the Sophists with whom he had formerly
foregathered and to whom he was indebted for his "exhibitionism," as
well as for the didactic and hortatory style which was not without its
admirers among the ancients. No, as illustrations of a liberal discipline
none of these personages-Socratics still less than Sophists-was capable
of satisfying the sense of moral reality which Plato had acquired as a
result of his initiation into the counsels of his leader. At most, if we
must make a merit of their influence, they were capable of provoking
him by the spectacle of their shortcomings, had such an incentive been
necessary, to that precision and completion of the Socratic idea upon
which he was to spend the most vigorous and fruitful years of his life.
The fact is that the strength as well as the weakness of the Socratic
dialectic resides in its skeptical, its essentially critical character. It is not
by chance that the dialogues wherein Plato for the most part follows his
master's method turn out to be so uniformly dubitative or inconclusive.
They are models of inquiry and research, exercises in the eradication of
error and the assaying of residues. In this respect they suffer, as criticism
32 See Diogenes Laertius, VI, 3: "f3tf}A.LIXQLOU %IXL vou," etc.
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always must, from the defect of their qualities. Nor is it insignificant
either that controversial as they necessarily are under the circumstances,
they should be so heavily shotted against the Sophists and so uniformly
indifferent to the Socratics. Aside from any consideration of delicacyfor is it too much to assume that Plato was sufficiently ingenious in a
pinch to have founJ some way of attacking their principles while sparing
their persons, as he seems to have done in the case of the l\frgarians?aside from any such scruple, if he has neglected the one party for the
other, it is for the perfectly intelligible reason that he found the latter
of little or no importance in comparison with the former.:l:l
At all events in dismembering Socrates they had lost whatever claim
they might otherwise have had to his consideration. And in spite of the
tremendous influence of Stoicism, that supposititious child of Antisthenes,
Plato w.i.s right; for the student of humanism the Socratic sectaries are
virtually negligible. For him it was the spirit of Sophistry that was the
startling and significant apparition of the age-that spirit which has risen
again and again, as often as laid, to distract the minds of successive generations. Talk of the legacy of Greek science as much as we please, it had
in sober truth few positive assets to bequeath. As a matter of fact it is
not improbable that the Greeks would have had difficulty in understanding what we now mean by the term. It is perhaps an open question
whether our physics is not to dissolve into a kind of mathematics; but if
so, we may be sure that it is not Greek mathematics that will liquefy it.
Nor have I overlooked the fact that our "philosophy of nature" appears
to be backsliding into a pre-Aristotelian, even a pre-Tim:ean stage, in
which matter is rapidly dematerializing into a sort of spectral ectoplasm
composed of space and time and ingredience or something even more tenuous and wraithlike, comparable with the "more and less" and the "indeterminate dyad." How apt the instance it hardly becomes me to say; but
it serves to emphasize the sanity of Socrates in discounting current science
and of Plato too, for as long as he remained under Socrates' influence.
But Sophistry, on the contrary, is perennial, as, I venture to think, Plato
once foresaw, in contrast with the transience of science and the vagary
of the Socratics. It has its roots in the human breast where it was planted,
and draws its virtues and vices from that very soil. Nor is there need of
further explanation why Plato, in his great moral dialogues, having once
turned his back upon the "science" of nature after the example of his
master, and ignoring the heresiarchs of Socraticism, addressed himself to
3:1 Not improbably he felt that they were all more or less tainted with sophistfy
and was satisfied that in attacking the Sophists directly he was cutting at the toot
of the evil, and might leave the branches to fall of themselves.
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the criticism of "the new morality" as instituted by the elder Sophistsits ideas on man, on nature, and on human life.
It is not unusual to speak as though there were an abrupt break
between the older physical philosophy, which had reached its term for the
time being with Democritus, and this newer ethical speculation with which
the names of Protagoras and his fe1lows are inseparably connected. And it
is true enough, I suppose, that the former movement had apparently suffered one of those suspensions or dubitations which we have recently been
celebrating under tl1e commercial figure of a bankruptcy. ln reality, however, it was not so much an interruption as a transformation. What Democritus had done was virtually to deny objective validity to the "secondary"
properties o~ matter,34 and in so doing to call in question a phenomenal
explanation of the outer and extended world, in the interest, as he believed,
of a more profound and intelligible conception of reality. Now, whether the
Sophists were fully conscious of the significance of their procedure or were
ridden by the kind of fatality that attaches to an idea as to a curse or a
blessing, it was upon these rejections, the discards of the Democritean
system, that they pounced and out of which, after reshuflling them, they
undertook to construct their theory of human nature, its proper ends and
activities.
Unpalatable though the atomic theory as such may have been at the
start to Democritus' countrymen-in the picturesque phrase of a historian
of their philosophy, they found it too "gritty" for their taste; 35 still its
secondary and indirect effects were of tremendous importance and justify
to a great extent the respect we have been wont to pay it, notwithstanding
the confusions to which our desire to assimilate it to our own' conceptions
has given rise. Or after all was it less Democritus' hypothesis itseif that
was responsible for men's gradual change of attitude, than the general
charge upon contemporary thought which induced concurrently the Democritean physics and the Sophistic ethics? But this is, no doubt, to disdinguish too curiously; as the fir8t to formulate the idea Democritus deserves whatever credit belongs to it. At all events its point consisted, not
in anatomizing matter, or yet in reconciling, according to the prevailing
interpretation, the Parmenidean one with the Heraclitean many, but in
pointing to i the eventual quantification of nature. To be sure, Democritus
had not the mathematics for the task; but he did make, by hook or crook,
what has turned out to be the correct forecast. It remained only to develop
the calculus and to add a few further quantitive hypostaseF, like mass,
inertia, and attraction, in order to complete the metaphysics of ~cience.
34 'VOIJ,(p XQOdl .•• h'eii ll'a-ioJJ,a. xa.l. Xll'VO'V: Diels, £rag. 125.
35 A. W. Benn: The Greek Philosophers.
'
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But meanwhile the knell of the qualitative interpretation of nature had
already tolled. If substantial reality is indeed reducible in the last resort
to differences of shape, size, and position solely, then all those objective
conceptions of truth which have occupied so prominent a part in the
history of thought are suspect and questionable. Quality and value, agreeably with the view of Democritus and the Sophists, became wholly subjective and illusory, mere counters of opinion, one as good as another.
"As things seem to you," in Protagoras, "so they are to you, and as things
seem to me so they are to me; and what appears to no man is not."36
Granted if you like that the Sophists themselves were no great philosophers in the strict sense of the term.37 None the less they had seen
the writing on the wall, whose-ever the hand; and in laying claim to
an ethics they ,vere obliged to pretend as well to some sort of consistent
epistemology in accordance and an ontology consistent with it, however rudimentary and inchoate its character. Not only had they a "real" or practical
W eltanschauung, determined in part by their own interests as well as the
exigencies of the "enlightenment;" but they had been, many of them,
pupils or students of such systematic thinkers as Anaxagoras and Heraclitus, to say nothing of Democritus himself. In short, it is impossible to
deny them the same sort of scholastic rating as we accord the majority
members of our universiti~s at the present time. Writing occasionally on
physical and even mathematical subjects, they devoted themselves assiduously to the cultivation of linguistics, philology, anthropology, ethnology,
archa:ology, and folklore, to say nothing of civics and political and social
science, and of literary interpretation and appreciation. In fact, the socalled "moral sciences" revert to them. On the whole, their conception
of learning is, if anything, much nearer our own popular ideas than is
Plato's. While as for the normal and methodological phase of science
which we are more likely to associate with metaphysics-and this is the
point after all-they were quite capable, as the titles and remains of their
writings show, of giving such an account of knowledge and experience in
general as sufficed not merely to justify their own conceit of wisdom and
to impress their contemporaries but also to leave its mark upon posterity.
As sensationalists, then, whose creed centered in the relativity of knowledge and the indetermination of reality, so far were they from breaking
or interrupting the continuity of philosophic thought-which was after
all as alien as themselves and as antipathetic to the genuine Athenian
genius-that they were merely extending the Ionian or Milesian succes3 6 Thetetetus, 167b, 15le. Cf. H. Gomperz: Sophistik und Rhetorik,
117 For a rather minimizing estimate of their endowments in this

H. Gbmperz: Sophistik und Rhetorik.
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sion-if I may call it for convenience by the name of its originatorsiato the province occupied to-day by thei moral and social sciences,-thc
Gei.steswissenschaft!-a movement not without its counterpart in modern
times. Their psychology, dependent as it was upon bodily structure and
organization~ was in proper terms a derivative of physiology; their ethics
reduces to a species of i11stinctivism as it might be determined in one
way or another by custom or expediency-a sort of social tropism. Their
man, though the cock of creation, was but a featherless biped with a
hypertrophied brain. Indeed, they were but a step short of behaviorism
and may have missed it only by the breadth of a name. In sum, their
originality consisted, not in any revolutionary discovery or invention, but
in the explication of a transmitted principle. Such in brief was their practical or "real" philosophy, whether worthy of the cachet of metaphysics or
not. And it was this W eltanschauung, quite as much as their specialized
instruction, which recommended them to those eager and unsettled young
spirits who had been so recently bilked of their confidence in the demoded science of their predecessors.
In itself all this generalization was enough to arouse Plato's disapproval,
but particularly so when considered as what it not improbably was, an
apology for character and conduct. Not only was there something inherently false and hypocritical in the pretension of men with such ideas
to the possession of any wisdom at all, let alone that wisdom whose function it was to secure the well-being of society-the royal or kingly science
as Plato called it; not only was their private practice open to suspicion"Is it not disgraceful," Socrates exclaims, "that men in such case should
bear themselves so presumptuously!"-but their official code was no less
corrupt and vicious, as exemplified in their identification of pleasure with
happiness and of the public with the good life. It is on the former counJ
that Plato attacks Polus' glorification of doing as one likes, anticipatory
of the Emersonian "whim," contending against that promising young
pupil of Gorgias' that it is; better to suffer wrong than to do it and that
the offender's sole chance of salvation is to pay the penalty and purge his
soul of his guilt. On the latter count he takes issqe with Callicles, the
precursor of Nietzscheism, preferring the lot of the philosopher before
that of the politician, the theoretic before the demagogic life, in an argument whose studied urbanity as usual rather adds to its acerbity than
detracts from it.
And yet defective as the Sophists' humanism might appear in other
respects, the gravamen of offense was to be found in its upper register.
What actually moved Plato to indignation, we may believe, was their
contempt of the higher notes of human nature. In the same breath with
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which they avowed the relativism incidental to their theory of knowledge,
they proclaimed the adequacy of an organ so constituted, of an atomic
and phenomenal consciousness, to all the needs and requirements, to the
aspirations as well as the appetites, of man. It was of such a creature,
confessedly so feeble and imperfect, that they had the impudence to make
not only arbiter but the autocrat of creation, sov,ereign of good as of
evil. "I am far from saying that no man is wise," so runs Protagoras'
Apology, "but I call him wise who, changing things about, makes good
to seem and be in lieu of evil."38
For all their astuteness, clever as they were in the main, they failed
to notice--or it troubled them not at all-that their rationalism, in asserting the self-sufficiency of the natural man at the same time that it recognized the infirmity of his faculty and confined him within the narrow
partitions of a pragmatic truth, had left of human nature nothing but a
mutilated and misshappen trunk. In their partiality in making man dependent for the source of his inferior being upon the promptings and
insinuations of a nature no different in kind from that of the batrachian,
Plato seems inclined to indulge them-such a view was not irreconcilable
with his own belief in the duality of human nature; at least he reconsiders
his sneer at the tadpole as man's rival in the art of mensuration. What
he could not forgive or overlook, the unpardonable sin in his eyes, was
the futility that would c11t off humanity altogether from participation in
a higher and nobler reality, from that spiritual endowment or portion,
{}Elar; 'ttvor; ?tal a.'tv<pou µoi.Qar;,39 which he himself believed to be man's
birthright, affiliating human nature in its upper reaches with the divine
through communication with the ideas of beauty, truth, and goodness.
It is a great pity that the word supernatural has lost what would seem
to be its native English connotation, particularly nowadays when we are
in such dire need of a specific against the seductions of the subconscious.
Were it otherwise, were it possible to redeem its character and restore its
credit, we then might without impropriety contrast the Platonic with the
Sophistic man as a supernatural creature-not wholly natural, not altogether of the earth, but in some part, however small, of a superior order
-a being not wholly earthly, if not wholly spiritual. It is in this sense at
all events that Plato, without denying his mortality, has no hesitation in
calling him divine ( {}Ei:or;) as he succeeds in transcending his lowlier
station. Such is the force of the similitude which informs the Phcxdrus,
Plato's most eloquent profession of faith in the spirituality, as well as the
duality, of human nature. There the spirit of man is likened to a charioteer endeavoring to guide a span of winged horses to his celestial goal.
166d.
Pha:drus, 230a.

38 Thea:tetus,
39
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Of these the one is noble and of a noble breed, well trained and amenable
to the rein; the other is quite the reverse, a rebellious, unruly brute, inclining to earth and struggling, often successfully, to thwart the efforts
of its mate to lift the chariot of the soul.
In effect then, as illustrated in the figure, Plato's achievement, taken
up and perpetuated by the Platonic tradition, was to spiritualize the
naturalistic humanism, which was, to give them their due, original with
the Sophists and for which, partial as it was, posterity and Platonism
too is so far forth in their debt.40 But instead of leaving man with his
harassed conscience alone in the universe with the lower animals, the
beast and the brute for his best allies, the humanism of Plato promoted
him to a companionship, a real though humble friendship with divinity
and made him a sharer in its ends, an ally of the gods.
The procedure, if I may so speak of it, by which Plato succeeds in
transforming in this manner the imperfect humanism of the Sophists and
in reclaiming for man's usufruct, his spiritual heritage, consists with the
distinction which he draws in the Republic between the two minds-the
one lower, and the one higher-the reason and the nous. The reason
is clearly enough the agent of rational discourse, the instrument of abstraction and comparison and inference as exemplified in the process of ratiocination. The nous however is difficult of definition. On some accounts I
should like to translate it soul. In the respect that I am now considering,
in respect of man's spirituality, soul is perhaps the nearest English equivalent; it has the proper poetic and imaginative associations. But it is, if
anything, too sentimental. In accord with the Hellenic genius, which was
never obsessed by the fantastic delusion characteristic of heretical romanticism that it is possible to know with the emotions, there is about the
Platonic nous, even in late tradition, more than a trace of intellect, of
which English soul has been pretty well stripped by precedent, in great
part, of false-Platonizing poets like Shelley and Wordsworth.41 I might,
then, if I were confined to a single expression, compromise the matter
by calling nous, in despite of paradox, the intellectual spirit. In any case
it is the organ of spiritual divination or intuition, the faculty apprehensive
of ultimate truth or reality.42
40 I still speak, it will be noticed, of Plato's dualism in spite of the tripartite analysis
of the soul in the Repubhc. But this partition notwithstanding, human nature is even
there viewed as in division between the vou~ and the 'to ba.tuµf)'tLXov, the luµo!;
taking sides with one or the other according to circumstances.
41 While Dean Inge, for instance, in his Philosophy of Plotinus renders nous by
spirit, Professor Brehier in his edition and translation of the same author calls it
fintelligence and Mr. McKenna in his translation of the Enneads employs intellectual
principle.
42Jt is the means by which we apperceive-if I may try to bring another term to its
right scnscs--the ideal forms, which become in this way spiritual presentations.
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So Plato refers to it as an O'ljJL~ or {}fo, a vision or insight; thoughagain we must guard against the ambiguities of our English vocabularyso far from being visionary in the sense of deceptive or passive, it is the
power which enables us to communicate with the great impersonal ideas,
significantly that of beauty as well as of truth and justice: and which ( to
adopt a later and Stoic phrase) presides over the hegemony of man, maintaining the order and balance of his members-an activity that while intellectual and moral is no less spiritual-for we have to remember that
Plato's beauty is but the lowest rung of the ladder, and that his virtue is
a wisdom, not an emotion, however much they, as truth also, may be
irradiated by love.43
Doubtless, it is and always has been the problem of humanism to
find some way of living satisfactorily in this world. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to look upon a life of unhappiness otherwise than in some
sort a failure. Nor with Plato is happiness less than a prime consideration. But then satisfaction and happiness are conditioned, to say the
least, fully aSI much by the nature of man as by the nature of the world.
How little they depend, in Plato's opinion, on worldly circumstance alone,
is made clear at the beginning of the Republic, when he accepts, the challenge of Glaucus and Adeimantus to show that the good man in utter
destitution is in better case than the wicked in prosperity and repute.
"Ein guter Mensch in seinem dunkeln Drange
1st sich des rechten Weges wohl bewusst."
In the course of this dialogue undertaken with such a purpose he proceeds to develop realistically what he considers the genuine humanism
together with the kind of society in which alone the genuine humanism
after his kind can flourish and short of which it must remain a private
accomplishment of the individual. That there is a great deal in the
Republic to shock and offend modern sensibilities-and those of the Greeks
too for that matter-it would be idle to deny. Even Plato seems finally to
have despaired of the socialization of humanism and resigned himself
to its isolation in natures of distinction.44
Nor is man's destiny without bearing upon the problem of satisfactory
living either. And that man has a future no less than a past Plato firmly
believes. About the exact character of that future he is not certain; in
speaking about it he invariably had recourse to myth. But certain he is
that it depends upon the manner in/ which man lives his present life and
on the degree to which he has cultivated what I have ventured to call
his intellectual soul.
43 To discuss Platonic love at this point would take me too far afield. Suffice it to
say that it was a passion largely intellectual and spiritual even in its concrete manifestll•
tions, as Alcibiades' tribute at the close of the Symposium amply attests.
44 Cf. T M~tetus, l 72'd- l 77c.
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So much he takes as assured. And those who speak otherwise speak
after the mannei; of the Sophists. No man can be happy in defiance of
his higher nature or save in conformity with the peculiar virtue of human
kind. And that nature, that virtue is discovered, not by the tlickering
reflections of sense or the capricious suggestions of impulse and instinct,
not even by the tentative gropings of reason-but by the immediate revelation of the great immutable ideas to the soul.

45 T he,ztetus, 17 6e. Cf. the whole passage. I cannot translate the quotation. P,rofessor
Fowler translates for the Loeb Library as follows:-"Two patterns, my friend, are set up
in the world, the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, Which is most
wretched." This is very well; only we must bethink ourselves that divine and godly
and blessed have not the same connotations in Plato as they have for u.s. There hi1$
been so much Platonism assimilated by Christiani~y that in reading Plato we are
disposed to view him inversely in the mirror of our own religion. Perhaps godlike will
come nearer his meaning than divine, which is in many instances nearly synonymous
with spiritual, while blessed should be freed of its peculiar theological suggestion.
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If we seek a raliying point, to begin with, for Plato's political conceptions, we shall find that they all centre about a single idea-the idea of
justice. No other problem has given rise to more discussion, I suppose,
than just this problem of the relation of justice to society and the individuals composing it; and in no age, perhaps, has it given rise to more
discussion than it did in the age of Plato. The difficulty has to do partly
with the nature of justice itself and partly with the discovery of a practical
working definition. Abstractly it is easy enough to explain that justice
consists in giving everyone exactly what he deserves. But who in any
co.Q.ceivable state. of society is able to determine exactly what any one deserves-least of all he himself; and how is it possible to make sure that
he gets it, neither more nor less? It is bad enough to ad:minister the
approximate, the rough and ready justice of the courts of law without
undertaking to settle such questions as these with the fallible judgment
at our disposal. And in default of the competence and method necessary
to such an adjustment society has been obliged to muddlei along as best
it might, allowing the individual, within certain limits, to take what he
can get, mider the dubious pretence of legality, without considering too
closely whether he deserves it or not, in accordance with the good old plan,
"That they should take who have the power
And they should keep who can."
Under these circumstances there has gradually grown up a kind of
discrepancy between men's professions and their practices, between the
sort of thing that they talk in public and the sort of thing that they confess
only to themselves or acknowledge only by their actions. On the one hand
they pretend to be animated, both as individuals and as citizens, by a
single and unique preoccupation with justice, upon which they assert
their community and government are founded. On the other hand they
seek their own advantage by any means in their power, regardless of their
neighbours or of any particular standard of right and wrong. Eulogising
virtue and honesty with their lips, they recognize in their hearts that
nine times out of ten such scruples are merely side-issues, that the main
aim is success, and that success is not to the good, the virtuous, and the
honest, but to the strong, the audacious, and the adroit. It is the latter
sort of man who gets on in the world; he is honored, flattered, respected
without concern fon his merits. He enjoys the esteem of the public, he
unites their votes, he holds their offices, he rewards his friends and pun99

100

PLATO

ishes his enemies. And what is more, he carries his point, he controls the
administration of what he and every one else calls justice, he influences
legislation and law in his own sense. In short, right becomes merely his
conveniency, the conveniency of the powerful. And in the meanwhile we
go on, in our fatuity, calling the conveniency of the unjust justice and
speaking as though justice were the foundation of our polity, when in
reality its foundation is force or fraud in one form or another. Why not
come out with it, then, flat-footed? Is anybody the dupe of our hypocrisy?
Why not say that it is the smooth appearance, the plausible pretence that
we have in mind when we educate our children in the shams of honesty
and virtue? Why not acknowledge that it is a mask for their actions with
which we are providing them? that we are teaching them a vocabulary
with which to impose upon the simple and credulous who accept phrases,
like specie, at their face value? Why not confess among ourselves that
our little speeches about justice are for business and politics, a mere
diplomacy of language; but that for the practical affairs of life our incentives are success and self-advancement? In other words, why not define
justice as the advantage of the reigning interests whatever they may happen
to be at the time?
Modern as all these notions seem, though cloaked as a general thing
with a decent reticence, they are all, as a matter of fact, to be found in
Plato. They are to be found in the mouth of Thrasymachus in the
Republic; they are to be found in the mouths of the Sophists, of Callicles
and Protagoras and Gorgias, the rationalists and utilitarians of the time,
with whom: they were as favourite doctrines as with Nietzsche. Indeed,
the young men of Plato are full of the futility of virtue and honesty and
justice, of the expediency of wickedness and the high hand, of the natural
rights of the strong and the dexterous over the weak and the simple, of the
excellence of success and the legitimacy of any means by which it may be
attained.
It is against these thinkers that Plato undertakes to vindicate the desirability of a genuine and absolute justice, and it is in opposition to their
notions of government that he attempts to rear an ideal republic upon
the corner stone which they have rejected as unfit for the purpose. And
what concerns him most, to begin with, is less justice as a founadtion of
government than justice as a foundation of character. At the outset it is
the individual to whom his gaze is directed and not the community. In
one sense his Republic is less interesting as a plan of society than as a
kind of symbol of the human spirit. It is the inner city, the city of the
soul, the spiritual city, upon which he has his mind's eye; and he constructs his ideal polity for the sake of comparison. The justice which it
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is so difficult to study in the small letters of the individual, he hopes to

read to better advantage in the capital letters of the city. For after all
the just man and the just city are counterparts one of the other, and what
is justice in the individual is justice also in the community, or contrariwise.
With this idea in mind, then, his first care is to re-establish the cause
of justice and virtue as the basis of human character. And to do so he
proceeds to argue that man is happy just because he is virtuous. To declare that virtue insures success and that honesty is the best policy is
absurd and mischievous. The upright man may be successful or not-it
makes no difference; in any case he can dispense with success, his satisfaction is in his own merit. Strip him of the goods of existence; refuse
him the respect due to his qualities; worse than that, let him have the
reputation of an evil doer; and last of all, let his righteousness escape the
approval of the gods themselves-even then, as compared with the wicked
flourishing in prosperity, surrounded with admiring followers and Batterers,
and blest in spite of reality with the name and character of virtue; even
then, says Plato, will the just man be happy and the unjust wretched.
Yes, it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it. And if the wicked
understood his own best interest, he ought to desire nothing so much
as to be brought to justice, to expiate his misdeeds, and by so doing
regain his innocency.
But this justice which forms the basis of character and which, properly
understood, insures the only genuine happiness, what is it? Who is the just
man? It must be confessed that Plato's definition strikes the modern as
rather peculiar, mainly, I think, because it lays no particular stress upon
the rewards accruing. At the same time it seems to me that it has one
advantage over other definitions in being the only one which furnishes
in any sense a working formula for the regulation and adjustment of
human affairs. And it does so by indicating the conditions under which
alone justice can work itself out. It indicates as nearly as can be done,
I fancy, the manner in which some sort of relative justice can be attained.
It has its difficulties too, but as a definition it has this advantage.
Justice, then, in the individual consists in a kind of balance or equilibrium among the faculties by virtue of which each is enabled to do its
proper work and to contribute in its proper degree to the welfare of. the
entire being. In other words, justice is defined by its obligations rather
than by its privileges, one reason evidently why the definition is bound
to be distasteful to us nowadays. In Plato's mind there existed a sort of
hierarchy among the faculties. At the top stood the mind, the vou~,
perhaps what the Germans call Vernunft; at the bottom lay the appetities
and passions; and midway between was situated the courage or mettle, the
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kind of thing we think of when we speak of a man of spirit, the nearest
thing in Plato's psychology to the will. In the just man the mind or
reason should rule. And by mind or reason Plato understood not merely
the discursive or syllogistic reason or ratiocination but something akin
as well to divination, intuition, or insight. Of the perception of higher
truth he always speaks as an o,jni; or {Ma, a seeing or vision. To this principle the passions and appetites are to be kept in subordination by means
of the animation or courage, which in a correct balance of the faculties
allies itself with the mind or voiii;. Such is the just man; he is the man
who has harmoni7ed and ordered his spirit in this wise.
In this respect, it will be noticed, Plato stands at the antipodes from
the Bergsonians, who seem in some obscure manner to divorce the intuition as an organ of truth from the reason and to associate it with the
instincts, so making of it a servant or confederate of the third estate. In
this interpretation the mind is left in isolation with no direct and instant
perception of reality, while the sole reality immediately appreciable becomes that of the desires and impulses-a sense of eternal mobility and
flux, in which the foundations of character are submerged and finally
swept away, and truth itself loses all stability and degenerates into an
exclusive regard for the many as the sole reliable data of consciousness.
Now it is in just the contrary sense, for the sake of making his idea
of the hegemony of reason clearer, that Plato undertakes to construct an
ideal polity, where it will be easier to recognize the qualities of justice
in accordance with his conception of the parallelism between individual
and state. To take this structure of Plato's quite literally, as has been
done so often, would be to make a grave mistake and to prove oneself
more of a Platonist than Plato himself. As a matter of fact Plato is not
wholly serious about his republic. He is led to introduce the subject in
the first place as, an illustration of his general theory of justice. Such, he
says, would be the perfect state, where justice may be studied to the best
advantage. Once embarked, however, he becomes interested in the undertaking for its own sake and dwells complacently upon its details; occasionally he is quite carried away by it. But on the whole, the plan itself
remains a ;eu d'esprit, a play of the imagination, which he never expects
or hopes to see realised in anything like the shape in which he proposes
it, as is evident from a comparison with his Laws. It is, then, a species of
allegory or parable--ot better, perhaps, a metaphor; it is seriously meant,
not as a practical project, but as an illustration of Plato's general ideas of
government, and it is full of penetrating aperfUS with regard to human
nature and society.
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Ideally, then, such a city as he proposes as a paradigm of the just man,
is composed of three definite and distinct classes or orders analogous to
the three faculties of the individual. At the bottom there are the workers
of all kinds-tillers of the soil, labourers, handicraftsmen, merchants-all
who contribute to the support of the community. Just above are the warriors, the protectors and guardians of the commonwealth, answering to
the courageous or spirited principle in man. From the latter are chosen
the rulers, who in the perfect city are philosophers prepared for their work
by a long and arduous discipline and selected by successive eliminations from
the mass of the warriors. As philosophers they are naturally unwilling to
undertake the task of government and are moved to do so only by a sense
of their responsibilities as the sole members of the city competent for the
business. They descend into politics as a man who had been used to the
light of day would descend into a den or cavern. But then, no man who
wishes to rule is fit, in Plato's opinion, to do so.
In a state so constituted justice will consist, as before, in a balance or
equilibrium of forces under the direction of these philosopher-rulers, who
make up the vov~ or mind of the community. They will be assisted in
their labours by the class of warriors or guardians, who, like the courageous part of the individual, are intrusted with the preservation of order
as well from sedition within as from hostility without. Of the workmen
Plato has little to say; they fail to interest him particularly as long as they
do their work in subservience to their superiors and provide for the subsistence of themselves and others. At the same time it would be a mistake
to suppose that he contemplates their condition as one of serfdom or
slavery, though to such a condition he has no great objection in the abstract.
In this instance, however, his city exists as a whole for the benefit of its
inhabitants-or rather, it would express his meaning better to say that the
inhabitants exist for the benefit of the city. It is not for the sake of the
well-being of such and such a person, he declares, that the state exists, but
for the well-being of the whole. In this way the working class has its share
of the advantages resulting from the organization-a share proportionate
to its abilities and importance. As in the case of the purely physical principle in the individual, however, its predominance over the other orders
would mean confusion and disaster. It has neither the wisdom of the
lawgiver nor the mettle of the warrior. It is, therefore, as though Plato
took it for granted or assumed it rather than despised it. As its functions
arc perfectly familiar already, he sees no need to dwell upon them.
Of the warriors, on the contrary, he has much to say that is curious
and interesting. In this connection it must be remembered that the rulers
are originally members of this class, being selected from it in accordance
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with certain standards so that up to a given point the conditions of both
are alike. It is evident that these two classes taken together form an aristocracy; there is no doubt about it, they are the superiors of the third
estate in every respect. Distinction of classes is a postulate of the system;
it is a part of the conception of justice, for without distinction justice becomes unthinkable and the acme of injustice resides in the socialistic conception of an equal participation by unequal participants. And this distinction he purposes further to strengthen by means of a gross convention
such as necessarily underlies every government, whether it happens to be
that of the divine right of kings or that of the divinity of the people's
voice and the sacredness of the will of the majority. Pure convention in
either case and equally preposterous on examination. But so it is and
so it is indispensable. And in like manner Plato proposes the necessary
convention at the root of his polity. We will teach the people, he advises,
that while they are all of the earth and brothers, yet they are made of
different materials-some of gold and some of silver and some of bronze;
and the nobler the metal, the nobler the creature. This is pretty gross, to
be sure-pretty nearly as gross as) the infallibility of majorities; not quite,
perhaps, but still gross enough in all conscience-and yet admirably adapted
to the purpose-to safeguard the distinction and hierarchy of the several
classes and orders. At the same time its crudity was tempered in practice
by the circumstance that Plato provided for a rectification of the errors of
birth. If a gold or silver child should be born in the brazen class, he was
promptly to be promoted as soon as he manifested his quality; on the
other hand, if a bronze child should be born of gold or silver parents, he
was liable to degradation in like manner.
Though an aristocracy, then, in the most distinctive sense, the two
upper classes were an aristocracy of merit. As a result they were not simply
an aristocracy of privilege but an aristocracy of responsibility. They were
carefully educated, and trained; their life was a severe and strenuous drill
in the form of a rigid communism. They had no right to property of any
kind save their clothes and their arms. They were without homes; the
houses in which they lived, when they lived in houses rather than in
camp, were not their own. They received their support from the community. They ate in messes. They had their wives and their children
in common. Their marriages were temporary; and the offspring of their
transient unions were taken possession of by the state and cared for in
public nurseries. No man was supposed to be able to recognise his own
child or identify it. Woman, as having the same faculties as man only
weaker, was to bear her part in the same affairs and occupations. Like
him she was to exercise in the pala:stra; like him she was to bear arms
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and fight the battles of her country; like him she was to eat in her mess
and live homeless and free of permanent ties save her duty to the state
and society.
By such ways and by such means did Plato dream of founding and
preserving an efficient and uncorrupted aristocracy. Shocking as some of
these notions are to the modern consciousness, there is still something to
be said for them in theory if not in practice. It was in some such manner
that the monastic orders were managed; and no more powerful and effective organizations ever existed. But then they were pledged to chastity
as well as to poverty; and there are but two ways to be chaste-either to
have no wife or to have only one, of which the former is doubtless the
better if it were not for the difficulty of perpetuating the caste. At the
same time it must be acknowledged that Plato has recognized one important truth: that an aristocracy, to be worthy of the name, must be
free from individual self-seeking and from the distracting influence of
feminine frivolity. Let the order be as wealthy as you please-the wealthier, the better as an order; but see that its members remain unmoved by
hopes of personal enrichment, if they are to devote themselves heart and
soul to the furtherance of the object for which their body as a whole exists.
And see too that they are removed from the insinuations 06 the sex with
its vanities and caprices and irrelevances, if they are to amount to anything as public officials. Even as it is, there is nothing more egotistic
than the father of a family, who is obliged to prefer the welfare of his
wife and children before that of his neighbors; there is nothing more disheartening in the pursuit of a disinterested aim than the reproaches of a
family which imagines its; own interests to be neglected and is piqued at
the prosperity of acquaintances and associates. Even at the present day
there is nothing more exigent than the claims of a family. How much
greater must have been its distractions at the time of Plato, when wives
were ignorant as well as idle and luxurious! Consider the confusion introduced into Socrates' final interview with his friends by the irruption of
Xanthippe. All this Plato saw; he had probably some knowledge of
Xanthippe himself and the kind of home she made for her husband. And
against this sort of thing he tried to provide by breaking up the home in
the interests of disinterestedness and by abrogating the importunities of
wife and children at the same time that he removed the children from the
timid and selfish instruction of their parents. And for his day, too, he
would have accomplished not a little in giving woman something to do,
in supplying her with a mission, or to employ the modern cant, in making
her an instrument of social service. But after all, he reckoned without
his host; he failed to count with human nature, and he proposes as a
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remedy for human weakness what is bound to seem to the average man
something little short of a monstrosity.
But after all, in this vision of things as they might be one must not
take Plato too seriously. Nobody was ever more conscious of the difficulties and paradoxes of his plan than he himself. Even in his own eyes
it is hardly more than a castle in the air, to which he attaches only a
relative importance save in as far as it helps him to realize his idea and
principle of justice. Evidently in such a city as this, where everything is
properly disposed and where every man is in the right place, justice will
consist in every one's minding his own business. The well-being of the
community will depend upon every individual's and every class's doing
its own work and fulfilling its own function in its proper station in life.
In other words, justice in the large as in the small is simply order. This
is the reason why it seems to me that Plato's definition has a certain
experimental-I hesitate to say practical-value which is wanting to most
definitions of justice. It specifies the actual conditions under which justice
is possible; there are no nice appraisements and delicate assessments of
awards and emoluments to be made ... Provided every member of the
community does the work for which he is fitted in the scale of his relative
ability, he will ·automatically· re<;~~e his fdeserts. And here is, of course,
the crux of the .system-the accu.r:ag: direction of the citizens' proclivities;
and though 1.iYis· probabiy ~sief to determine what a man is fit for than
what he is worth, still the former task is hard enough. And it is complicated by the not infrequent occurrence of the exceptional case, who
would have fared worse under Plato's authority than he does in the present
scheme of things. Such persons are not seldom of great value to society,
although that value may not be capable of exact computation. Of these
exceptions the hardships are often extreme; they are suited for none of
the usual employments, their services to the public are seldom recognized
by their contemporaries, they seem hardly to belong to the world into
which they have been brought-their livelihood is as problematic as their
utility. Such a character was Blake or Coleridge, to mention only poets.
And yet the development of moral types of the sort is as important for
civilization as the production of Rothschilds or Bismarcks. In human
society, as it is actually constituted by a free play of more or less spontaneous forces working elastically to approximate results, such characters are
able, as a rule, to find some kind of place and existence, even though with
difficulty. But in Plato's republic with its strict suppression of individualism
they would have had no footing; contributing in no wise to the support or
the protection of the government of the city, falling properly into none of
his classes, they could expect no other fate than repudiation and banish-
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ment. Such, as a matter of fact, is the sentence to which he condemns
the poets; much as he loves them personally, his polity has no room for
Homer or Hesiod or Sophocles. They are but fabulists and makers of
falsehood. At most they can be tolerated only as they will consent to
teach useful and salutary truths; that is, as far as they cease to be variations
and conform to the normal type of society.
But however this may be, whatever the difficulties and inconsistencies
even of an ideal constitution, one thing· is clear-Plato's conception of
justice as an order or balance of forces in an individual and a community.
Such has been his objective from the first, much as he may have loitered
by the way attracted by the scenery along the roadside. Once he has
reached this conclusion, however, he proceeds, with his conception as a
criterion, to the more practical part of his work-the criticism of actual
forms and types of government and the search for the best and most
advantageous one possible.
Since justice consists in a delicate equilibrium of powers, in the formation of a perfect harmony out of a number of divers elements, it is
evident that the task of insuring it is an exceedingly difficult and problematic one, requiring the highest kind of ability on the part of the
ruler or justiciar. In fact, government is an art or a science demanding
both natural aptitude and acquired skill. As such it is entirely out of the
power of the crowd, which is bungling and foolish-the government of
the many is a contradiction in terms; it is not a government at all but
an anarchy. It boasts that it is a government of the people, by the people,
for the people; and· so it may be. But none the less is it a government of
the masses, of quantity, not of quality. As such it means the suppression
of the minority by the majority. And since merit is always in the minority,
it is the government of the better by the worse. Further, as it knows
itself to be inferior and to have usurped a position which does not belong
to it, it rapidly develops a distrust and a hatred for any sort of distinction
whatever.
Under these circumstances there are only two careers open to men
of ability, who in happier conditions might become philosophers or lovers
of wisdom. On the one hand they grow into demagogues; for being debarred by their talents from ruling, they can only learn to truckle to the
multitude and to echo its whims and caprices, falsely pretending that these
opinions constitute a system or philosophy of government-or, as we
should say, a platform. In Plato's words such persons might be compared to "a man who should study the tempers and desires of a big beast
. . . he would learn how to approach and handk it and at what times
and from what causes it is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the
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meaning of its various cries, and by what sounds it is soothed or infuriated;
and . . . when by constantly waiting upon it, he has become perfect in
all his lore, he calls what he has learned by the name of wisdom and
makes a method or art of it ... calling this honorable and that dishonorable, good and evil, just and unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and
moods of the big beast." Or on the other hand, the man of ability who
has no other opening for his activities and who is revolted by the role
of demagogue, may engage in thei single pursuit which the mob are capable of respecting; namely, the making of money. Hence the growth of
a plutocracy along with every democracy. At the same time, as the accumulation of great wealth in the. hands of a few tends to recruit the ranks
of the needy, the rise of a plutocracy serves to reinforce the democracy
which breeds it. In this way the proper balance of powers is broken up
and destroyed; intelligence and courage cease to rule and the passions
and appetites assume the ascendency; intuition is degraded from the reason
to the desires. In a word, justice is not the controlling principle of such a
community, but license, or, as the people delight to call it, liberty.
"Is not this, indeed, a delightful state of affairs!" exclaims Plato with
sardonic enthusiasm, "where a man may say and do just what he likes"
and "where the individual is able to order his own life for himself just
as he pleases," "where there is no necessity for you to govern . . . or to
be governed, unless you like" and "where, because some law forbids you
to hold office, there is no necessity ... that you should not hold ofli.ce""a charming form of government indeed, full of variety and disorder, and
dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike." And finally,
"when a <lemocracy which is thirsting for freedom . . . has drunk too
deeply of the wine of liberty, then, unless her rulers are very amenable
... she calls them to account and punishes them"-is Plato prognosticating the recall? What she wants are "subjects who are like rulers and
rulers who are like subjects; these are men after her own heart, whom
she praises and honors both in private, and public," until "the anarchy
finds by degrees a way into private houses and ends by getting among the
lower animals and infecting them." "The father grows accustomed to
descending to the level of his sons and to fearing them, and the son is
on a level with his father-for neither of his parents has he any respect
or reverence." "The teacher fears and wheedles his pupils, and the pupils
despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike-the young
man is on an equality with the old and is ready to compete with him in
word and deed; and the old men condescend to the young and are full
of jocularity and pleasantry; they are loath to be thought morose and
authoritative and therefore they adopt the manners of the youth." "Even
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the she-dogs are as good as their mistresses; and the horses and the asses
have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of citizens;
they will jostle a body if he does not get out of their way-and all things
are full to bursting with liberty." "Above all, see how touchy the\ citizens
themselves become; they chafe impatiently at the least hint of authority,
and at last,, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws; they will
have no one over them."
Such is Plato's diagnosis of democracy; and though relieved by touches
of humor, it is serious enough. Whatever we may think of it, it is
necessary to remember one thing. Plato is not now theorizing; he is
speaking from experience; he had seen democracy distinctly and close at
hand. He had never run for office, I believe; but he had relatives who
had stood within its danger and he had followed the trial and condemnation of his friend and master, Socrates.
But his objections to democracy went even deeper. It was not only
opposed to his principles by its disorderliness or essential injustice, its
pretension to distribute a kind of equality among equals and unequals
alike, its tacit denial of the fundamental facts of nature in the creation
of better and worse, its confusion of higher and lower; but what was
worse, it was antipathetic to his own character and disposition, which
we.re finely aristocratic and distinguished. To such a person democracy has
a way, it must be acknowledged, of making itself peculiarly detestable.
Where the blame lies, I do not pretend to say-on both sides, I fancy.
On the one side democracy itself has a hatred of distinction, which it
makes no effort to conceal. As a matter of fact distinction is inimical to
its existence. For that reason it likes to see pretenders to its favors on
all fours at its feet. But at, the same time it can not be denied that the
man of distinction frequently displays a superciliousness with respect to
the masses which is as galling as it is in one sense undeserved. Every
man is respectable as a human being whatever he may be as a constituent
of the mob. It is worth noticing that Shakespeare, who speaks so slightingly of the populace as such, modulates his voice when he addresses its
individual members and treats even his fools with a kind of human sympathy. But, at all events, that Plato detested his democracy as well as
disapproved of it, seems pretty certain. He detested its vulgarity, its cant,
its rough and ready judgment, its self-complacency; and he held himself
aloof from it by prejudice, perhaps, as much as by principle. Nor were
the conditions of demoralization under which he beheld it such as to
elicit a favorable criticism even from a more unprejudiced observer.
Nevertheless, with all allowance made for the circumstances, there is
still something in what he says to make the thoughtful pause before
pushing to an extreme a form of government which is so particularly
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liable to extremity and whose virtue consists so largely in moderation.
Other governments are likely to fall by deficiency of their own principle,
democracy alone by its excess.
At the opposite pole from the democratic type of government is the
monarchical. With Plato's sympathies and ideas it is not surprising that
he should more incline to the latter than the former terminal, although
he can not approve of it unreservedly. Nevertheless, in the actual state
of things, of all systems that seem to be possible he appears to believe that
the best chance of securing something like justice is by the instrumentality
of a benevolent despot-a single arbitrary ruler of good parts and disposition, neither weak nor violent, uniting in his own person the three
attributes of the perfect governor-wisdom, courage, and steadiness. Such
a character would appear to be the best equipped for weaving a harmonious design from the diverse elements of society; above all he would seem
to have the best opportunity of carrying out a consistent policy. In this
characterization may possibly be detected a regret for Dionysius of Syracuse, of whom he had hoped so much ·and in whom he had been so
bitterly disappointed. At all events, as he acknowledges, the happy conjunction of circumstances necessary to unite these qualities in a single
individual and to bring this individual into power is so rare as to be
wdlnigh miraculous. And in default of such a ruler he declares for a
kind of limited or constitutional monarchy, whose master is restrained and
controlled by law. As for the other forms of government by the few
as opposed to the many-namely, oligarchy and tyranny-he has for them
no toleration of any kind whatever.
In following Plato's discussion, as I have tried to do, with an eye
to what seems most pertinent to our particular occasions, I have implicitly
taken account of the most important tenets of his political creed as far
as they have any modern interest or significance. It remains to indicate
what is positive rather than negative in his conception. In the first place,
that his theory of government is aristocratic., is perfectly clear. The two
systems that he reprobates the most severely are democracy and plutocracy.
The symbolic or metaphoric republic that he constructs for the purpose
of illustrating the city of the soul, is ruled over by an aristocracy and an
aristocracy pretty much unhampered by laws except of its own making.
The will of the aristocracy is the law. And not only is it a government
by an aristocracy which is the desideratum but a government for the
aristocracy. The purpose and raison d'!tre of a state is to be sought not
in mediocrity but in excellence. It is not by its average that a nation
is justified but by its genius. And to the production and_ preservation of
genius should its efforts be directed. Not that the remainder of society
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is non-essential and negligible, but it takes its value from above; and the
cultivation of an industrial community merely for its own sake would h~ve
struck him as absurd as the attempt to develop a stomach independent
of the body.
As far as these conclusions are a matter of terms, an affair of logic
pure and simple, it is difficult to see that Plato is very far wrong in them.
That the best are alone the natural rulers of a state and that the ruling
should be done in the interests of the best is so obvious on statement that
it has taken any amount of sophistication and any number of centuries
to make it appear otherwise. Even then the contrary opinion has succeeded in gaining a footing only by means of an indoctrinated convention
as gross as Plato's parable of the gold, the silver, and the bronze mena convention so at odds with the facts that its falsity is patent to the
most superficial. That convention consist~ in the denial of the aristocratic
principle-in the denial, that is, of any such natural distinction as better
and worse. Or positively, it consists in the assertion of the romantic
doctrine of equality-a doctrine that we are obliged to deny in deed a
dozen or more times a day. In fact, so contrary is it to our actual convictions that even the candidate for office is revolted when he is compelled
to act consistently in accord with it and to abase himself to the level of
those whom for the occasion he delicately designates as his equals. Nor
is such a distinction between better and worse a practical impossibility.
For the rough and ready purposes of government it is easy enough to
make a partition of the kind. Education, property, nativity, even sex constitute tests sufficient for practical politics.
And yet, as usual in human affairs, there is in reality one obstacle in
the way of applying the theory. The world is full of people who have
come into it more or less accidentally and unintentionally. As they are
here by no fault of their own and in fact would gladly be almost anywhere
else if they could, and as in the gaiety of their hearts they will in all
probability proceed to bring others like them into a place to which they
find themselves so admirably adapted; the theoretical legislator like Plato
finds himself at any given time with a collection of odds and ends on his
hands, which it is extremely difficult to dispose of. To be sure, there may
be no great harm in this folk. To adapt Plato's own figure, they are
like the amiable but incapable owner of a vessel, who is a little hard of
hearing and short of sight, and is indifferently acquainted with navigation, and who is coaxed and bullied by various members of the crew who
hope to get the job of pilot. At the same time it is just this sort of
gentry that complicates the legislator's problem. Theoretically Plato begins
by making a clean sweep of them. He dumps the rubbish somewhere
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outside of his boundaries and retains only such material as suits his own
designs. But the solution seems hardly practicable at present, particularly
since we in America have been pursuing the opposite policy. And under
the circumstances it is this matter which destroys the regularity and
symmetry of many a very pretty social theory. It is itself one of the forces
or factors which go to shape the final result as it exists in fact and nature.
It is a part of the destiny of nations. In short, if you have a population
of a certain type, what else can you make of it than the kind of thing
it lends itself to? At the same time,, to rescue as much of Plato's aristocracy as is feasible, it is worth while trying to make the best of your
materials.
In the second place, innovator as Plato seems at first sight, it is clear,
on second thought, that he is all for conservatism, as for aristocracy. Perhaps the two ideas are in reality correlatives. At all events, once his ideal
republic established, he would preserve it, if possible, in much the same
shape forever. Indeed, rigidity is of its very essence. As its partitions are
inflexible and inelastic, allowing only for a few sorts of vocation; so in
itself it forms a more or less motionless and inalterable structure, incapable
of any great modification: or adaptation. For the cultivation of that wide
variety of individual character which we esteem one of the merits of
civilization, it had no care. In its essence it was thoroughly socialistica kind of higher organism in which the citizen had pretty well lost his
personality. Like modern socialism it guaranteed his existence at the
cost of his liberty. Further, as the best state conceivable, there naturally
remained nothing more. to do for it except to conserve it in accordance
with the principles laid down for its institution.
On the whole, this seems to me one of the instances in which Plato
is carried away by his project; and, as so often happens in such cases,
it is necessary to go a little deeper to get the steady bearing of his thought.
Obviously enough the motive that moves him in this particular instance
is a care for the permanency of political institutions. And in this respect
he agrees with Burke. He recognizes as true what is too patent to be
insisted upon-that the life of a nation is a slow development, that its
present rests upon its past, and that any change should be made slowly
and carefully in the direction, of its growth. He sees that a state which
breaks with its tradition is adrift and that innovation is especially dangerous in a matter of government, whose adjustments are so delicate and
complicated as frequently to escape the scrutiny of a single lawgiver or
even of an entire generation.
"All other errors but disturb a state,
But innovation is the blow of fate."
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Not that he denies the value of a legislator who is thoroughly advised;
such a person with the adaptability to meet any emergency with intelligence, is better than any set of mechanical laws or provisions that can be
devised in advance. But with the difficulty of obtaining such a director
at any given time before his eyes-a difficulty that amounts to a virtual
impossibility-he recommends a prudential respect for antiquity and
tradition.
In the third place and finally, Plato's ideas are as moral as they are
aristocratic and conservative. The model of the just city is the just man.
And as the just man exists for virtue, as he finds his happiness and good
in virtue alone, so the just community exists for the same end and prospers
accordingly. That Plato overworks the similitude between the two cases,
must be granted. The main purpose, the higher justification of the
Republic resides in demonstrating that the happiness of the just is the
sole real and permanent good. The institution of the state is in one
sense a side issue, undertaken for that purpose. Hence Plato is continually forcing the analogy. But in any case his constant insistence upon
the necessity of virtue as a part of the very being of government, may
at least lead us to ask whether the modern divorce between morality and
public policy is altogether justified, whether it is not in some sense parallel
with the attempt to separate morality from literature and art. That our
civil government might be a little healthier for an infiltration of morality,
I suppose, no one will dispute. And that international affairs should be
conducted with some eye to moral considerations, would not be entirely
out of the way either. And yet this is not just the point. By considering
government from this point of view, Plato, like Burke at a much later
day, was saved from .making of politics a mere technology removed from
other concerns and artificially isolated as a wholly independent and selfsufficient study like physics or dynamics. On the contrary, he was able
by this means to keep in constant touch with human nature. In consequence he succeeded in reducing some of the eternal principles of the
subject to their very root in the moral consciousness. Arrd as a result,
while many of his shifts and expedients seem little better than ridiculous,
his general discussion has always commanded the attention and respect
of statesmen of all nationalities and all ages.
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